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SEQUEL

OF THE

POLICY OF ENGLAND

TOWARDS

SPAIN,

IN ANSWER TO THE

EARL OF CARNARVON'S WORK,

ENTITLED,

"PORTUGAL AND GALICIA,"

TO WHICH IS PREFIXED AN

Answer

TO AN ARTICLE IN THE QUARTERLY REVIEW, N°. CXV.

Southern, Henry, and Villiers, G. W. F., 4th earl of Clarendon.

LONDON:
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THE form in which the following pages appear, requires a few lines of explanation. It was stated in the Pamphlet entitled "Policy of England," &c. that the author had been induced to reply to Lord Carnarvon, because Lord Carnarvon's reputation and character gave weight to the errors into which he had fallen; and, upon like grounds, no notice was taken of certain attacks that appeared in the Tory Journals, nor of some unmannerly Pamphlets, in which the facts and arguments contained in the "Policy," &c. were impugned. The author entered the lists with Lord Carnarvon, and waited impatiently for his Lordship to take up the gauntlet that had been thrown down. His Lordship, however, gave no signs of life, and a respectable Review having published an attack upon the Pamphlet, the author determined upon answering

it. The Reply was actually in the Press when a second edition of Lord Carnarvon's work was announced, which there was good reason to believe was to be accompanied by some strictures upon the Pamphlet, and it was judged expedient to await its appearance.

The author might possibly have thought otherwise if he had been aware that so great a length of time would have taken place between its announcement and its publication; a delay of which the cause can be surmised, as well as the reason why the work appeared at the particular moment it did; and certainly those reasons are not to be looked for in that absence of party spirit to which his Lordship lays claim. The author now publishes his reply to the article in the Quarterly Review: for, although a portion of the general observations which that reply contains may be now somewhat out of date, subsequent events have only served to prove the correctness of what is advanced in them.

SEQUEL,

ETC. ETC.

An article has appeared in the Quarterly Review, which it would be most ungrateful on our part not to acknowledge, for we consider it the greatest triumph which has signalised our attempt to prevent the British public from being misguided, and to make known the whole truth upon a subject of great importance, as regards the foreign policy of our Government, and the interests of our country. Aware as we are of the combination of parliamentary and newspaper talent which has been employed in the attempt to refute our arguments, and contradict our facts, we confess we hardly expected that our adversaries, by the poverty of their statements, and the superabundance of their malice, should have allowed judgment to go by default.

Of the first portion of the Review we shall say nothing, as it consists only of extracts from Lord Carnarvon's work, occasionally broken by fragments of *original* matter, which, as they serve for a foil, and bring out in high relief the graceful style of the author of the work on Portugal and Galicia, we have no doubt will be viewed by his Lordship with the same feelings of thankfulness, which we

ourselves entertain towards the critic for the good offices he has done our pamphlet in the latter part of his Review. That this critic should reply to arguments by abuse, in which he certainly is no mean adept, is not wonderful; but we are surprised that the editor of the Quarterly Review should not, for his own credit, have expunged some of the vulgarities in which the article abounds, and which, though they sufficiently denote the tone of mind of the author, and the class to which he must belong, will surely be reprobated, even by those readers who adopt the Carlist principles of the Quarterly.

The Reviewer says that the pamphlet is the joint production of M. Mendizabal and the Foreign Office; "is marked by the spirit of stock-jobbing, and that we should laugh at all criticism, if we could find that our literary effort had raised Spanish bonds $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent." Now, we will venture to affirm that such a notion of "*the spirit*" in which our pamphlet was written, occurred just about as much to the numerous persons who have done us the honour to read our "literary effort," as did to ourselves the idea that Lord Carnarvon had an interest in depressing Spanish funds; and we shall therefore leave the Reviewer to the monopoly of his notion, and shall not stoop to repel such a charge. We will, however, assure this rebuker of "gentlemanlike misrepresentation," that the pamphlet is the production neither of Change Alley nor of Downing-street; that without any impulse from

either of those quarters, we were induced to write it solely by a desire of counteracting the effects which might be produced by the errors in Lord Carnarvon's work; and that M. Mendizabal is as innocent as the Reviewer himself of having "prepared the materials" for our pamphlet.

The Reviewer is pleased to state that we, or our "Downing-street auxiliary, endeavour at the outset to conciliate our readers by paying a just tribute to Lord Carnarvon's character," by which, if he means any thing beyond mere flippancy, he must intend to have it believed that the British public is so unanimously Carlist, and so much in love with Lord Carnarvon's advocacy of Carlism, that some previous propitiation was necessary to bring them to listen to any arguments on the other side—a view which we take leave to doubt.

To pay a just tribute to the talents or performances of an opponent previously to entering into discussion with him is, we apprehend, sufficiently in accordance with the usages of Parliament, of the Bar, and of society in general (though not perhaps in the habits of the Quarterly Review, or of the Morning Post), to save us from the charge of disguising timidity under the mask of conciliation. We had a double motive for saying what we did of Lord Carnarvon. It was a personal satisfaction to us to place on record our opinion of his Lordship, and our sense of his distinguished character and abilities, and the deference that any production of

his pen must meet with, made us wish to demonstrate the errors into which he had fallen. For like reasons it would never have occurred to us to reply to the ignorant and lowlived diatribes of the Morning Post upon the policy of the Government towards Spain, or indeed to the article which we are now commenting upon, were it not for the respectability of the Review in which it has been published, though there is internal evidence that the person charged with Spanish affairs in the Morning Post and the writer of the article we are replying to, are the same.

The writer declares that he, of course, cannot affect to enter into the voluminous details of a discussion upon the Basque Provinces, and we applaud his convenient reserve, but he picks out a few passages from our pamphlet upon what he calls the larger and more important questions, and upon their issue, he says, must rest the credit of the antagonist statements. Upon this ground we will meet him.

Lord Carnarvon has much more reason to complain of his indiscreet advocate than of our pamphlet. With respect to the Carlist party and the Infant's connexion with it, we shewed that his Lordship had been led into error; but the Reviewer proposes to himself to upset our statement and justify Lord Carnarvon's by "one or two private anecdotes," and proceeds to tell how a Spanish gentleman, now in London, when passing through Sara-

goza in 1833, was visited by Cuevillas, then a Brigadier, who assured him that the Royalist Volunteers were ready to come forward upon the summons of Don Carlos; that this was communicated to his Royal Highness, who returned for answer that his brother whilst alive was his king and theirs, and he should consider all those making similar offers as traitors.

Nothing discouraged, however, by this threat, it seems that Don Tomas Reyna went to the Infant, deputed by his regiment, the Horse Grenadiers of the Guard, on a similar message, and that the Count del Prado, Alcudia, Vallego, Belingero, and Col. Fulgocio, all did the same, and were all disapproved.

These anecdotes being, as the Reviewer declares, of a private nature, we cannot take upon ourselves to state whether they have any foundation or not; but this we know, that *Brigadier* Cuevillas in 1833 was a Captain, and by no means of a calibre likely to influence or to be able to engage for all the influential men of the Royalist Volunteers; that Don Tomas Reyna was a Lieutenant, and not likely to have been sent upon such a mission by his regiment; for although a part of the Horse Grenadiers were supposed to be disaffected, the majority were known to be Anti-Carlist. Alcudia was an ignorant bigotted man, who may possibly have made offers to Don Carlos, though we are very sure he never published having received such an answer as the

Reviewer attributes to Don Carlos. Vallego was the only clever man who frequented the Infant's apartments, but he was reckoned mad. The others are mere men of straw, and their devotion was cheap, for they had nothing to offer. But Don Carlos would listen to none of their offers, for the very reason which the Reviewer is so good as to supply us with—that they were made in 1833, when it was too late for intrigues, and when nothing but an open declaration of war against his brother could have served the Infant's cause: and that was forbidden by the discretion which has always been the better part of his Royal Highness's valour.

The Reviewer, however, with a simplicity in exposing himself, which is really laughable, says, that the offers were made "at a period when Don Carlos knew, as all the world now knows, that the advisers of the dying Ferdinand were preparing a violent change in the succession, to the exclusion of Don Carlos." Why, bless the mark! All the world, except the Reviewer, *then* knew that the King's illness at La Granja took place in 1832, and that in 1833 there was no advising, no preparing a change of succession, for every thing connected with it had been notorious in Europe for several months. The Reviewer obligingly adds, that it was "this intrigue (the preparing a change in the succession) which prompted those offers;" but as the intrigue could not at that time have

existed, may we without offence be permitted to infer the same with respect to the offers?

As the Reviewer, however, really must be desirous of *some* information upon the subject on which he has been writing, we assure him that he might as well attempt to make the people of Spain believe, that the Infant had not apartments in the Palace at Madrid, as that those apartments were not the focus of the Carlist plots, which were so abundant during the King's life. While we are upon this subject, as we do not wish to be left behind by the Reviewer, we also will contribute one or two anecdotes, but they shall not be private.

The Reviewer naturally never heard of Bessieres—but such a man existed nevertheless, and although originally, as it is said, a boot cleaner at Barcelona, and at one time actually condemned to death for a Republican, he ended by being a Major-General, and enjoying the complete confidence of the Infant, in whose "Cuarto" he was constantly to be seen; his plots and conspiracies carried on in the name of Don Carlos were notorious in Spain, and never disavowed by the Infant; but in 1826, (when none of those intrigues existed, which, in the Reviewer's opinion, justified Don Carlos in taking measures against the traitorous machinations of his enemies), having attempted at Guadajara to raise the country and to proclaim Don Carlos, he was taken and immediately shot with his companions; and if any one in this country believes that Bessieres acted

without the cognizance and secret approbation of Don Carlos, we can assure him that no one in Spain is of that opinion. Ferdinand's attachment to his brother was of the most tender description—in their relative positions this attachment amounted to weakness, for, although perfectly aware of the Infant's proceedings, he always attributed his conduct to the influence which the Infanta and the Princess of Beira exercised over him. He accordingly gave the most express orders, that whenever the evidence in the investigations of the different plots began to touch the Infant's "Cuarto," the investigation should be stopped, and the proceedings quashed.

In the inquiries instituted upon Bessieres's conspiracy, upwards of 30,000 persons were involved in different parts of the kingdom, but the evidence having been brought directly home to the Infant, every thing was stopped, and no one was punished. Upon one occasion, however, Recacho, the chief of police, led away by his zeal, disobeyed the Royal order, and placed on record the proofs he had obtained of Don Carlos's participation in a plot. Ricacho was banished.

In 1833, a great number of Gardes du Corps were sent away from Madrid for their Carlist opinions, and previously to their departure they went in numbers at a time to take leave of the Infant. When they came out of the "Cuarto," they boasted of the assurances they had received, that in a few

months things would be settled according to their mode of thinking, and they displayed the money that had been given to them.

We could mention the names and the acts of all those who formed the "Junta Magna de Don Carlos" in Madrid, and could go on *ad infinitum* recounting anecdotes upon a subject so notorious in Spain. But the patience of our readers must already be exhausted, and we will only add that the King, foreseeing the troubles that were likely to come upon the country, proposed upon two occasions to Don Carlos, that his son should be married to the present Queen, then Princess of Asturias, which was refused in the most peremptory terms by the Infant.

The Reviewer next, with every appearance of that bliss which ignorance sometimes produces, informs his readers that we have misstated the question of the Succession; and complains that we have not given the slightest hint why we called the Cortes of Philip V. a *mock* Cortes. We did not give this "*hint*" for the same reason for which, if we had been writing about the Commonwealth, we should have thought it unnecessary to explain why we called the Long Parliament *long*—it was because we thought that certain historical facts and denominations are sufficiently notorious not to require explanation; and that those who do not know them, would go and study before they exposed their ignorance by writing articles in Quarterly

Reviews. We did not enter into the question of the succession at any length, because we thought it would be a subject uninteresting to the English public; but as so much has been said upon the subject in Parliament, without the errors which certain Honourable Gentlemen fell into having been properly exposed, or the matter having been presented in a complete form, we entreat the attention of our readers to the following facts respecting this important and most grossly misrepresented question.

Almost before the war had ended, Philip V. resolved upon changing the order of succession to the Crown of Spain. Himself a foreigner, under the dominion of his wife also a foreigner, with a Court mainly consisting of foreigners, hardly seated on his throne, impelled by motives which cannot be considered as connected with any national interest, he determined upon repealing the law and custom which had obtained from time immemorial in his newly adopted country, and to the prevalence of which the Spanish nation attributed some of the happiest events of its history. A fundamental law too by which he, Philip V., himself derived his right to the throne, and for the maintenance of which the country had carried on so fearful a struggle, and had cheerfully made so many painful sacrifices.

A monarch so situated was bound to enact such repeal, to celebrate such a radical change, in the

most solemn and formal manner, and to call in to the support of the new law, all the authority and weight that could be afforded by the institutions of the country.

It so happens, however, that this annulment of the ancient law of succession was brought about in a way which would have invalidated even the most ordinary act.

The authorities which dwell upon this act are few,—but they are fatal to the pretensions of those who found their claims on the Spanish Salique law.

The Marquis of Sn. Felipe, who wrote his Memoirs of the War of Succession,* was a warm adherent of Philip V., a favoured courtier of his palace, and a general of his armies. He wrote his book in the lifetime of the King, and dedicated the work to his Majesty. It was to be expected that he would give as favourable a report as possible of a measure which he well knew was the private work of his Master, and of the Queen and her courtiers; and yet the substance of his narrative is sufficient to shew that the change was brought about by violence and intrigue, and after all was never legally enacted.

He states the consent of the Council of State to have been gained by the consummate art of the Queen.

* Commentarios de la querra de Espana i historia de sa Rey Phelipe V. por D. Vicente Bacallar y Sanna, Marques de Sn Phelipe, &c. &c. Genora, 4to. tom. ii. pp. 123, 4, 5.

That the Council of Castille, a body of the highest authority, and celebrated for its justice and wisdom, refused its consent, and that the King ordered its written decision to be burnt.

That the King subsequently insisted that each Councillor should give his opinion separately, in a sealed letter addressed to himself, which was done. With what result we are not informed; but we learn from another source,* that the President of this Council, Don Francisco Ronquillo, was for his obstinate adherence to his duty banished from Madrid.

Such were the auspices under which this new law set out; but it had still to undergo the indispensable solemnity of passing through the Cortes. What we learn on this head from Sn. Felipe is contradictory and obscure. In one place he states that the Cortes also at first refused their consent, (como nola admitieron los reinos), and afterwards he adds, that the measure was adopted "with the consent of all the cities in Cortes."

From other sources† we are enabled to clear up the difficulty. A Cortes had been held a few months previously in Madrid, for the purpose of receiving the King's renunciation of the throne of

* See Coxe et Muriel, in note, vol. ii. p. 142.—Mariana, Teoria de las Cortes, tom. ii. p. 95.

† See Belendo, Historia Civil de Espana des de 1700 à 1733, part 1. c. 92.—Historia de la Fundamental de Espana, &c. Por Don Pedro Saban y Larroga, &c.

France for himself, his heirs, and successors. To this Cortes it was probably proposed to adopt the new law of succession, a measure which they could not entertain, having been only convoked for a specific purpose, and having no powers to treat of other matters. When, however, this Cortes had concluded the business for which it had been summoned, and only twenty-seven of the Deputies remained in the capital, the King issued an edict directing those towns only whose representatives remained in Madrid, to send up powers to these particular individuals to treat of a new law of succession. A proceeding in direct violation of the law and practice as to the convocation of Cortes. Thus it was the King, and not the towns, that designated the Deputies to the Cortes; for, instead of summoning them to send up members, he said, these are the members adapted to my purpose, and I ordain that you send powers to them.*

Will any body deny that this was a *mock* Cortes. A Cortes which consisted only of the *rump* of a former one. From which all the cities of Catalonia, and several of those of Castille and Arragon,

* Con todo eso no se celebráron legitimamente ni en debeda forma, ni se despacháron cartas convocatorias, ni se hizo eleccion de procuradores por los ayuntamientos de las ciudades y villas de voto solamente se previnó y mandó á estos que enviasen sus poderes bastantes á los diputados de los reinos que á la sazon se hallaban en Madrid, de quienes no habia sospecha que dejasen de acceder servilmente á las insinuaciones del Gobierno."—Mariana, Teoria de las Cortes, vol. ii. p. 96.

were excluded; and which was summoned in a manner which violated all those principles of representation which had been held sacred by every King and Queen of Spain that had preceded Philip on the throne.

However, the Act was consummated, but it never was put in force. It is remarkable that it was not published as a law, but was registered among the Acts of Council, until in the new edition of the "Recopilacion de las Leyes" it was introduced among them by Reguera Valdelomar nearly a century after its enactment.* No case ever occurred in which it was called in question, and indeed it would appear that it was held as a dead letter: not only from the universal silence respecting it until it was repealed by Charles IV., but from a conclusion to be drawn from the practice of the Spanish Courts of Law.

It is a principle established in the laws of Spain, and confirmed by daily practice, that all "Mayorazgos" or entails where not otherwise specified by the will of the founder, follow the law of succession to the Crown, which is held to be the type of these institutions. Now had the new law of succession ever taken root in the country, or been regarded in any other light than as a Royal indiscretion, best buried in oblivion, some attempt would assuredly have been made to exclude the female successors in

* Novisima Recopilacion de las Leyes de Espana, &c. folio, Madrid, 1805.

Mayorazgos. Such an attempt has, however, never been made in a Spanish Court of Law, and no change in the practice in these cases has ever been contemplated.

We have stated that no occasion has ever arisen in which this new law of succession became applicable. Since the accession of Philip V. the crown has descended in a regular succession of males until it became vested in the present Queen. But according to Sn. Felipe,* the law did not only exclude females from the succession, in favour of the transversal line, but added "the circumstance and condition that the Prince should be born and bred in Spain." Now, if this be also the sense in which the law of Philip V. is to be taken, it has been more than forgotten, it has been treated with perfect contempt; for Charles IV., a Prince born and educated out of Spain, succeeded to his father without so much as a question being raised as to the place of his birth.

It is but just to state that this clause is not found in the law as published in the Novisima Recopilacion, and as this collection was formed by order of the Government of Charles IV. with whose title to

* "Pero con circunstancia y condicion que fuese este principe nacido y criado en Espana, porque de otra manera entraria al Trono el Principe Espanol enmidiato y en defecto de Principes Espanoles, la hembra mas proximo al ultimo Rey." — *Comentarios, &c.* tom. ii. p. 125.

the throne that clause conflicted, it is possible the text of the act has been tampered with.

There may be times when mighty motives of state, the prosperity of the nation, the decidedly expressed wish of the country at large, and other equally grave reasons may justify a departure from legal and long established forms. But we look in vain for any one of these reasons in the history of King Philip's Law of Succession. It was not for the sake of peace; the other countries of Europe were content with the solemn renunciation of the throne of France by Philip, and of the throne of Spain by Louis XIV. Peace was already made, except with Austria, and certainly the new law of succession was not made to conciliate that power: for by naming the house of Savoy to succeed to the throne in case of the extinction of the line of Philip V. it pointedly excluded the claims of Austria, and may so far be considered as having been hostile to the Imperial Court.

Neither could the motive be to prevent practically the junction of the Crowns of France and Spain, by the perpetually excluding from the throne of Spain a female who might intermarry with a king of France. For the new law of succession was not the Salique law of France as is generally supposed—and this, if any thing were wanting, would prove that unfortunate law to have been a mere Court play-thing, a whim of the Queen, who possessed uncontrolled power over her feeble con-

sort, and who fancied that she was in some way or other favoring the House of Savoy, of which she was a most devoted daughter. Females were not *excluded* from the Throne of Spain by the law of Philip V., they were only *postponed.*

The following is an extract from* "The New Regulation of the Succession in these Realms," dated in Madrid, 10th May, 1713:—

"And being wholly extinct, the masculine lines of the Prince (his eldest son), the Infant (his other son), and other sons and my descendants, legitimate males of males, and there being in consequence no male of the right line my legitimate descendant, on whom the crown may fall according to the rules above laid down,† *there shall succeed in these realms the daughter or daughters of the last reigning male of my right line, in whom the male offspring have become extinct, &c.*"

Hence it is clear, that not even an European, much less a Spanish object was to be served by this capricious law; nevertheless it has been over and over again stated with inexcusable ignorance, or with unblushing disregard of truth, that the salique law of Spain was guaranteed by the treaty of Utrecht, and had thus become part of the international obligations of Spain. We have shewn that such gua-

* Novisima Recopilacion, Lib. iii. Tit. 1, Ley 5.

† "Suceda en dichos Reynos la hija ó hijas del ultimo reynante varon agnado mio, en quien feneciese la varonia, y por cuya muerte," &c.

rantee would serve the purpose of none of the powers who signed the different treaties of Utrecht, and consequently it was not likely to be made a condition in any of those treaties; and accordingly we find that in no part of any of them is mention made of any such matter; and though writers on this subject have so often referred to those treaties, no one has quoted or specified a passage which has the slightest relation to the subject.

Philip V. himself, in the preamble of the law, put forward no political motive whatever for the act: he dwells on the advice of his Council of State, which was cajoled, of his Council of Castille, which was forced, and on the consent of the Cortes, which was packed, and on his right to regulate his own family affairs; as if the long and bloody war through which he had just waded to the throne, had not sufficiently proved to him that the succession to a crown was anything but *a family affair*— and thus concludes, *for such is my will.**

In this state the new law of succession remained during the lifetime of its author, Philip V., who died in 1746, and during the quiet reign of Ferdinand VI., who having neither offspring nor hopes of any, was succeeded by his brother Charles III. of Naples. In the subsequent reign of Charles IV.

* "Que asi es mi voluntad." Of this expression says Mariana in his Teoria de los Cortes, "Se podria imaginar expresion mas violenta, mas repugnante à las leyes del order moral, y mas injuriosa à una nacion libre."

when two of the most illustrious men whom modern Spain has known, Campomanes and Floridablanca, prevailed in the Royal councils, it was determined to settle any doubts to which the innovation made by Philip V. in the succession might in future give rise, and to restore the ancient law to its former undisputed authority.

The Cortes were summoned with all the formalities and solemnities used from time immemorial in the celebration of their meetings, and one of the first matters treated of was the express annulment of the law of Philip V.

The proposition was made to the Cortes by their President, Campomanes; who, after recounting the innumerable blessings which the country owed to its ancient fundamental law, thus, in a few lines, sets the whole question at rest.

"The experience of so many centuries has proved that it behoves Spain to keep her ancient laws, and the immemorial custom laid down in the Law 5, title xv. part ii., that females be admitted to the Crown by virtue of the said law, if of the preferable and elder line, and be not put after males farther removed.

"Although in the year 1712 an attempt was made (*se trató*) to change this regular method, for some motives adapted to the circumstances of that time, and which no longer exist, that which was then effected cannot be deemed fundamental law, by reason of its being contrary to those then in

force and sworn to, and by reason that the nation *(reino)* neither asked for, nor treated of so notable an alteration in the succession of the Crown, by which the nearest lines became excluded from the succession, not only females but males.

" If now in time of tranquillity a radical remedy be not applied to this change, great wars and disturbances may be expected and dreaded, such as those which occurred at the time of the succession of Philip V., all which will be guarded against, if it is now ordered that we keep our laws and ancient customs, observed for more than 700 years in the succession of the Crown."

The Cortes adopted unanimously the proposition of their illustrious President, and presented a petition to the King. That petition is brief and forcible; it runs as follows:*—

" Sire,—By the law II. tit. xv. part ii. is enacted

* See Ilustracion de la Ley Fundamental de Espana, p. 78, and Discurso Historico Legal, &c. p. 76.

" Senor,—Por la ley 2ª, titulo 15, partida 2ª, está dispuesto lo que se ha observado de tiempo inmemorial, y lo que se debe observar en la sucesion de estos reinos," &c. And afterwards, " Por lo que suplican las Cortes á V. M. que sin embargo de la Novedad hecha en el auto acordado 5°, titulo 7°, libro 5°, se sirva mandar se observe y guarde perpetuamente en la sucesion de la monarquia dicha costumbre inmemorial atestiguada en la citada ley 2ª, titulo 15, partida 2ª, como scimpre se observó y guardó y como fue jurada por los Reyes anticesores de V. M. publicandose ley y pragmatica hecha y formada en Cortes, por lo cual conste esta resolucion y la derogacion de dicho Auto Acordado."—*Buen Retiro on the State of the Cortes*, 30th Sept. 1789.

that which has been observed time immemorial, and that which ought to be observed in the succession of these realms, experience having proved its great usefulness; for by it were united the realms of Castille and Leon, and those of the Crown of Aragon, according to the succession pointed out in that law, and the contrary has caused wars and tumults.

"For which reason the Cortes beseech your Majesty, that without regard to the innovation made by the 'accorded act,' V. tit. vii. book v., your Majesty will please to order to be observed and kept perpetually in the succession of this monarchy the said immemorial custom laid down in the said law, II. tit. xv. part ii., as was always observed and kept, and as was sworn to by the predecessors of your Majesty, publishing the law and the Pragmatic Sanction, by which this resolution may appear and the annulment of the said 'accorded act.'"

The King resolving that nothing should be wanting to give force to the measure, formally consulted the fourteen Bishops and Archbishops who had been summoned to swear allegiance to the Prince of Asturias (the late king Ferdinand).

The answer of this grave assembly is still on record, and if we were not afraid of overloading this statement with documents, we would quote it at length. Their opinion was in brief this, that Philip V. had not the right to alter the fundamental law, as they prove, His Majesty "ought in conscience and justice to accede to the solicitude of the Cortes (los temos)."

Being now not only convinced of the necessity of the measure, but having taken every step the importance of the occasion required, the King answered the Cortes as follows:

"To this I answer you that I will command those of my Council to expedite the Pragmatic Sanction which in similar cases is right and customary, bearing in mind your petition and the opinions that have been taken."*

This resolution of the King was published in the sitting of Cortes held 31st October, 1789, together with other answers given to other petitions of that body to the Throne.

At the same time, however, a decree of His Majesty was read, calling upon the Procuradores to keep the resolution a secret "until the publication of the Pragmatic Sanction at the time which His Majesty in his wisdom should hold to be convenient."

The law was accordingly deposited in the archives of the Secretary of State, sealed up in a cover on which was written "Reservad solo a S. M." And there it remained until it was ordered to be published by His Majesty's son and successor, Ferdinand VII., in his royal cedula of the 29th March,

* Aesto os respondo, que ordenaré à los de mi Consejo espedir la pragmatica sancion que en tales casas corresponde y se acostumbre, teniendo presente vuestra suplica y los dictámenes que sobre ella haya tomado." — *See Discurso Historico-legal, and Appendix, p. 77.*

1830, who thus completed in point of form all that was wanting to the act of his father.

Thus on one side of the question we have the "Reglamento" of the Succession (for no one ventured to call it a law) of Philip V. got up under the circumstances we have stated, and in abrogation of a solemn law of partida, rooted in ancient practice, and having as fast a hold of the opinions and prejudices of the people as our own law of succession (to which it is precisely similar) has in England.

On the other hand, if Philip V. could annul a law of partida, surely Charles IV. could annul a reglamento of Philip V. To say nothing of the repeal of that reglamento being a mere return to the ancient law, the modern regulation never having been recognised nor put in practice. For the details of the proceedings in the Cortes of 1789 we are chiefly indebted to the documents and papers published by Count Floridablanca.* This distinguished statesman was at the time Minister of Grace and Justice to Charles IV. a chief actor in the proceedings of the Cortes, and the adviser of his Monarch on the occasion.

In the Constitution of 1812 the ancient law of succession was once more solemnly promulgated. Ferdinand VII. having abolished the Constitution

* See Histbria de la Ley Fundamental de Espana, por Don Pedro Saban y Larroga, &c.—See also Appendix to Discurso Historico-legal sobre el derecho de la Princesa Isabel Luisa à la sucesion à la Corona, por Don José de la Pena y Agayo, &c.

could not of course refer to its authority: but he did exactly what the Cortes of 1812 had done; he founded his act upon the proceedings of the Cortes in the reign of his father, and fulfilled the only formality requisite to annul the Regulation of Philip V. according to the ancient usages of Spanish legislation.

If the reader has followed us through the above abstract of the facts and documents of this question, which has been so much talked of and written about, and so little understood or enquired into in England, he will be able duly to estimate the qualifications of the Reviewer for examining or refuting our pamphlet.

It would be difficult, even in the annals of reviewing, to find a paragraph in which ignorance and presumption were combined in so happy a degree, as in the one which we shall take the trouble to quote for the purpose of exposure.

Quarterly Review, No. 115, *p.* 285.

"(1) The author's whole argument on this point (the question of the succession) rests on a single word. He calls the Cortes—which under Philip V. in 1713 proclaimed the Salique law, which excluded females, to be the law of the land—a *mock* Cortes—that is the whole and sole argument: but *how* it was a *mock* Cortes, in *what* the mockery or illegality consisted, there is not the slightest hint. The Jacobites called the Convention Parliament, which settled the British succession, a mock Parliament; and certainly with more plausibility than we believe the author, if he had condescended to attempt to prove his fact, could have impugned the Cortes of 1713. But he has not only left his epithet *mock* devoid of

any kind of proof or support, but he has omitted to notice two other most important features in the case.(2) The first is, that whether Philip V. and his Cortes were right or wrong, Ferdinand at least had no right to gainsay their acts: he derived from them his whole right to the Crown, and he had therefore no colour or pretext of right to exclude by a (3) secret and merely personal act of his own, the rights of his brother Don Carlos, which, with regard to the (4) *succession*, were identically the same with Ferdinand's right to the possession. Ferdinand had only a life-interest in the Crown, and it was (5) a 'mockery' of all legality, and all justice, that he should pretend to dispose of the vested rights of his brother, and the (6) constitutional allegiance of the nation. And by (7) *will* too; what pretext was there that any such alteration in the constitution of Spain could be made by *will?* and such a will! made (8) secretly in 1830, in 1832 secretly revoked, in 1833 again secretly and in *articulo mortis* revived. And let us (9) further observe, that the settlement of the succession under Philip V. was ratified by the Treaty of Utrecht, and was therefore become part of the international law of Europe. (10) If we felt the least public interest in this question of the succession, *these are a few of the observations which we think it would very much puzzle the author to reply to.*"

(1) We have already supplied the Reviewer with the information as to what was meant by the term "mock" Cortes—and he will probably not again compare the convention Parliament of England with the twenty-seven Deputies, the straggling remains of a former Cortes, ordered to be invested with new powers by a Sovereign who declared that, as the head of his family, it was his right to arrange the succession of the crown as he pleased.

(2) How is it that Ferdinand derived his whole right to the crown through Philip V. and the Cortes? It is true that Ferdinand was a lineal descendant of Philip V., just as Philip V. was of Philip IV.; therefore he may thus be said to derive his whole right to the crown through Philip V.: but in the same manner it may be said he owed his whole right to Philip IV. or Philip II. But the Reviewer's phrase is "Philip V. and his Cortes." It therefore refers to some act of that King and of the Cortes in conjunction: but there is no such act which affects the succession, unless it is the change made by the reglamento. But is the Reviewer not aware that the Salique law of Philip V. has *never* been acted upon, or does he choose to suppose that since the enactment of the said law, females have been put aside for the admission of males, and thus the claim of Ferdinand had been derived from "Philip V. and his Cortes." This appears an almost incredible instance of carelessness as to historical facts, but our readers will speedily find it is neither the only one, nor the most flagrant to be found in this single paragraph of the Quarterly Review.

(3) The Reviewer says that Ferdinand "had no colour or pretext of right to exclude *by a secret and merely personal act* of his own, the rights of his brother Don Carlos." He did not do so, by any secret or personal act. The act as we have seen, the "Pragmatic Sanction," was promulgated in the usual form of a Royal cedula. And so far was it

from *secret*, that it was published in the Madrid Gazette, and circulated in print to every authority in the kingdom.

Neither was it any mere act of one sovereign, but the completion of the formalities of a law that had passed the Cortes, and had received the solemn assent of his predecessor on the throne, the then reigning monarch. Neither was this pragmatic sanction published under any immediate pressure of circumstances. It is true that it had direct reference to the daughter of Ferdinand, the present Queen Isabel of Spain: but at that time Ferdinand was neither old nor infirm, his wife was young and beautiful, and had at the moment been three months pregnant. This child, which she was then bearing, was born six months after the publication of the pragmatic sanction, and proved a female, the present Infanta Donna Maria Isabel Luisa. But at the time of the promulgation of the act, the chances of sex were equal, and had the offspring proved male no immediate question would have arisen, and the act of Ferdinand never would have been disputed.

(4) Don Carlos's rights to the *succession* were not identically the same with Ferdinand's right to the *possession*, and it is a strange perversion of fact to say so. Ferdinand's right to the possession was *undisputed*—being according to all the laws and customs of the land. Don Carlos's right to the *succession* rested upon a *disputed* regulation, which

had been formerly annulled, and had never been acted upon.

(5) Ferdinand, it is true, had only a life interest in the Crown, but it was no "mockery" in him solemnly to decree that the resolution of his father and of the Cortes of 1789 should come into force, and that the ancient and unbroken law of succession should be held in respect. If Philip V. could annul a fundamental law, surely, even according to the Reviewer's doctrines, Ferdinand VII. could revive one. Ferdinand had even a far better right than Philip to begin a law in the language of the Reglamento, in order that

"For the laying down a rule adapted to the convenience of the interior of my own family and descendants I (Philip V.) may pass as the first and most interested, and master to dispose of its establishment"—but he did not do so: he strictly followed the laws and customs of his ancestors and his country, and established his daughter's rights on a footing that nothing but the blindness and bigotry of Don Carlos and his advisers would have ventured to dispute.

(6) If anything is meant by the "constitutional allegiance" of the nation, the whole of the constitutional allegiance of the nation was the inheritance of the Queen, without any act or disposition of her father.

(7) And by *will* too! Can ignorance in this reading country be carried to such an extravagant

pitch? and in the Quarterly Review too!—the censor and judge of the literature of the day? !

(8)—but "a will made *secretly* in 1830."—By this is meant the Pragmatic Sanction, universally published on the 29th March, 1830. "In 1832 secretly revoked." By this is meant not a will—but a Royal decree revoking the Pragmatic Sanction, *secretly* and *violently* forced from the King, when apparently dying, by a band of conspirators at La Granja. "In 1833 again secretly and *in articulo mortis* revived."

When the King recovered from his seeming death, indignant at the infamous use which had been made of the state of insensibility and weakness to which he had been reduced by disease, he called together all his ministers and councillors, the Archbishop of Toledo, and the heads of all the different classes of the nobility, the deputation of Cortes, the deputation of the northern provinces, and the chiefs of the commerce of Madrid, on the last day of the year 1832.

When they were assembled before him, His Majesty put into the hands of Count Fernandez del Pino, his Minister of Grace and Justice, a Royal decree, one of the most remarkable documents perhaps to be found in the history of royalty. This decree was immediately read before him, and gives a most forcible account of the manner in which disloyal and misguided men had surrounded his bed, and surprising his royal mind in the agony of a

dangerous infirmity, from which he had been wonderfully preserved by the mercy of God, had caused him to sign a decree annulling the Pragmatic Sanction of the 29th March, decreed by his august father at the petition of his Cortes in 1789, which, as the King goes on to declare, "I could neither do as a King, for by so doing I should destroy the fundamental laws of the State, nor as a father, for I should thus despoil my own daughter of her inheritance."

The account of this solemn proceeding with the Royal Decree, and the names of all the distinguished individuals summoned, was officially published the subsequent day in the Gazette of Madrid, 1st of January, 1833,—nine months previous to the death of the King.

This is the secret revival in 1833, and *in articulo mortis*, of a will, according to the enlightened Quarterly Reviewer of 1837.

(9) We have already stated that the settlement of the Spanish succession is nowhere mentioned or alluded to in the treaties of Utrecht; and that it neither has nor can become any part of the international law of Europe by these treaties, or by any others that have as yet been concluded.

(10) The Reviewer considers we should be very much puzzled to answer his observations, and we leave him to judge of the extent of our embarrassment. Lord Carnarvon also appears equally to have deceived himself when (p. 264, 2nd edit.) he

stated that we should find it no easy matter to demonstrate that the Crown or the Cortes of that day were guilty of disregarding any formality essential to the act, or of any moment whatever.

There is no question of politics with respect to which fallacy appears to us more easy, than that of intervention, and none upon which party spirit can more readily misrepresent those exceptions which are inherent to every general rule, and accordingly there is no ground of attack against the foreign policy of the present Government, upon which the Tories conceive themselves to be stronger than those principles of non-intervention, laid down by the Whigs before coming into office in 1830: but no act of their administration appears to us more capable of defence than the intervention of England in favour of Spain, (we say Spain, because we are now treating of that country, though the policy has been equally justifiable as regards other countries); that is to say, if the various circumstances which *ought* to be taken into consideration are maturely weighed.

In public affairs as in those of private life (the latter, by the way, being no bad guide for the management of the former), it is easy to vilify the conduct or misrepresent the intentions of a government, or an individual, by putting forward that which suits the purpose of the moment, and keeping out of view those different considerations which render evidence complete, and are indispensable for impartial judg-

ment. We readily admit that the principle of not wantonly meddling in the affairs of our neighbour is essential to the well-being of society. The man, or the government, which proclaimed a contrary doctrine would be a public nuisance; but does this prevent me when my neighbour's house is on fire from assisting to extinguish it? Am I not to see that "mea res agitur paries cum proximus ardet," and am I to be accessory to my own injury because as yet the adjoining wall only is on fire? Have I no interest in arresting the hand of the incendiary, because he applies the brand to the next house and not to my own? Am I, when I see my friend attacked by robbers, to turn a deaf ear to his entreaties for aid, because my maxim is, not to meddle with other people's affairs, because his loss may not affect me? because his life and not mine may be in danger? The precepts of Christianity, every unselfish principle that man should most cherish, that due regard for our own interest which is inherent in us, are unerring guides upon such occasions:—and thus it occurs with Governments: we care not whether they be Whig or Tory, for both are alike subject to, and both must alike bend to, the varying course of human events. The Whigs proclaimed the general principle of non-intervention in the affairs of other countries;—but did any reasonable man ever see in that declaration a denial that the time might come, or circumstances might arise, when it would be for the honour or the in-

terests of England to have recourse to any of the various modes by which one country may intervene in the affairs of another, or that if such occasions did arise, the honour of England was to be stained and her interests set aside, in order that no exception should be made to that which was not, could not, be other than a general rule.

Supposing that Prussia, in order to extend her commercial system, sought to take forcible possession of Belgium—ought we to remain tame spectators of such usurpation, and submit to an armed exclusion of our manufactures? And if we did so, how furious, but how just, would be the attacks of the Tories, upon an adherence to a general principle which had brought upon us such dishonour? Should it please Russia to intervene in the affairs of Turkey by sending 100,000 men to collect the debt that is owing to her, are we, regardless of our interests in the East, to turn a deaf ear to the Sultan's prayers for succour, allow ourselves to be ejected from the Mediterranean, and succumb to the designs upon our Indian possessions, which Russia is supposed to entertain. If the Tories would advocate such baseness, the country would be ill inclined to submit to it; but let such a fact once go forth, that England is bound hand and foot by a fixed principle, that she is rendered immoveable by it; and then there is an end at once to her greatness, her glory, and her power of being useful. England would be politically dead. Yet it is to no

less a risk than this that the Tories would expose us, if they are sincere in their desire to restrict the Government to their own interpretation of the supposed pledge of the Whigs. Why, however, when his Majesty announced last year, in his speech from the throne, that he had successfully mediated between France and the United States, why did not the Tories attack that act of policy, which was as much an exception to the general rule of non-intervention as any that has taken place in the Peninsula? even a more flagrant one—for we at the same time intervened in the affairs of two foreign nations. The Tories, if they pretend to honesty and consistency, should on that occasion have said—"It is true that a trifling misunderstanding existed between two great nations, which might have ripened into a quarrel, but which the mediation of a common ally might settle; you were bound, however, not to have interfered or prevented a maritime war, from which the whole world might have suffered, and in which England might ultimately have been involved." Would they have dared to use such language? Could they have faced the indignation it must have created? Yet their opposition to the Government upon the Spanish question is not one jot more reasonable. They say—"You declared yourselves for non-intervention, and yet you have given arms to the Queen's soldiers, and the flag of England is on the coasts of Cantabria; you are therefore inconsistent and revolutionary; you

have disgraced yourselves and your country."—Carefully keeping out of sight the causes that led to that intervention, and the English objects that are to be served by it, they appeal to all those feelings which can be enlisted in behalf of *conservatism* and economy—they say, the Government is advocating the cause of revolution in Spain, but we trust we have shewn in our pamphlet that it is not the cause of revolution in Spain that has been supported by England, and moreover, that the real cause of revolution there, is the cause of Don Carlos; and when they urge the plea of expense, we say that England is not yet so poor in spirit and in means, that she will not cheerfully submit to sacrifices comparatively trifling, that may tend to augment her power and influence. The real secret, however, is, that the Tories dread to see the spread of liberal institutions, and hate all that may be displeasing, or serve as a check to their new ally, and model for good government, the Emperor of Russia. Were he condescendingly to approve the policy of His Majesty's Government, the fire of vituperation from the Tory Dii Minores would soon slacken, and we should hear in Parliament less of that language, which in coarser strain has been adopted by our Reviewer. He styles the policy of England towards Spain "the height of impudence and apostacy," "a breach of pledge," "and desertion of principle," "a forfeiture of national faith," "and can hardly refrain (!) from calling them

scandalous tergiversations." Our vocabulary not being as rich as the Reviewer's, we at once decline fighting him with his own arms: but we cannot help admiring in him a new instance of the bounty of nature, who always ordains that where venom exists, its countervailing antidote shall not be found wanting. The Reviewer has in the present case assisted nature in her beneficent designs, and brought his own antidote with him: for in support of his attempt to poison the truth, he quotes two speeches of Lord Lansdowne's and Lord Grey's, the latter, according to his own words, enforcing the policy of the former, in which is advocated the abstinence on the part of England from the appearance of all intervention (in the affairs of Belgium) even *by way of advice*, unless it was required by the people of that country themselves.—"*Unless it was required by the people of that country themselves.*" Here we take our stand—not because we could not adduce abundant proof of the consistency of the Government—but because we are quite satisfied with that which the Reviewer has provided, for no one who has paid the slightest attention to the affairs of Spain for the last three years, will hesitate to admit that such intervention as we have afforded, (and its only fault is the smallness of its amount) has been *required by the people of Spain.* When we say the people of Spain, we are not talking of the whole of the inhabitants, and we do not suppose either the Quarterly Review, or the Morn-

ing Post, would require universal suffrage; but we mean the Government of Spain—that Government which was invested with all the attributes of authority—which was exercising all the functions of government; which was in possession of the whole country with a small exception, of all the colonies, and of all the revenue of the State; and which having been formerly recognised in nearly every town and village, was constituted by the people as their legitimate representative with Foreign Powers. This Government asked our intervention—we as well as France were entreated to give it, by the Ministers (M. Martinez de la Rosa and Count Toreno) most jealous of the national honour, and well known for their long opposition to foreign interference: but who at last acknowledged the necessity of it, not because the physical means were wanting to put an end to the struggle, but because the moral force which intervention would have given, was absolutely necessary for the purpose, and afforded the best chance of speedily consolidating the Government, and securing the peace of Europe. On the other hand, the prolongation of a war of opinions was certain to call into activity revolutionary principles, the most adverse to the prosperity of Spain, and the most dreaded in other countries.

This urgent entreaty of the Spanish Government was backed by public opinion in Spain, by the Cortes, by almost the whole of the periodical press, by all the influential classes of society, and as we

have stated in our pamphlet, by the Carlist chiefs themselves; but so disinclined was the English Government to depart unnecessarily from the rule of non-interference which they had laid down, and so determined were they not to do so without ample cause being shewn for it, that they declared the time was not yet come for making the exception to their general principle, and urged the Spanish Government still to trust to the national resources for putting an end to the civil war.

Again, however, was the application made some months afterwards, and in terms, if possible, still more urgent. The French Government refused upon French grounds alone, but did not deny that the measure might be advantageous for Spain. The English Government admitted that the time was at length come when such means as they could command ought to be placed at the disposal of the Queen of Spain, and some extension was then given to the Quadrupal Treaty. Those means, according to that treaty, were only naval, but they would have amply sufficed if France had adopted a similar course—but in affording this limited assistance, how, we ask, were Lord Lansdowne and Lord Grey inconsistent with their former professions? or how did Lord Palmerston differ from his colleagues when in the speech also quoted by the Reviewer, he stated, "that one nation has no right to control by force of arms the will of another nation in the choice of its Government or rulers?"

No such right was ever claimed by England, nor any such question mooted as regards Spain. For Spain *had* made choice of her Government, and her rulers. That Government indeed was weak, and called upon us to help it to remove the embarrassments which prevented it from being strong, and we did not refuse, because in the consolidation of the Queen's Government, some of the most important interests of England were concerned. We conclude that no impartial man will argue that our recognition of the Queen was an act of intervention, or deny that (setting aside those more extended views of policy which we endeavoured to expound in our pamphlet) it was as little open to England to have taken a different course, as to have hesitated to recognise the Emperor Nicholas, in order to see whether the Russian army might make good their predilections in favour of the Grand Duke Constantine, or whether the nation would adopt the will of Alexander, by which the order of succession to the throne had been changed.

The Morning Post and the Quarterly Review have no right to suppose that, because they were ignorant of all that had taken place with respect to female succession to the throne of Spain in the time of Philip V. of Charles IV. and of Ferdinand VII., his Majesty's Government were so likewise. *They* knew that right was on the side of the Queen, and they acted upon their knowledge. We are quite willing to appeal to the Duke of Wellington, Lord

Aberdeen, and Sir R. Peel, upon this part of the Spanish question, and to abide by their answer, as to whether they would have acted differently. We suspect, moreover, that these Statesmen see very sufficient reason (though it is possible that the writers in the Post and Quarterly Review may not) for desiring that the Queen may continue to reign, and that Don Carlos and his family may be for ever excluded from the throne.

We had a cogent interest in assisting the Spanish nation to extinguish the civil war caused by a Pretender to the Throne, who deliberately deluged his country with blood in order to promote his illegal claims, and to that object, and no other, we lent our co-operation. When, therefore, the Reviewer affirms that England has given to Spain Constitutions and Governments—that she has guaranteed the Estatuto—and has encouraged revolutions—he affirms that which is utterly false, and which he has no more reason for believing to be true than that the British Minister at Madrid "meddles himself in all the petty personal intrigues of the Court and Cabinet;" and we say so, because the only authorities he quotes for the statement, are *two French Newspapers*, one of them the National, the organ of the Republican party in France, and delighting in indiscriminate abuse of England and Englishmen—the other, the Gazette de France, the organ of the Carlists, and known throughout Europe for its unblushing system of falsehood. The British Govern-

ment and their agents abroad, can only feel pleased at having merited the disapprobation of those parties and their newspapers, and the British public, at the same time that it duly appreciates the *animus* of the Reviewer, and the value of his testimony, will probably infer that in Spain at least, both the Government and agent have done their duty.

The Reviewer *finds* that our "political meddling" in Spain tends only to our commercial detriment, and for his discovery he is indebted to a misquoted or misunderstood speech of M. Guizot's.

M. Guizot said, that if French interests were likely to be interfered with by any particular arrangement with England, measures were taken to prevent such arrangements. Whether M. Guizot said such measures were or would be taken, there appears some doubt on reference to the reports of his speech—if the latter, we reply, why should the French Government not take such measures? Should we not do the same, if English interests were endangered in Spain by any arrangement with France? But does that prove that any such arrangements *were* ever proposed on the part of England? We believe it would puzzle the Reviewer to state what exclusive advantages in Spain England has ever sought—and any improvement in the commercial system of Spain would be fully as beneficial to France as to England. No arrangements then detrimental to France having been contemplated, the preventive measures of the French Go-

vernment cannot have been resorted to; and if M. Guizot affirmed that they *had*, we can only say, that it is one of those *lapsus linguæ* to which even the most cautious speakers are occasionally liable in the heat of debate, and when answering an opponent.

Yet the Reviewer, upon this speech of M. Guizot's, states that England and France have rival interests in Spain, and that their mode of negociating with their unfortunate ally is not only disgraceful, but a burglarious interference with national independence! We cannot condescend to answer this. That our commercial interests in Spain have not been neglected, we feel as certain as that there was no intention on the part of our Government to seek any advantages for England, in which France should not to the fullest extent participate. It is possible that the Spanish Government may not yet have discovered that the real interests of Spain would be best promoted by liberalizing her commercial system, and that by checking the vast contraband trade which is now carried on, the morality and the revenue of the country might be infinitely increased. It is possible that the Spanish Government may be indisposed, at a moment of civil war, to introduce extensive fiscal changes, or that our own Government may not be able to make the corresponding reductions which Spain might in reciprocity expect: but sure we are, that her Majesty's Ministers have not neglected their duty upon this matter; for they

must well know that the political alliance which they are seeking to establish with Spain, cannot be durable, cannot be relied upon, unless it is based upon the substantial interests of both countries, and upon the means which each may possess of being useful to the other.

Here we should close our reply to the principal attacks which have been made upon our pamphlet, and should certainly not notice any which have appeared in the Morning Post, were it not that Mr. Grove Price, in his rhapsody upon Spanish affairs, thought proper to allude to two letters published in that journal from Mr. Henningsen and Mr. Honan. Out of respect for ourselves and for the House of Commons, but certainly from no such feelings for the opinions of the late member for Sandwich, we deem it expedient to say a few words upon those letters.

Mr. Henningsen writes in a tone which does not merit much courtesy on our part, though we are not inclined to quarrel with the enthusiasm he displays in favour of his friend. Mr. Henningsen, with reference to Zumalacarregui's death, implies that we have (in a note, page 88) mistaken his meaning. What he says, however, in his letter is so mixed up with his vindication of Zumalacarregui's character, that we do not clearly understand whether he asserts that he never suspected that that officer did not die fairly of his wound. Mr. Henningsen in his book had dwelt upon the "very

trifling" nature of the wound, which was in fact from a spent musket ball in the leg—upon the expectation of his speedy recovery entertained by the surgeons, the English surgeon only differing from the Spanish in fixing a shorter period for that recovery—upon the dismissal of the English surgeon, and upon the removal of Zumalacarregui to a distant part of the country; and finally in his own words, upon "the over-dose of opium" which was administered to him just before his death. All these details certainly left upon our mind the impression, that his friends as well as his enemies had been accessory to his death. If Mr. Henningsen, however, will declare that he never entertained any opinion of that sort, we will readily express our regret at having mistaken him; and refer for our authority for what in the text we have put doubtfully, to the universal impression which exists in Spain. We had no intention to malign Zumalacarregui, nor have we done so. We stated that we had no wish to "detract from the merit or to disparage the talent of" the Carlist chief; and we probably should have made but a passing allusion to him, had we not thought it necessary to state facts within our knowledge in refutation of certain passages in Lord Carnarvon's work. We now repeat what we before stated with regard to Zumalacarregui's behaviour towards Don Carlos. We do so moreover with even greater confidence than before; for we have recently made further enquiries upon

the subject, and from some friends of Zumalacarregui we have learned that he justified his conduct in this respect upon the plea of absolute necessity, and upon the ground that if he had permitted the Prince even to think he could have his own way, both the army and the cause would have been sacrificed to the intrigues of the priests and courtiers by whom Don Carlos was surrounded. In this Zumalacarregui probably acted with judgment; we were not investigating his motives—we confined ourselves to the fact; and we will give a proof that this fact was well known in the country, and that the supremacy of Zumalacarregui was generally acknowledged. Upon one occasion when Don Carlos arrived with his General at Villafranca, he ordered mass to be said on the following morning at ten o'clock. The functionaries of the cathedral made no objection, but immediately went to Zumalacarregui to state among other reasons for not obeying the royal order, that the sacred vessels were all buried, and that they should be exposed to great risk if they were then to dig them up. The General desired that they would give themselves no trouble, as the King should not hear mass; and on the following morning, shortly before the time when Don Carlos was to have gone to the cathedral, he was informed that the troops were about to march, and that his Majesty must accompany them.

With respect to the intercepted dispatches, we derived our information from the concurrent testi-

mony of various persons, as incapable, as they were without motive for deceiving us, and we have no doubt as to the veracity of their statements, notwithstanding Mr. Henningsen's declaration, "that none of his (Zumalacarregui's) dispatches ever were intercepted." Mr. Henningsen may imagine that he enjoyed the entire confidence of the Carlist chief, but he should remember that a young man and a foreigner, a stranger to the country and to the service, might *possibly* not know every thing, or always be told that which there was a powerful motive for concealing.

We have every reason for believing that if Zumalacarregui had not been deprived of his regiment, (after having been acquitted of some charges which were brought against him) and if he had not been treated with injustice and harshness by Quesada, he would never have joined the ranks of the Pretender. That he had Carlist predilections is true; but not to the extent that Mr. Henningsen supposes. This may be inferred from the fact, that when commanding in Ferrol in the year 1832, a popular commotion took place, and Zumalacarregui issued a proclamation to the people, at the bottom of which was "Viva el Rey, Viva la Reina, Viva *su descendencia.*" Now, as this was not a usual form, either Zumalacarregui resorted to it for the purpose of making known his adherence to the new order of succession, or else it was a gross act of hypocrisy on his part; and of that we have no

ground for accusing him. The original document written and signed by himself is in the possession of his brother, one of the most upright judges and excellent men in Spain.

That Don Carlos should not have accepted Zumalacarregui's resignation, is no proof that he was not ill-treated by him. He did not venture to dismiss him, because, notwithstanding the severity of the chief to his soldiers and the natives, popular opinion was in favour of his military talents, and it was generally thought that he and he alone could overcome the Queen's troops. The courtiers, however, knowing the thraldom to which their Master was compelled to submit, congratulated him upon the relief afforded him by natural causes.

Mr. Henningsen, in talking of the punishment inflicted upon spies, says, that the "women were *only* stripped to the waist, and their heads being shaved, a jar of honey and feathers was poured over them—*without further ill treatment*—they were then suffered to depart." In the first place, Mr. Henningsen must know full well that this was not the *only* punishment to which women were subjected; he must know too that it was not inflicted alone upon such women as were spies, but upon all who were connected with those who were even suspected of taking part with the Queen. Let Mr. Henningsen put himself in the place of a husband or a brother of one of these unfortunate women, and we will leave to his own feelings to judge of theirs, and then of the propriety of his word "*only*."

But now as we have been brought before the public on so many important occasions, we shall, in justification of ourselves and as a satisfaction to those of our readers who have done us the honour to attach credit to the statements and views contained in our pamphlet, avail ourselves of the opportunity to say a few words upon recent events in Spain, which have come in singular confirmation of all that we advanced.

We declared that the people of Spain with one voice implored for peace—that they were exhausted and languishing for a cessation of the misery they endure—and that with a nation so disposed, the work of consolidating the blessings of tranquillity would be light for a Government, armed with powers corresponding to its will and its interests. We stated our conviction that great and important as the event of the deliverance of Bilboa was, it would not prove sufficient to produce a final settlement between the combatants, and that the nature of the country would prolong the war, unless a third party intervened to propose an adjustment—and that a few British troops sent to Spain, and the guarantee of a loan, were all that was wanted to restore peace to that distracted country. We will confine ourselves to facts, and our readers will judge of the correctness of our former assertions.

During many weeks after the relief of Bilboa the Carlists, who in Aragon, Valencia, Estremadura, and other parts, were ravaging the country, ceased

as if by magic; the confusion and dismay which prevailed in the North paralyzed these savage bands; they retired to their mountain haunts or dispersed, and the people, like a man rising from a bed of sickness, began to revive, and to enjoy even in their weakness a foretaste of returning health and vigour. Confidence was gradually displayed, and the blessings of order were universally acknowledged—the contributions were paid, and every exertion that the exhausted state of the people would permit, was made to minister to the wants of the army.

At this critical moment, however, when it was most requisite that the action of the Government should be felt, Spain may be said to have been without a Government. During the months of February and March an epidemic seemed to have seized the Cabinet; the Ministers of State, of Foreign Affairs, of War, and of Marine and the Colonies, were unable to attend to business; and public affairs, in as far as they depended upon the Government, were in a great measure left to chance. Yet no advantage was taken of this state of things. No tumults or political commotions were heard of, either in the capital or the provinces. The Cortes, although they deplored the absence of M. Calatrava, by whose sound sense and experience they willingly submit to be guided, continued their discussions in the same spirit as before, and the people feeling the danger of ministerial changes, at such a moment clamoured not against the lesser evil of a temporary absence,

of those Ministers who had been charged by the Queen with the Government, in the hour of her peril at La Granja, and who had done for the country as much as could be expected, and more than had been hoped.

Can it then be doubted what is the real wish of the country? Can any one deny that peace at any price is the universal object of the Spanish people? If they had been favourable to the Carlist cause, why did they not rise in its favour at a moment when every disposable soldier had been sent to the insurgent provinces? why did the Carlists disappear when they considered their cause had received its death blow at Bilboa? and why was their disappearance followed by every sign of reviving prosperity in that part of the country which they no longer infested? If, as upon previous occasions, the people could be deluded to seek in political commotions a remedy for the ills they endured, revolutionary spirits were not wanting to stir them on to the work, but the voice of such men found no echo; and no response but that of order, while the representatives of the people in the National Congress without any regular leader, without the official knowledge which a Government is able to bring to a debate ran no riot, and were seduced into no revolutionary measures, but have steadily, and to the best of their abilities, pursued their vocation of giving fundamental laws and constitutional reforms to the country. We are much in the habit, and with justice, of extolling

our own wisdom and good sense: it must, however, be remembered that we are very rich and powerful, and free, and that, under such circumstances, it is comparatively easy to be sensible and wise. But let us, if possible, imagine England again torn by a civil war—her Government pennyless at home, and without credit abroad,—the people without work, without bread, and without protection—and let us imagine, in the midst of all this, a House of Commons elected under every possible circumstance of popular excitement and licentiousness, and that the task to be performed by the Members so returned was to create a House of Peers—to strengthen the power of the Crown, and to diminish the power of the Commons; and supposing that such a House of Commons was left to itself, without a leader and without the interference of the Government, who will say that the people and Parliament of England would have displayed the same moderation and judgment that have distinguished the people and Parliament of Spain? Is it then humane to turn a deaf ear to the suffering cry of such a nation? Is it generous to refuse the pittance that would relieve them? Is it politic not to secure an ally, who now seeks our protection, and who may one day be so powerful and so useful?

That the relief of Bilboa has not proved sufficient to put an end to the war is unfortunately but too manifest, but had England, immediately after that event guaranteed the loan, or later, furnished the

small number of troops which we suggested, tranquillity would by this moment have been restored in Spain.

It would be difficult, without going into tedious details, adequately to describe the confusion which reigned among the Carlists upon losing the grand stake for which they played at Bilboa. The dismay was universal—the Pretender's Generals were arrested—his ministers were changed—every species of political and court intrigue was rife—the people were indignant at the deceptions that had been practised upon them—many of the troops returned to their homes, and the most rigorous measures were resorted to, in order to prevent desertion and emigration from becoming general. Had the Queen's army then advanced, no resistance would have been made by the Carlist troops, and the Basques would have gladly seen their country occupied by the forces of the Queen.*

Unfortunately, however, the money necessary for

* It may be thought that in this latter we are affirming too much. It was, however, the language of all the peasantry who came to Bilboa after the siege was raised; and in the month of March, when the Carlists had recovered their spirits, Espartero's army was met by the authorities of Durango (the very head-quarters of Don Carlos), who asked his protection, and placed every thing at the disposal of the Queen's General, and during the whole time that the troops remained in that part of the country the inhabitants did not, as on former occasions, leave their homes, but readily supplied the troops with provisions which were paid for by Espartero, and the strictest discipline was maintained in the army.

undertaking the expedition in a manner to secure its success was wanting. Espartero's army was without shoes or clothing, and absolutely in a state of starvation—the British Legion was upon less than half rations, and General Sarsfield for the want of 15,000 dollars was unable to stir from Pamplona in order to take advantage of the affair at Bilboa as he had intended. So much money was owing to the contractors that, although they lacked not good will, they had not the means of continuing the supplies. How was it possible in a winter of unexampled severity, and with an army so justly discontented as the Queen's, not only to undertake an extensive and combined operation, but even to stir from the quarters where the naked and hungry soldier at least had shelter from the inclemency of the season. Yet £500,000 at that moment, would have enabled the Government to reap all the fruits of the success of the Queen's arms at Bilboa. In war, perhaps, rather than under other any circumstance, it is true that "*bis dat qui cito dat*"—and had England guaranteed that paltry sum within the first six weeks of this year, it would have been worth double, aye, or ten times the amount at any other period, and when we pressed the question upon the consideration of the Government and of Parliament, it was by no means with a view of suggesting that England should take upon herself such a burden as she did in favour of Greece, although we are sure that both her own interests and those of

humanity are fully as much concerned in the pacification of the Peninsula, as they were in a settlement of the Greek question: but we knew that Spain had such security to offer as would have rendered all risk of loss to us impossible.

The money, however, was not forthcoming; Spain was left to her own resources; the Government and the country did their utmost, but the poor do not manage their affairs quickly or completely. Two months elapsed before clothing and provisions sufficient could be got together, and the Carlists in the mean while recovered alike from their panic and their surprise, at being left undisturbed; during six weeks they hardly made preparations for defence. They then, however, set vigorously to work, they broke up the roads, they dug entrenchments and threw up parapets in every direction, and placed every tenable position in Guipuscoa in a state of fortification. Towards the middle of March the different corps of the Queen's army commenced their operations, and if a more considerable British force had taken part in those operations, tranquillity would at this moment exist in Spain, as it would have done a few weeks previously by means of an English guarantee of a loan.

If the action of the 16th at Hernani had turned out differently, it would have been decisive of the war. The main body of the Carlist army was concentrated there; a considerable portion of it had placed itself in a position where it had no retreat,

and if beaten it must have surrendered—the communications with France (that all important object) would have been cut off—the demoralization of the Carlists would have been general, and all opposition in future would have been looked upon as hopeless, while Espartero with 25,000 men already at Durango and Elorrio, and advancing upon Mondragon, every where received with friendly demonstrations, would have completed the work by an immediate occupation of the whole country.

But *Diis aliter visum.* Sarsfield, retained by sickness or snow, or some other cause, allowed eight battalions of the enemy to march upon General Evans—they arrived at a fatal moment, and the sight of such powerful reinforcements produced a panic in troops, ill disciplined, and worn out by six days fighting and bivouac in rains that had hardly ceased—confusion spread through the whole line—the efforts of the officers to rally their men were unavailing, and the rout would have been complete, but for the bravery, the steadiness, and the admirable discipline of 450 British Marines who occupied the extreme right of the line—they checked an impetuous attack of the Carlists and drove them back—they for a time sustained a regiment that had given way, and finally, when the day was lost, they saved the artillery and ammunition, and provisions, and covered the retreat, all with the same order and precision as if they had been on Chatham Parade. Had another such battalion been on the

left flank, neither panic nor confusion would have occurred; had 3000 such men been in the field, the Queen's army would have left a garrison in Hernani and halted that night in Tolosa. Within a week from that time, the British officer who commanded His Majesty's troops might have mediated between the belligerents, and England would have given peace to Spain.

Thus the guarantee of half a million at one moment, or the succour of 3000 British troops at another, would have sufficed to bestow an inestimable blessing upon thirteen millions of Spaniards—and we appeal to the British public to say, whether there was any thing unreasonable, or wild, or inconsistent with British policy and British interests in the course we recommended in our pamphlet; and we ask, whether the remarks of Sir R. Peel in the debate on the 10th of March upon our recommendation, and the ironical cheers of those who are determined to be his adherents were justified. We seek not to convince such men as the Member for Oxford, or the ex-member for Sandwich; they have their own particular small party purposes to serve, but to the Right Hon. Member for Tamworth, whose statesmanlike mind is not swayed by party motives, who is before every thing else an Englishman, and whose objects, whether he himself or others govern the country, must ever be the greatness and glory of England—to him, with sincere respect, we address a request, that he will more

closely examine the Spanish question than he has perhaps had leisure or occasion to do, since he ceased to be at the head of his Majesty's councils. We ask him to look at it as a Christian, as a philanthropist, and as a politician, and we are convinced that if he does so, the Right Hon. Baronet will see much to modify in his speech of the 10th of March. We are convinced he cannot be aware of the enormous amount of suffering which at this moment the civil war produces in Spain. The paralyzation of the Queen's army has again called into activity detached bands of insurgents, who are now ravaging some of the fairest provinces of the Peninsula—whole villages are sacked and burned—a portion of the inhabitants are murdered, and the survivors are left in beggary and without a home. Can a Christian coldly look upon such suffering and not desire to put an end to it? Would the Right Hon. Baronet not gladly extend his private charity to relieve it—and would an act grateful to him as an individual, be culpable in him as a representative of the only really charitable people in the world?

But can a British philanthropist view with indifference the present struggle of Spaniards to emancipate themselves from the darkness and slavery in which they have been bound? Must he not sympathise with men who are endeavouring by every sacrifice to secure the same freedom of opinions, the same liberty of action, and the same blessings of

equal justice which we ourselves enjoy? The Right Honourable Baronet has declared distinctly that "he wished to see Spain enjoy settled liberties, and that under such institutions as may be most conducive to her happiness, and best calculated, by their slow progress, to establish her settled freedom." We sincerely believe him, because such views are philanthropical as regards Spain, and best adapted to the interests of England, who cannot but desire to see the wide extension of liberal institutions like her own. She has no right, unasked, to interfere with forms of Government in other countries, but when we find a nation struggling to advance that which we desire to see established—when that nation acknowledges its weakness, and implores our aid in the great work of its own regeneration—when that aid can be afforded effectually at a trifling sacrifice, ungenerous and heartless is the policy which dictates a denial of it. We know the difficulties which await all appeals to national sympathies, and that they have a better chance of success if blended with considerations of a more solid and profitable nature, it is therefore upon its political and commercial bearings that we most rely for attracting the favourable attention of our countrymen towards the Spanish question. We shall not repeat the views and arguments upon which we insisted in our pamphlet, and indeed we feel inclined merely to express our gratitude to Sir Robert Peel, who had the manliness to *throw over* his *absolute* adherents, and to

declare that the success of Don Carlos would be adverse to English interests. There lies the whole question—for the *present* state of things in Spain cannot be favourable to English interests, *ergo* these interests will be best served by the triumph of the Queen's cause. There is no question in politics which appears to us so clear as that, and the longer the solution is delayed, the greater will be the danger to which those interests are exposed.

It is now a matter of notoriety that if Bilboa had fallen, more than one power of Europe had determined upon the immediate recognition of Don Carlos. England and France would then at once have come into collision with those Powers in a war of opinions, and the peace of Europe would have been endangered, and in all probability broken, upon the very grounds on which it is so important to postpone a rupture to the latest possible period. Under such circumstances, however, (and until the question is terminated they may any day occur,) it would become imperative upon us not to abandon the Queen's cause, or to permit the success of the Pretender to her throne—our influence, the very existence of our power in Europe—the issue of the war might depend upon it, but under what aggravated circumstances of difficulty and expense would our assistance then be given, compared with what it would now cost? The Carlist insurgents are now pent up in a narrow space—now one decisive action may put an end to the war. But how difficult it would be if those in-

surgents were subsidized in every part of the Peninsula by the Holy Alliance—if arms and troops were to arrive under the flags of Austria or Naples—if Russia, in payment of her support were to hold a port of Spain, and to beard us at Gibraltar.

This is a state of things that may any day occur; it has been weighed and meditated in the Cabinets of the Continent; the opportunity only is wanting to give effect to the preparations that have been made. So long as the Spanish question remains unsettled, we are comparatively weak, because our union with France is every day endangered. This is the only question which prevents that union from being strong; and that is the reason why the Northern Powers view with dread the restoration of tranquillity in Spain, and why, for that same reason, we have an additional interest in putting an end to the war. It is not impossible, that we may again see France seeking internal tranquillity by means of foreign aggression, and should the peace of Europe be so disturbed, the first act of the beleagured Powers of the Continent would be to stimulate the civil war, and assist the Carlist party in Spain. In such a contest we know not what part England would play, but of this we are well assured, that, in the Peninsula, she cannot remain neuter, unless she would voluntarily descend to a third-rate Power in Europe, and if we take part with France we at once engage in a continental war, and must be prepared for all its consequences

to our manufacturing interests and our internal prosperity.

Should the destinies of England be so unfortunately ordered, that we were again to oppose by force the policy of France, we should find ourselves in inglorious alliance with the Northern Powers, fighting upon Spanish ground against the nascent liberties of the people, and contributing our blood and our treasure to establish despotism in the Peninsula, and to exclude ourselves from a country, where our political and commercial interests, combined with our geographical position, ought to render our influence advantageous and lasting. That such degradation may not be in store for us is our most fervent prayer—but let us not lull ourselves into a false security, or think that impossible which we wish should never occur.

In her foreign policy England should fear nothing, but she should despise nothing. We should, with prudent foresight, watch events, and keep our eye upon coming dangers. We are at this moment masters of them, they may soon approach us with an overwhelming force. The Peninsula but a few years ago, was the field where the battles of Europe were fought and won—it was upon the Peninsula that first dawned that sun which brought repose to Europe, and shed upon it the blessings of peace. It is on Spanish ground that the war-cry of Europe is again heard, and the war-cry of a conflict of opinions. The duration and extent of

that conflict no man living can tell, but blind must those be who fail to see the shadows that such events are now casting before them, and deeply responsible to their fellowmen are those, who having power to avert this impending danger, wait with apathy the arrival of that crisis, which will shake society to its foundation, and rend asunder the ties which hold the European community together.

That Don Carlos should ever occupy the throne of Spain, unless placed and maintained there by foreign bayonets, when England has retired, or is driven from the field, we hold to be impossible: but we do not deny that the contest, as it is now carried on, may be indefinitely prolonged; for the nature of the country, the character of the combatants, the poverty and consequent weakness of the Government, the apathy of the masses, the political rancour, the intrigues and distrust and indecision which such a state of things gives rise to, are calculated to render a civil war interminable, but every day that it drags on brings fresh cause for apprehension, for the present wise endurance of the nation, like all other things, must have its limits. The reign of reason will cease, and an era of violence will ensue, we shall see a spirit of federalism arise, the frontier provinces will place themselves under the protection of France—other provinces will declare themselves independent. There will be distinct governments and conflicting interests, until society is reduced to its original elements, and

the Peninsula, instead of being a source of strength to England and France, will be a festering wound in their political system.

Let it not be supposed that we could remain indifferent spectators of such a scene. It would be a nuisance to Europe, which Europe would abate, for it would be more dangerous and intolerable than the war in Greece, which the Powers who signed the treaty of 1827, were "penetrated with the necessity of putting an end to," and "being animated with the desire of putting a stop to the effusion of blood, and of preventing the evils of every kind which the continuance of such a state of affairs may produce, they resolved to combine their efforts, and to regulate the operation thereof by a formal treaty, for the object of re-establishing peace between the contending Parties, by means of an arrangement called for no less by sentiments of humanity than by interests for the tranquillity of Europe." Wisely did those Powers then act, and similar motives would impose upon the Continental Powers a similar intervention in the affairs of Spain. England might or might not take part in such intervention. If she did, she would have to bend her policy and sacrifice her interests to the Holy Alliance: if she did not, she must be content to see foreign troops in *permanent occupation* of the Peninsula—for by permanent occupation alone, can a system of government, imposed upon Spaniards by foreign bayonets be maintained.

All engrossed as we are with our own domestic concerns, and little as we are accustomed to think or to care about foreign affairs, we are certain that there is not an English heart which would not shrink from the contemplation of the degraded condition into which we should have fallen, if such a state of things were to come to pass; yet either of the two views which we have presented of the futurity of Spain, or of our own, is possible, is probable, if the civil war be not promptly put an end to, and the question therefore calls for the attention of those, who would prevent rather than wait for oncoming evils, and who are honestly interested in the welfare and glory of England.

We have said that every day that the war drags on, brings with it fresh cause for political apprehensions; and we add that, at the same time it brings cause for regret at the delay, and consequent loss, which occur in establishing advantageous commercial relations with Spain.

The Right Honourable Member for Tamworth has said, and said most justly, that those relations are not upon a satisfactory footing; but we are sure he will admit, that a moment of civil war and of great political excitement is not the most favourable to a weak and embarrassed Government for successfully combating the errors of ignorance and prejudice. Let us remember that we are a century in advance of Spain in civilization; and yet but a few short years ago our own tariff bore as ample

proofs of illiberality as that which is now so destructive of the revenue and real interests of Spain. Let us remember the tremendous difficulties which Mr. Huskisson had to encounter in his first attempts to liberalize our commercial system; all the accusations to which he was exposed, and all the opprobrium which was cast upon that distinguished statesman in Parliament, by the press, and by the manufacturing interests; and if this could happen not twelve years ago in enlightened, prosperous and tranquil England, let us not harshly condemn the Government of Spain, if, while struggling for existence, it has feared to raise up fresh enemies against itself, and has delayed to give effect to principles of which it acknowledges the soundness, and upon the application of which it knows the prosperity of Spain in a great measure to depend.

The question, however, is not exposed to the same difficulties in Spain as in England. Spaniards are accustomed to conform to the mandates of authority; and were the Government to acquire the strength which the restoration of tranquillity would impart, the task of liberalizing the commercial system of Spain would not be hard, neither would it, after a time, be an unpopular one, for the majority of the nation are aware that they are sacrificed, not to the manufacturing, but to the smuggling interests of Catalonia. They know that a vast revenue could be collected by the State which is now enjoyed by the smuggler; and when we

consider the prodigious improvement in public opinion which is silently making its way in Spain, and that the great principle of religious toleration has just been declared by the Cortes, it is not too much to expect that reason and self-interest will not be long in opening the road to commercial freedom. But were the civil war at an end, a far wider field for enterprize offers itself than even the entire abolition of customs duties in Spain would afford, and in that, foreigners would be met with open arms both by the Government and the nation. The means of investing capital profitably in Spain are beyond all calculation; and the desire of Spaniards to see foreign capitalists arrive increases every day. The national property now on sale is valued, at the least, at twenty millions sterling—it is of every kind and description most favourable to well-directed industry; three thousand leagues of roads are to be made—the contractors for which will have a monopoly of the tolls; harbours are to be cleared and bridges* built—all of which would return a rate of profit to the speculator, such as we have long ceased to dream of in England. The application of capital to a general system of banking, and to the better cultivation of the wines of Spain,

* An eminent French engineer has just contracted for the erection of twelve bridges in Spain, upon condition of having for a certain number of years the tolls now taken at the respective ferries: he will be looked upon as a benefactor by the country, and will realize a fortune by the undertaking.

would be advantageous to a degree that we firmly believe no other investment of capital in Europe is capable of becoming; but these advantages are all contingent upon the speedy termination of the civil war. Were that achieved, we know that British capital would flow abundantly into Spain; and that we should then have in Spain such an ally as she is able to become, and as we stand in need of; there would then be no more fear of political commotions, for the poor and the idle would be employed, and public attention would be, for the first time, turned to the developement of the boundless resources of a hitherto unhappy, because neglected country.

We now appeal to our readers whether, with reference to dangers to be avoided and advantages to be gained, we have not shewn cause why England should lend her aid to a great work of humanity; and we appeal not to the Government, of whose policy and dispositions there is no room to doubt, but to the opposition, whether the time is not come for giving the aid of England effectually. The Quadruple Treaty exists, and is in force—it must be executed, let the Government be Whig or Tory. It was most honourably and punctually fulfilled by Sir Robert Peel, when in office, and it would be so again were the Right Hon. Baronet to return to power. We will ask him whether he would then adopt any other policy than that which the Government now pursues—whether, if he were at the head

of affairs, he would not desire to give some extension to that Treaty, if he found it not fully adequate to the purposes for which it was concluded? and whether, therefore, the interests and honour of England would have been promoted or disserved, if the measure of assistance we ventured to recommend had been proposed by the Government to Parliament, or by Parliament to the Government?

REPLY

TO CHAPTER XV. OF THE SECOND EDITION

OF

LORD CARNARVON'S

"*Galicia, Portugal, and the Basque Provinces.*"

In this Reply, by Lord Carnarvon, there is certainly nothing to account for the length of time which has been occupied in giving it birth. In order to defend himself against our charges of inaccuracy, it was only necessary for Lord Carnarvon to shew upon what authority he had made his original statements, and it assuredly need not have taken him upwards of four months to decide whether he would do that or not. But in the way of events, to be sure, something has occurred to delay his publication, in the shape of a reverse of the British Legion, and that has been turned to ample account by his Lordship. But success having, subsequently, attended their efforts, it is thought well to push forth into the world the old attacks against them, and against the policy with which they are connected, lest public opinion should turn in their favour—now that they have shewn themselves not only brave in fight, but generous in victory; now

that they are proved by the testimony of their enemies to be uncontaminated by the dreadful examples of cruelty which were set them by those very enemies, and which were practised upon themselves; if the publication of the attack upon them had been delayed, the injustice, though really the same, would be apparently too great even for the bad faith of Carlist Tories. Lord Carnarvon's work, moreover, appeared at the moment when the Carlists were in a most critical position, when the news had just arrived in England of their having been compelled to change the theatre of war, without having fulfilled the Tory prediction and boast, that they would enter Castile and march victoriously to Madrid. Not a moment, therefore, was to be lost in bolstering up their cause, in attacking the Government of Spain and the nascent liberties of the Spanish people, and in vilifying the policy of England, lest the opportunity should be lost for ever, and Spain regenerated should become a lasting monument of Tory misrepresentation and malignity.

The character of Lord Carnarvon's reply has excited in us feelings of surprise and regret. He has associatcd himself with all those who have attacked us, and although he has not used their scurrilous language, yet by his excessive approbation and recommendation of their works, he must be considered to approve of it, for indeed their abuse forms a great part of their performances.

His praise of Mr. Walton's pamphlet,*—his earnest hope that "The Nobleman" (who would have been flogged at school for his slovenly manner of putting together what he *cribbed* from the Morning

* "Reply to the Anglo-Christino Pamphlet," written, as Mr. Walton informs the public, because it was the general opinion of those with whom he conversed, that the task of answering our Pamphlet naturally devolved upon him, to which he says he yielded, but with reluctance, as he had just risen with debilitated health from the laborious composition of two volumes on the revolutions of Spain; and if we may judge from his pamphlet, we should infer that the task of reading that work must be fully as laborious as was its composition. The first pages of this pamphlet are devoted to puffing some other works of his own, and describing the presentation of one of them to Don Carlos at Gloucester Lodge, where he assures us that that Prince seated him near him and conversed with him for upwards of an hour, and he says, that afterwards at Onate, Don Carlos paid him a compliment in the most amiable manner, and with a smile which bespoke the kindness of his heart,—and in a country, like ours, asks Mr. Walton, shall not such a Prince as this (i. e. one who smiles upon Walton, *and seats Walton near him*) find an advocate, when he and his adherents are assailed by a nameless slanderer?

We think he ought, certainly, to find just the kind of advocate that Mr. W. appears to be. We therefore freely leave to his Royal Highness any advantage that he can derive from the vulgar work of his defender, assuring the latter, however, that if he had been able to use the conventional language of Gentlemen, and to abstain from mixing up the coarsest abuse in a controversial discussion, we would, though at the risk of writing as long and tedious a pamphlet as his own, have replied to his sophisms and misstatements, and have exposed his distorted facts: but such a person should only be answered in his own style, and in that we acknowledge ourselves his inferiors.

Post and Morning Herald) may not have used his pen for the last time in the service of his country—his admiration of the shallow pedantries of the article in the Quarterly Review and his adoption of Mr. Honan, all tell alike against Lord Carnarvon's judgment and taste. We repeat the unaffected expression of our regret at the course taken by Lord Carnarvon, for the tone of our pamphlet was one of courtesy towards his Lordship, and his reply would have stood higher if he had not taken into his service such offensive auxiliaries. Lord Carnarvon, however, is probably blinded by that party zeal, upon the absence of which he so frequently congratulates himself, for when we find it asserted in his pages that the glory of England is tarnished —that "in the management of Spanish affairs, her Majesty's Ministers have been led into a course of almost unmitigated error"—" that the Government have appealed to the worst passions of our nature, by advising our people to engage in brutalizing hostilities, for the sole and selfish purposes of advancing individual objects ;"—and when we reflect upon the spirit and objects of his work, we doubt whether any impartial reader will accept his Lordship's definitions of himself, that he is " actuated by no party views"—that he " wages no party war with her Majesty's Ministers"—that " he fights the battles of no party"—that " he is no partizan of Don Carlos, and no friend to despotic government."

Before we proceed further, we owe it to ourselves and to the numerous readers who have done us the honour to attach weight to the statements contained in our pamphlet, to notice a passage in Lord Carnarvon's Preface to the Second Edition of his work. His Lordship says, "I must also beg my readers to recollect that much of the information transmitted through his (our) pages to the public has been supplied by that Spanish Government, which is supported by the stock-jobbing interest, kept in place for stock-jobbing purposes, and notoriously identified with the views of speculators on the Exchange. Any representations therefore flowing, indirectly it is true, and through a respectable channel, but still flowing from such a source, must be received with deep suspicion."

In what way the Spanish Government is supported and kept in place for stock-jobbing purposes, we leave it to his Lordship to explain. Who are the stock-jobbers that support the Spanish Government? Are they the capitalists who have, one and all, refused to lend any money to Spain so long as the civil war lasts? Are the Messrs. Ricardo and Ardoin, who, formerly the Agents of the Spanish Government, have publicly retired from the management of its affairs, because Spain was unable to fulfil her obligations? and how is the Spanish Government identified with the views of the speculators on the Exchange, further than as being the Government of a nation that has a large foreign debt,

and which, being in want of money, is compelled to keep up certain relations with those persons whose trade it is to lend money?

To throw discredit on the Spanish Government, however, is not the only object sought. Lord Carnarvon, in the Preface, endeavours to fix a stain upon the Spanish Government, in order that that stain may equally attach to the Government of England, by whom, he asserts, in the body of his work, the Spanish Government has been established and is fostered and upheld; and thus he would, indirectly, but most unwarrantably, mix up her Majesty's Ministers with Stock Exchange transactions. His Lordship likewise, in order to disparage the correctness of our statements, affirms that much of our information "has been supplied by the Spanish Government." We deny, and we defy him to prove his assertion; for we solemnly declare that we received no information from the Spanish Government—that no member of that Government was aware that such a pamphlet as ours was about to be written, and that with none of them has there been any subsequent communication upon the subject, unless the sending a copy to Mr. Calatrava, many weeks after the pamphlet was published, can be called such.—The passage which we have quoted above, sufficiently evinces the *animus* with which Lord Carnarvon's work is written, but it is unworthy his station, his character, and his abilities.

We have already, and we fear at too great length,

entered into the question of the Spanish succession, and it is therefore unnecessary to add any remarks upon the errors which Lord Carnarvon has appended to those of the article in the Quarterly Review upon that subject. It may be well, however, to advert to his Lordship's misrepresentation of facts connected with the late King Ferdinand:—he says, "that towards the close of 1832, the King cancelled his will, revoked his previous decision (of 1830), and restored the Infant to his former right of succession. The decree to this effect was drawn up by the order, and signed by the hand of the King, while he was still conducting the Government. The subsequent act by which he again dispossessed his brother, and replaced his daughter in the direct line of the succession, was executed at a time when his Majesty had abdicated the reins of government, and had devolved upon the Queen all the powers of the State, in consequence of that increasing indisposition which, according to the proclamation, rendered him incapable of attending any longer to the welfare of his subjects."

Lord Carnarvon's readers may fairly suppose from this statement that the King, while in the full exercise of his faculties, restored the Infant to the direct line of succession, and subsequently, when incapable from increasing indisposition of attending to affairs, had reversed his decree. Now, what are the facts? Count Alcudia, from the first moment of his entering the Ministry, had deter-

mined upon re-establishing Don Carlos in the succession, and, during the King's illness at La Granja, that Minister, in conjunction with two Foreign Diplomatists, whose names we do not think proper to publish (nor do we choose to state in what manner a large sum of money was expended upon this occasion) considered that the time was arrived when the execution of the plot should no longer be delayed. The King had already received extreme unction, and when he was in a state approaching to insensibility; actually, as it was supposed, in *articulo mortis*, and but a few hours before his death was believed by the public to have taken place, and was announced as a certain event by the French Ambassador to the Court of Paris, Pena and Gonzaler, the King's Confessors, entered the royal chamber, and, taking advantage of the weakness of a dying man, with a solemn tone and uplifted hands, threatened the expiring Monarch with the pains of eternal punishment, unless he reversed the decree which had settled the crown upon his daughter. They commanded the Queen, who was present, to urge his Majesty to do that which would save his soul, and enable him to die with a quiet conscience. The King, whose mental faculties were clouded by the shadows of approaching death; who saw that something was urgently required of him, but who knew not what it was, cast an appealing look to his consort; and what would have been the heart of that wife, who in such a moment, so addressed on one

side, and so appealed to on the other, could have hesitated to sacrifice all earthly considerations, to soothe the last moments of a dying husband? The Queen consented. Count Alcudia, who was waiting at the door, instantly entered with a decree ready drawn up; the Royal signature, such as under such circumstances it may be supposed to have been, was obtained; and thus was wrung from the unresisting affliction of a weeping wife, and from the palsied hand of a dying man, an act replete with personal injustice, and national calamity.

These facts were well known to various persons then at La Granja. We have likewise received them from a party directly concerned in all the transactions at that time, and we pledge ourselves for the correctness of the statement.

The King, however, began to recover—his most alarming symptoms disappeared—but it was not until several days after signing the decree that he was made fully sensible of the import of the act he had performed. Upon becoming aware of it, he immediately dismissed his treacherous Ministers. His Majesty returned on the 19th of October to Madrid, and on the last day of the year he assembled the Notables of the State, and caused to be read to them the manifesto which we have given in a former part of this pamphlet. We thus see that it was only when the hand of death was upon him, and when perfidious advisers availed themselves of his dying moments, that Ferdinand wavered in as-

serting the rights of his daughter, and that in the fullest use of his intellectual faculties (which from the time he left La Granja until he died, were never impaired,) he finally, and in the most solemn manner, disposed of his brother's pretensions.

"We now approach," as Lord Carnarvon says, "the important question of the Basque rights." "My opponent states," continues his Lordship, "that the greater part of the privileges upon which I have dwelt, have long been annulled *de facto*, though the sovereigns of Spain have been too wise to do so by formal decrees;" and adds, "If he could substantiate this assertion, he would most effectually destroy the credit of any writer bold enough to publish to the world as actually existing, a connected statement of rights and liberties that had long ceased to have any real operation." Whatever the literary reputation of Lord Carnarvon may gain by his publication, we do not think that his "credit as a writer" of facts is more likely to be raised by this part of his work, than it is by any other portion of the romance.

His Lordship proceeds to ask in a triumphant tone, "But how does he support his position?" "Has the author of the pamphlet disproved in his reply the principal facts stated in the Basque chapter, as bearing strongly and directly upon the point at issue? Does he deny that as a general and operating principle of the Biscayan system, no Biscayan can be required to contribute to the Crown

of Castile a greater amount of taxation than that which was formerly paid to their Lords? Does he deny that the King, as such, can only nominate Biscayans to ecclesiastical offices in Biscay, and that their Alcaldes are freely chosen by the people? Has he not virtually admitted, by his silence, that no Biscayan resident in any province of Spain can be tried civilly or criminally by the laws of Castile, and that every case in which the rights of Biscayans are affected, must of necessity be referred to Valladolid, to be there determined by a Tribunal of Basque Judges, and according to the laws of Biscay? Has he disproved the statement, that no Magistrate can violate the sanctuary of a Biscayan's house, or seize his arms or horse, or arrest him for debt, or subject him to imprisonment upon any pretext whatever, without a previous summons to appear under the old tree of Guernica, where he is made acquainted with the charge imputed to him, and called upon for his defence, and discharged upon the spot, or bailed or committed, according to the nature of the crime and the evidence adduced against him? Has he attempted to deny that the Biscayan towns, with a few exceptions only, are represented—that the right of suffrage is popular in the highest degree; that the Biscayan Parliament thus elected, possesses exclusively the right to legislate for Biscay, to make new laws when requisite, and to repeal those which time or circumstances have rendered inexpedient; to propose the budget;

to adjust the taxation for the two following years, and to make every necessary arrangement connected with the internal economy, and external defence of the Province; that notice must be given at least fifteen days before the meeting of Parliament; that the measures to be discussed must be announced before hand, that the Deputies may have time to consult their constituents and receive their instructions; and finally, has he raised even a doubt upon the incontrovertible fact, which I have stated, that the veto of the Biscayan Parliament upon any resolution of the Spanish Government is absolutely conclusive."

We will first of all observe, that these questions are taken from books, and that they give, as we shall presently shew, a most vague and unpractical view of the laws and administration of Biscay. In the same manner, and by the same process, we could prove the City of London to be independent of the Crown of England, by asking, is it not true that the Heralds when they have to proclaim a new King, are obliged to knock at Temple Bar, and humbly demand permission to enter? and are not the Judges bound to try City causes in Guildhall? and have not the Brethren of the Trinity House a paramount sway over the River Thames, and the Light-houses of the coast? In a similar and equally satisfactory way, it might have been proved out of Delolme's book on the Constitution of England, that the last thing we wanted was a Reform in Parliament, and perhaps

Lord Carnarvon may say, that this is an admission of the correctness of his logic, and that a process of reasoning which would prove that Parliamentary Reform was unnecessary and improper, must be unerring, and that any other conclusion to which it may lead, ought to be adopted, as an indisputable truth. We think it right to state that we have never questioned the excellency of the Municipal Institutions of the Basque Provinces, but we again make the distinction which Lord Carnarvon says he is utterly at a loss to understand, between the privileges political and financial of the Basques, and their internal administration. We repeat, that these political and financial privileges might be abolished, or may have been altogether destroyed, without materially affecting the greater part of that system of local administration which Lord Carnarvon infers by his questions actually exists, or did exist in the Basque Provinces before the civil war broke out, and moreover, that so much of that system as would have been affected by the abolition of the political privileges, had really ceased to have a virtual existence in the provinces.

Our answers to Lord Carnarvon's questions will shew two things; first, that he himself has an extremely crude notion of the meaning of the questions he asks, and would be himself utterly unable to give a practical answer to them; and next, (and this is in point of fact the real question at issue), that in spite of old forms, and in defiance of ex-

cellent municipal institutions, the power of the Crown of Castile was of late years as despotic in Biscay as it was in La Mancha, whenever and wherever it was worth its while to be so. If a traveller is met by a robber who demands his money, and the traveller says, No, I will rather die than let you take it—but here it is, and I make you voluntarily a present of it; we cannot see that the robber would have much reason to complain of the privileged immunity of the traveller; or that the traveller would be much entitled to boast of his own generosity.

Before, however, we enter upon these more general considerations, let us see how far categorical answers, such as his Lordship doubtless expects, can be given to his most imposing list of questions as to the Basque rights.

Does the author of the pamphlet deny (first asks Lord Carnarvon) that no Biscayan can be required to contribute to the Crown of Castile a greater amount of taxation than that which was formerly paid to their Lords? The author of the pamphlet does deny it.

By the law 4. tit. 1. of the "Fuero de Vizcaya," the Biscayans, in their character of "nobles ó hijosdalgo," who were free from the payment of tribute by the laws of Castile, were exempted from the payment of contributions in the shape of *alcavala, moneda forera,* &c. and their Lords were compelled to be content with the taxes called *censos*

de las casas, maravedises on iron, and the tithes and rents of particular churches. Thus the King, as Lord of Biscay, could claim no other dues than those indicated; but this in nowise prevented him as King of Castile from exacting from the Basque Provinces such *donatives, subsidies, repartitions,* &c. as he required for the security and defence of the nation confided to his care; and this is the immemorial practice: the Government of Spain has required the contribution which corresponded to the donatives of the Provinces in a sum, under the polite names of subsidies and *donatives,* and has left to the Provincial Deputations the task of distributing the burthen and collecting the tax. One instance of this will be sufficient. On the 18th of February, 1824, as may be seen in the eighth volume of the Collection of Decrees issued by Ferdinand VII. (p. 195) that King by his own sole power and authority (Art. 1°) demanded of the Basque Provinces a donative of from three to four millions of reals, and (Art. 2°) required that this donative should continue for three or four years.

We will mention another significant fact. In the collection of Decrees (tom. vii. p. 4.) it may be seen that the Government of Madrid having levied eighteen million of reals on the different Consulates (or commercial corporations) of Spain, Bilboa was saddled with its share; and this is not all, for by the same decree a high additional duty was laid on various articles of commerce on their entering into and leaving the Basque Provinces.

Lord Carnarvon asks, if we deny that the King, as Lord, can only nominate Biscayans by birth to ecclesiastical offices in Biscay? This question is founded in ignorance. The presentation to livings is regulated by the synodal rules of the diocese, which have no relation to the fueros. The custom to appoint natives to ecclesiastical offices in the diocese is not peculiar to the Basque Provinces, it prevails in the bishopric of Burgos and in Santander. The King appoints to livings in the Basque Provinces only as the territorial Lord of particular patronatos, just the same as do the Conde de Onate, the Marques de Mortara, and numerous others, and he confers the livings on such as are eligible according to the rules of the diocese. But even the synodal regulations were broken through by the late King Ferdinand, who gave several of these livings to Colon, the Corregidor of Bilboa.

Lord Carnarvon asks, if we can deny that the Alcaldes of Biscay are freely chosen by the people? We can do so; and with the perfect conviction that if Lord Carnarvon had had anything more than a confused general notion of how the Alcaldes are chosen, he never would have asked such a question.

In Aramayona the Alcalde is chosen by the Marques of Mortara as Conde de Aramayona, out of six persons proposed to him by the valley of that name. In Llodio the Alcalde is alternately chosen by the valley and by the Conde de Ayala. In Villaro he is chosen by lot out of a certain number of persons named by four electors, who themselves

are also selected by chance. The family of Adan in Bilboa has from time immemorial enjoyed the privilege of naming the Provost and two Alcaldes (del fuero) for Lequeitio, as also for the district of Zornoza. In Uribe there was a question between the King and the Marques de Mortara, as to which of the two had the right of naming the Alcalde, and we are not aware how the question was decided. In Arratia the Alcalde was chosen every three years by the Council of Castile. In short, such is the variety of modes in which the Alcaldes are chosen in the three provinces, that our readers must be satisfied with this enumeration, as will no doubt his Lordship also.

Lord Carnarvon asks, if we do not virtually admit, by our silence, that no Biscayan resident in any province of Spain can be tried civilly or criminally by the laws of Castile; and that every case in which the rights of Biscayans are affected must be referred to Valladolid, to be there determined by a tribunal of Basque judges, and according to the laws of Biscay?

We trust that a man's silence is not always to be held as a confirmation of all the absurdities uttered in his presence; but if this doctrine were admitted, and if some authors talk as they write, the societies which they frequent would need to be loquacious indeed to maintain their character for good sense. We should have thought that silence would have been esteemed as the most appropriate answer to a

proposition as ridiculous in its nature as it is unfounded in fact. Were the Biscayans unfortunately cursed with any such privilege as this, it must necessarily have led to their excommunication as social beings, whenever they wandered beyond the narrow limits of the Vascongado triangle. Who would have dealings in Andalusia or in America with a Biscayan, if on the slightest dispute or difficulty arising the cause was to be whipped off to Valladolid? If no Biscayan in a distant province could be tried by any other than his own tribunal, the rest of society would be obliged absolutely to close their doors against individuals, possessed of a privilege, which would in most instances amount to complete impunity for crime. We can however assure our readers, that if either Lord Carnarvon, or the Spanish lawyer who gives lessons in Carlism to Mr. Grove Price, have found such a privilege in some old book of fueros,* the Biscayans never think of claiming it; but have, on the contrary, suffered themselves to be sued and imprisoned, arraigned and hanged just like any ordinary Spaniard. Neither the juez mayor of Biscay, who decided Basque causes in the chancery of Valladolid, nor any of the *oidores* who heard appeals from him, were necessarily Biscayans: the King nominated whom he

* *Ley* 19. *tit°* 1°. "Ningun vizcaino puede ser reconvenido fuera de Vizcaya sino delante del Juez Mayor por cualquier contrato y delito y que se remiten al Juez Mayor que reside en Valladolid declinando la jurisdiccion de otros juices."

thought fit for these offices, and the only penal code known in this court was that of Castile and Aragon, by which the Biscayans were tried; with only this difference, that the Biscayans being all nobles or hijosdalgos, they enjoyed the honourable and important privilege of remaining seated when hanged, instead of being compelled to stand in the august presence of the executioner.

Lord Carnarvon would have us believe that no magistrate can subject a Biscayan to imprisonment, without first summoning him to appear under the old tree of Guernica, where he is made acquainted with the charge imputed to him, and called upon for his defence, and discharged on the spot, or bailed, or committed, according to the nature of the crime and the evidence adduced against him. There was something about the venerable old oak of Guernica which pleased the poetic fancy of our antagonist. The fact, however, is, that, stripping this ancient tree of its romance, it happened to grow exceedingly near the gaol door, so the invitation to meet the magistrate at that "trysting place" was merely a piece of Biscayan politeness, and really meant an introduction to the Alguacil: a process very similar to that which cites the English outlaw to repair by a certain date to that other very romantic piece of old wood, the King's Bench, which used to send him to finish his days on "Tyburn Tree." If, however, the magistrate could catch his criminal, according to the words of the

fueros,* in "his skin and flesh," or in flagranti, or within twenty-four hours after the commission of the offence, no ceremony was used, and the delinquent was handed to prison without stopping to give a Druidical salute to the ancient oak of Guernica.

All that his Lordship says about no magistrate being permitted to violate the sanctuary of a Biscayan's house, or to seize his arms or horse, or arrest him for debt, &c. is literally translated from the *fueros*, and proves, if proof were wanting, the truth of our statement that his Lordship's Basque Chapter, as he calls it, is a romance; for we assert, on the authority of numbers of most respectable Biscayans, who have resided all their lives in the provinces, that nothing of all this is observed in practice. The officers of justice enter houses in the same manner as in the rest of Spain, arrest debtors, and carry them to prison, with a most entire disregard of what is laid down in the *fueros*, and of all that Lord Carnarvon has sung in praise of the glories of Biscay.

Lord Carnarvon asks a variety of questions respecting the legislative power of the Parliament of Biscay, which we shall answer in few words. The Parliament may make laws, but as these laws must be quoted in ultimate appeal before the Tribunal at Valladolid, they would not be held valid by the Iuez mayor, unless they had received the Royal

* "En cuero et carne." See Leyes 5ª, 6ª, 7ª, tito 9, of the Fuero de Vizcaya for the manner of proceeding against delinquents.

sanction. In fact, it is this Royal sanction, given at the commencement of each reign to the *fueros*, which confers upon them the character of a code of laws. Neither is the decision of this Parliament so paramount as Lord Carnarvon seems to think; for should its resolves displease any particular town or district, they protest against it, and the case is referred for settlement to the Council of Castile. Similar remarks are to be made upon the "incontrovertible fact," that the veto of the Biscayan Parliament upon any resolution of the Spanish Government is absolutely conclusive.* It is so in the written *fueros*, but this Parliament will be found in the sequel never to have used its veto for any other purpose than to lead to an arbitration or compromise between the measure proposed by the Government, and the manner in which the Basques chose to carry that measure into effect. Thus the Royal decrees for establishing the Royalist Volunteers were implicitly adopted by the Provinces in substance, though with some slight modifications in name and form. The officers were appointed by the Diputaciones Provinciales, but with this difference, the institution was the same to all intents and purposes in the Basque Provinces as in other parts of Spain, and was really established by the will of the Government.

* This veto was actually abolished by Ferdinand VII. *as regards all matters of commerce*, in the decree under date of 30th September, 1815.

The history of the establishment of the Police is precisely similar: the existence of a political police in the provinces is a direct violation of the *fueros*, (ley I. tit. 8. Fuero de Vizcaya,) nevertheless, the orders of the Government, directing it to be created, were carried into punctual execution. With the same difference as in the case of the Royalist Volunteers, the officers were appointed by the Deputations, but they corresponded directly with the chief office in Madrid, from which they received their orders: precisely as the Realistas did from their Inspector in the capital.

We had observed in our pamphlet that it was an illusion to say that in recent, as in older times, liberty and property have been inviolable: in answer to which, his Lordship says, "I state positively that no freeman in the Basque Provinces suffered either in person or in property because he was suspected of liberal opinions;" and he adds, "my opponent has not even attempted to specify a case of royal or ministerial aggression, but has wisely confined himself to general assertions, which can only be repelled by as general and confident a denial." Thus, it seems, Lord Carnarvon, emboldened by our not "attempting to specify any case of royal or ministerial aggression," is rash enough to venture upon "a general and confident denial." We lament for Lord Carnarvon's sake, that he requires no better foundation for "a general and confident denial," than a suspicion that his opponent is not in possession of

the means of contradicting him : and we do not envy the feelings of his Lordship, when he reads the following statement of facts.

By the Decree of the Regency, dated June 23, 1823, (art. 1. tom. 7. p. 45. & 46.) it was ordered that a list " should be formed of all the individuals of the Cortes, and of all those who had removed or contributed to remove the King from Seville to Cadiz ; that their property (art. 2.) should be immediately sequestrated, and (art. 3.) that all the Deputies that should have taken part in that deliberation should be held, by the sole fact, to be guilty of treason, and the tribunals, without requiring further proof than identity of person, were to inflict the punishment pointed out by the laws (death)."

In consequence of this Decree, and without taking into consideration either *fueros* or *contrafueros*, not only were Don Miguel Ricardo Alava, Lt.-General and Deputy to Cortes for Alava, and Don Joaquin Maria de Ferrer, Deputy for Guipuzcoa, condemned to death, but all their property was confiscated. The only other instance we shall add is that of Don Martin de los Heros, a distinguished citizen of Biscay, and recently Minister of the Interior, who, though he had not been a Deputy, but had accompanied the King to Cadiz, was punished by the confiscation of a portion of his property. But in this the Regency were guilty of no novelty. From the time that Ferdinand returned from France, up to 1820, there was no such thing as personal secu-

rity in the Basque Provinces, when the Court chose to persecute. During this interval numbers of persons were arrested in Bilboa and other places—kept in dungeons, and often on the point of being taken out to the scaffold. We may mention the names of Senores Olalde and Olavarria, implicated in the cause of General Renovales. In Guipuzcoa, Senores Otalora, Ymaz, and others were seized in the night, the agents of despotism breaking into their houses, and they were carried off to the castle of Pamplona, where they were kept prisoners for years. In Navarre many similar arrests took place.—Where were then, the inviolable *fueros?*

We here leave Lord Carnarvon with "his general and confident denial."

In referring to our statement that the Inquisition did exert its fatal authority in the Basque Provinces, his Lordship adopts the language of the Quarterly Review. "The Inquisition established, where it had a right to do so, in Old Castile, a kind of Holy Fortress to prevent the irruption into its territories of Biscayan liberties. When a fortress is erected on a frontier is it a proof that both sides are subjected to the same authority?" This writer, with that utter disregard of facts which is unhappily a distinguishing feature of Tory and Quarterly Reviewing, chooses to call Logrono a Holy Fortress, and from its being a Holy Fortress deduces the fact that it was a barrier on the borders of the jurisdiction of the Inquisition: and thence infers

that the authority of the Inquisition did not prevail in the provinces, and that the fueros were not violated.

We must, as usual, put down his Lordship and his worthy colleague with a plain statement of facts. The Inquisition was notoriously established in the Vascongado provinces, and those provinces were included in a department of which the tribunal was held at Logrono. In Vitoria, San Sebastian, and Bilboa, resided its Commissary Delegates. In the year 1817, the Commissary Delegate of the Inquisition at Bilboa prosecuted the astronomer Don Jose Joaquin Ferrer, a member of the French Institute, in consequence of the Custom-house having seized some prohibited books found in a case of scientific works addressed to him. The members of the Academy of History at Madrid have a Bull permitting them to read prohibited works; but this protection did not serve Mr. Ferrer: it was only by the exertion of considerable influence with the Supreme Tribunal at Madrid, that the Tribunal at Logrono, the "Holy Fortress," could be persuaded to retrace its steps.

We have thought it worth while to expose some of the numerous errors of Lord Carnarvon respecting the modern state of the rights and privileges of the Basques, not so much because we attribute great importance to the subject, but because such an exposure enables the reader to judge of the general credit to which a writer is entitled. For

whatever may be the actual value of the Vascongado fueros, whatever may be the policy or impolicy of suppressing them, we are firmly convinced that they had nothing to do with the origin of the war, and very little with the spirit or manner in which that war has been carried on. On this subject we have made numerous inquiries, and we find that of all the impartial and enlightened persons, inhabitants or natives of the country, some of whom were actually eye-witnesses of the rising, whom we consulted, not one considers the war a war of fueros. In fact, it is a contest of principles of far other importance than the continuation or suppression of the Basque meetings under the venerable old tree of Guernica. The inhabitants of the country tell us, and every thing confirms the statement, that the war is an apostolical war —that the breaking out was prepared as far back as 1828—that it was only prevented at that time by the King's journey to Barcelona, and by the suppression of the Carlist revolt in Catalonia; and that it was then deferred until the King's death. We know, from personal observation, that during the latter part of Ferdinand's reign the war was universally announced in the country as fixed to take place at that epoch; and it was dreaded by every person of property and consideration from one end of the provinces to the other. The war is one of priests and peasants; the former were nearly all apostolical agents, and the latter their blind and willing instruments. It is a remarkable fact, and

of course unknown to Lord Carnarvon, that the persons who have by far the most interest in the preservation of the fueros, and who form the aristocracy of the country, are almost without exception adherents of the Queen's cause.* These persons are now chiefly exiles in Madrid or in France, where they are living in obscurity on such portion of their moveable property as they could snatch from the devouring flames of war. These men are nearly all *fueristas*, and they did not despair of preserving their privileges under the enlightened government of the Queen Regent. On the other hand, can Lord Carnarvon shew that Don Carlos has ever said a word to the Provinces about their fueros? If the Basques were fighting for these fueros, and if Don Carlos were the protector of them, as Lord Carnarvon imagines, or would have his readers believe, by way of coupling Toryism with something liberal, is it not natural that in his numerous *bandos*, proclamations, and decrees, he should have made some allusion to these privileges. But we believe we may defy Lord Carnarvon, or

* The lawful authorities of the Provinces had hastened to recognize the rights of the daughter of Ferdinand. In the General Junta (Lord Carnarvon's Biscayan Parliament) of July, 1832, it was solemnly resolved to send a formal deputation to compliment the King on his daughter having been sworn and acknowleged Heiress to his throne: and this was done.

What will Lord Carnarvon say, when he learns that Isabel II. has been hailed as Queen by the Biscayan Parliament, "under the venerable old tree of Guernica?"

any of his Carlist friends, whether in London or Onate, to shew us any declaration in which he makes allusion to these fueros. We have enough of divine right and of the church: of the sacrilegious impiety of the Liberals, and their obstinate blindness in refusing to recognize the lawfulness of the Infant's right to the Crown; but not a word of the fueros for which the brave Basque is spilling the last drop of his blood. The truth is, that were Don Carlos to succeed to the throne of Spain, he would continue that war against the fueros which has been waged against them by all his ancestors from the time of Philip V. It has been the object of every one of these Monarchs to advance the Custom-house frontier to the coast of Cantabria. Philip V. actually did so, but was compelled to revoke his order, not by any resistance made by the Basques, but by the enormous quantity of contraband goods which the nature of the coast permitted the smugglers to land, for the supply of the rest of Spain.

It is true that the Constitutional system is also adverse to partial privileges and fueros; but if it takes these away, it gives in their stead free institutions, such as satisfy the most civilized nations. Indeed, so strongly was this truth felt in 1812, that the General Junta, or Biscayan Parliament, on being convoked on account of the publication of the Constitution, and having heard it read to them, declared themselves struck by "the marvellous uni-

formity which existed between the principles of this Constitution and those which had prevailed among them from the most remote antiquity:" nay, they remarked that in the Constitution these privileges were "even somewhat extended."* The same observations may also be applied to the constitutional epoch of 1820-3. Not so, however, to the epoch of the king's death, when the Basques broke out into open rebellion: for then there was no Constitution in existence, and their privileges were in no manner threatened. All that Lord Carnarvon tells us of the great agitation of the Vascongado provinces during the Regency of the Queen, from an apprehension that she and her Ministry were about to abrogate their privileges: of the petition to the King, that he would be pleased to resume the reins of government, &c. is about as *romantic* as any other part of his work.

Indeed we are able to state, on authority of a most satisfactory kind, that so far is Lord Carnarvon from being justified in attributing to the Queen Regent of Spain hostility to the fueros of the Basques, it has been, on the contrary, her invariable opinion, that those fueros ought to be respected, and that her Majesty still retains this opinion, even after the guilt the Basques have in-

* Actas de las Juntas generales ó sean acuerdos de las celebradas en Bilbao en los dias 16, &c. del mes de Octubre de 1812. Sesion del dia 18. p. 14.

curred by their resistance to their lawful Sovereign, her daughter.

Lord Carnarvon has attributed a most absurd importance to the proclamation of Castanon. It is a mistake to suppose that General Castanon *abolished* the *fueros:* he had neither the power nor the intention to do so: but in his capacity of Captain-General, he prudently or imprudently *suspended* them, until the pleasure of her Majesty the Queen was taken on the subject. But that only after the provinces had, upwards of six weeks, been declared under martial law, and with a positive exception, for any part of them which remained under the authority of its legitimate deputation. The three first articles of this Bando, which we insert in a note,* will undeceive all those who may

* Mando 1. *En consecuencia de la declaracion en estado de guerra de las Provincias de Vizcaya y Alava,* hecha en la Ley marcial del 14 de Octubre ultimo, quedan *suspendidos* los fueros y privilegios de que disputaban, y reasumidas y dependientes de mi autoridad todas las que existan en dichas provincias en todos los ramos de gobierno, y administracion *hasta la Soberana resolucion* de S. M. la Reyna Nuestra Senora, exceptuando la de Guipuzcoa en la parte que está encomendada á su Diputacion legitima.

2° Pero á fin de que no se interrumpa el curso de los negocios y no se causen danos irreparables al Real Servicio, *continuarán los Alcaldes y Ayuntamientos con las mismas atribuciones economicas y gubernativas que antes tenian, igualmente* la justicia segun las reglas establecidas.

3° En los pueblos en que existan los mismos Alcaldes y Ayuntamientos legitimos que habia antes del dia cinco de Octubre ultimo,

have been led into the belief that any measure, emanating from the Queen's Government, or from any of its officers, contributed to the breaking out of this rebellion, for which the friends of absolute sway are every where endeavouring to get up a false sympathy.

We have only one more remark to make on this subject. The population of the Vascongado provinces amounts to 284,000 souls. For this insignificant portion of the Spanish nation, be its privileges what they may, Lord Carnarvon would condemn the many millions of that noble people to all the horrors of a revengeful tyranny. He sees, or would have us see, in this contest, only a few mountaineers struggling for their liberties against an oppressor. Let not the public of England be deceived by this vain imagination. The liberties of these provinces are not what he has represented them; and if the inhabitants had preserved peace, and had refrained from rebelling against the Sovereign, to whom they had, through their Parliament, already done homage, it is certain that no change really injurious to their interests, or derogatory to their liberties, would have been brought about by the Government of Isabel, whose chief supporters

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continuarán en el goce de sus atribuciones municipales: pero donde los hubiesen mudado los rebeldes, serán restituidos inmediatamente los primeros al ejercicio de sus fúrciones. Capitanía General de Guipuzcoa. Tolosa 30 de Noviembre de 1833.

have always been, above all other men, distinguished for their devoted love of free institutions. Let not the public of England be deceived. The protegé of the Holy Alliance cares little for the liberties of the Basques. The *fueros* are a mere party tool, and few party devices were ever more gross, than that of endeavouring to make the freedom of one small department a handle wherewith irrevocably to rivet social, political, and ecclesiastical degradation, on a whole empire.

Lord Carnarvon presuming, we suppose, upon some more than human attributes of his own, takes upon himself to address us in the language of Holy Writ, and says, "Out of thine own mouth do I condemn thee," with reference to our statement that "the day that the French frontier can be closed against the Carlists, the war may be considered at an end." And his Lordship looking down from the eminence to which he has thus raised himself, solemnly passes judgment upon us, because we had previously affirmed, that the French army, although possessing the numerous advantages which we detailed, had been defeated in 1809, in the Basque Provinces. Undismayed, however, by the verdict thus pronounced against us, we shall appeal from it in a few words to any impartial reader. It is not a very strained proposition to affirm, that when an army has nothing to eat, the time is not far off when it will cease to fight; and when one of two contending parties leaves off the practice of fighting, we be-

lieve it may generally be said, that the contest is as good as over. The Queen's troops occupied the whole course of the Ebro, and a line drawn through Pamplona and Zubiri to the French frontier ;—no provisions, therefore, could pass from the interior into the Basque Provinces, and those provinces do not produce enough to support the Carlist forces collected in them. Those forces have always been dependent upon France for their supplies, and it is manifest that when the French frontier was closed against them, the war might be considered to be at an end. But Lord Carnarvon by placing in juxta position two passages of our pamphlet, which he quotes with more dexterity than good faith, seeks to make it appear that we have fallen into a contradiction.

In exemplification of the nature of the country in the Basque Provinces, we instanced the effectual resistance which Mina, with a small force, had been able to make against the well appointed armies of France : but we did not say, that Mina's army was not perfectly supplied with every thing it stood in need of.

In another part of our pamphlet, we said with reference to the supplies of the Carlist army, and not with reference to those circumstances by which alone the French were defeated, that the day the frontier of France was closed, the war might be considered at an end. Circumstances, moreover, have occurred which, in a singular manner, sup-

port what we advanced. After the repulse of the British Legion at Hernani, on the 16th of March, the Carlists were occupied day and night in strengthening their lines, and in fortifying Hernani, Oriamendi, Astigarraga, &c. and in rendering every approach to the French frontier as difficult for their opponents as possible. When the main body of the Queen's army was passing from Bilboa to San Sebastian, a Council of War, composed of all the Carlist Chiefs, was held on the 6th of May, at Tolosa, at which it was resolved, that the lines of Hernani and the communications with France should be defended at whatever cost.

The Carlist troops were accordingly marched up from Estella, and every preparation was made for a battle, which each party knew would be decisive.

On the 9th of May, Espartero, with the last division of his army, arrived at San Sebastian, and on the 12th, the Carlists, not daring to await the issue of the combat, decamped in the night with the main body of their army, and with all the baggage and artillery which they could carry with them.

Hernani was entered by the Queen's troops on the 14th; the fall of Irun and Fuenterrabia, and the stoppage of all communication with France, were then inevitable; and on the 19th, the Infants Don Carlos and Don Sebastian, with more than one-half of the army, and with the whole of the Carlist Court, its Bishops and Friars included, started off to seek a resting place elsewhere, and left to the

mercy of the invaders that country, which had been compelled to make such tremendous sacrifices for the Carlist cause. We know that the Newspaper Correspondents, and other authorities of equal weight, have attempted to give to this expedition the character of a great *coup d'etat*—that the Pretender was to occupy Lower Aragon, to raise the Castiles in his favour, and to march upon Madrid. If these, however, were his objects, it is clear he has signally failed. If he had not such objects in view, and what military man who will follow upon the map the wandering march of the Carlist expedition, can be of opinion that he had; and what man of common sense can believe that Carlos of his own accord or free choice, left Navarre for the barren mountains of Catalonia, if he had no such object in view? Why, then we say, that the movement was a forced one; that the Pretender with the flower of his army was driven from the country he had till then occupied, and has placed himself, because he could not help it, upon a level with Gomez, or Don Basilio, or any other scrambling chief of a marauding expedition, whose course is rapid to escape pursuit, is marked by violence and plunder, to relieve the urgent necessities of the moment, and is remembered with abhorrence and resentment by the country which has been traversed by such a scourge.

We will, however, admit, that instead of expressing our belief that the day the French frontier can

be closed against the Carlists, the "war may be considered" at an end, we should have said, that on that day the war "*ought*" to be at an end, for we confess we had not sufficiently taken into our calculation, the skill of the Queen's Generals in making the least of their advantages. On the 24th of May, the Carlist expedition, with only three days provisions, was shut up in Huesca, and if Iribarren had only waited until the following day, when the division of Buerens was to arrive, he would have been greatly superior to the Carlists in numbers, and the surrounding country being occupied by the armed peasantry of Aragon, who had risen en masse against the enemy, not a man of the Carlists would have escaped. Iribarren, however, attacked them in the town with his inferior force, and he was of course unsuccessful. Oraa subsequently at Barbastro did no better, and with a negligence unpardonable, and hitherto unexplained, he allowed the enemy to cross a rapid river with all their wounded and baggage during the night, when with the utmost ease he could have annihilated them. With similar ingenuity did the Baron de Meer avoid reaping the fruits of the action at Grà, which ought to have been decisive; and he afterwards permitted the enemy to cross the Ebro, as they had previously passed the Cuica. Espartero remained inactive for a fortnight at Hernani, and then marched with scarcely any opposition through the whole of the country, which till that time had been occupied by the Car-

lists. He was at the head of nearly 30,000 men, while the enemy's force did not amount to 10,000, and had he displayed the commonest energy or activity, he might, at this moment, have brought the whole of the insurgent country to the same state of tranquillity which prevails in the districts adjacent to Irun and Hernani, where the proprietors and peasantry have returned to their homes, where the ordinary business of life has been resumed in its accustomed security, and where a universal satisfaction is expressed by the inhabitants at their happy change of masters.

Saving then our erratum, we believe that when our readers reflect, that in consequence of the probability of losing the communication with France, Don Carlos was compelled to abandon that country where alone his cause had flourished; that he and his expedition might with common prudence or skill have been taken prisoners or destroyed: and that with common activity the Basque Provinces might now be occupied by the Queen's forces, our "calculations" will not be considered so manifestly inconclusive, or our "statements so directly opposed to each other;" but it will rather be thought that "a certain nobleman,"* instead of being an upright judge, has but borne false witness against us.

Lord Carnarvon says (p. 311) that it is almost unnecessary to add that our statement "that Don

* St. Luke, chap. 19, ver. 12.

Carlos refused the assistance of Austria when coupled with the condition of not re-establishing the Inquisition, is wholly incorrect." His Lordship, however, admits that an "agent acting on behalf of Austria, Russia, and Prussia, communicated with Don Carlos on the subject of the Inquisition, to whose re-establishment those powers were naturally and justly opposed." But does his Lordship really believe that those powers took the trouble of sending an agent to Don Carlos for the purpose of innocently "communicating" with him upon the subject? out of mere idle curiosity to know what his Royal Highness's opinions might happen to be respecting that institution? or does he not suspect that they may perchance have had some definite objects in view when they jointly sent this agent, and that one of those objects might be to obtain a pledge against the re-establishment of that institution to which they were "naturally and justly opposed," and which they believed Don Carlos was inclined to support, as their agent confesses that "he adverted to the point with some apprehension?" The very answer of the Infant, as given by Lord Carnarvon, proves the object of the mission. His Royal Highness "observed his views were much misunderstood; that he was quite aware that the Inquisition was unsuited to the age, and he would never be the man to restore it." Does not this answer indicate what was the question to which it was a reply? But even if these are the real

opinions of Don Carlos, which they may or may not be, still Don Carlos is not a free agent, and never can be any thing but an instrument in the hands of a fanatical and ferocious party. He accordingly did not, and could not give the pledge against the re-establishment of the Inquisition, which his disclaiming allies required of him. Lord Carnarvon says that, relying upon party authorities, we have "announced to our readers negociations that have never occurred, offers which have never been tendered, and refusals which have never been made." In answer, we say that our authority was certainly a party one, for it was a warm advocate of the Carlist cause, and one of the oldest as well as perhaps the most distinguished of European diplomatists: his words were exactly those given in our pamphlet, that an agent had been sent to Don Carlos with offers of assistance, upon condition of his promising an amnesty, and not to re-establish the Inquisition upon his coming to the throne. He added likewise that the three Courts in question were indignant at the pledge having been refused by the Infant. We know likewise that the same intelligence was written by more than one Ambassador to his Court from Paris. Lord Carnarvon says that the agent admitted to him he had "communicated" with Don Carlos upon the subject, but though "a man of birth and honour," he must have been a sorry diplomatist (and therefore a very unlikely man to have been selected for such a mis-

sion) if he had admitted that general persecution and the re-establishment of the Inquisition were to be the preannounced consequences of Don Carlos coming to the throne; for such a fact would have cooled even the zeal of so hot a partizan of the Infant as Lord Carnarvon, and would have rendered all support of the Carlist cause at once and for ever impossible in England. This agent, therefore, wisely concealed part of the truth from his Lordship; and with respect to the amnesty, he appears either to have been silent, or to have said that, which Lord Carnarvon deems it prudent not to make public.

As for the evidence of Captain Henningsen and his "well-written letter," addressed to a fashionable Morning Paper, we can hardly treat them seriously. A letter from the Bishop of Leon to a Spanish diplomatist, and another from Don Carlos to the Bishop, are given; the first saying that a manifesto should be published announcing the re-establishment of the old councils of Toledo, by which the Inquisition would be quietly abolished, and the second, declaring the readiness of the writer to publish the manifesto in question, although he states, with a candour which we recommend to Lord Carnarvon's notice, as one of the inconveniences of a manifesto, that it raises expectations "one may never be able to realize."

But can these documents be looked upon by any reasonable man as proof of what Don Carlos would

do in times and circumstances different from those in which he found himself when those documents were written? What excellent resolutions are made in adversity, and totally forgotten, or rejected as inconvenient, when fortune turns in our favour! What wise plans of reform are meditated by men out of power, and discovered to be dangerous and inexpedient when the moment for putting them in practice arrives! "Height will recall high thoughts; ease will recant vows made in pain, as violent and void." We are perfectly prepared to admit, that should Don Carlos ever reign, the abolition of the Inquisition would be both dangerous and inexpedient—nay, more, he would find it impossible to dispense with the Inquisition. Fanaticism and the throne of Charles V. must be inseparable; and to carry on the only system which would give Carlos a chance of wearing his crown, the Inquisition is an instrument as indispensable as popular representation is to the maintenance of a constitutional form of government. That tribunal must reign in all its dreadful power, and well the Bishop of Leon knows it. Accordingly, when Don Carlos informs him that, if he "still judges the manifesto necessary and useful," he is ready to publish it, it never appears. But how can Lord Carnarvon say that the gallant captain (Henningsen) *justly* observes that the Inquisition "is still deeply rooted in the prejudices, if not in the affections, of the peasantry." If it is to the

Basque peasantry that the captain alludes, we will give his authority all the weight to which a few months campaigning with Zumalacarregui may entitle it; but then, what becomes of the abhorrence of the Basques to the institution, and their effectual resistance against its establishment among them? If it is of the peasantry of all Spain that he speaks, what are his data for such an utterly unfounded assertion? Where has he acquired, or upon what grounds does he pretend to possess, any information respecting the people of Spain? Lord Carnarvon possesses upon this subject all that Mr. Henningsen has not, and Lord Carnarvon should not have thus identified himself with a calumny against the humbler classes of the Spanish nation.

Let it not be supposed that in thus predicting the re-establishment of the Inquisition, we speak in parables like Lord Carnarvon, or do more than argue from the past as to what would be the future fate of Spain, if Don Carlos were to establish his pretensions; and if it should be the inscrutable decree of Providence thus to humble and chastise the Spanish nation. We will beg our readers to go back with us to a period that must be in the memory of most of them, and to bear in mind that Ferdinand VII. was a far abler man than his brother, and much better acquainted with his country, and fully convinced of the dangers of allowing any one party to obtain supremacy in the state. The period to which we allude, is that when the French army had

delivered the King from a Constitutional form of Government, and when he *spontaneously* published a manifesto of which the following are extracts:—

"Spaniards,—It being the first care of a King to provide for the happiness of his subjects, and that happiness being incompatible with doubt respecting the future fate of the nation and its individuals, I hasten to calm the misgivings and anxiety which might be produced by an apprehension that despotism should be enthroned, or that the rancour of a party should prevail."

His Majesty then, after adverting to the disasters of the war, says, "he is desirous of making known the sentiments of his heart by publishing the following manifestation."

"Art. 1.—I declare of my own free and spontaneous will, and promise upon the faith and assurance of my royal word, that if any change in the actual political institutions of the country shall become necessary, I will adopt a Government which shall render complete the happiness of the nation, by guaranteeing the personal security, the property, and the civil liberty of Spaniards.

"Art. 2.—In the same manner I freely and *spontaneously* promise, and I have resolved to carry and to cause to be carried into effect, a general oblivion, complete and absolute, of all the past without any exception whatever; for by that means will be re-established among Spaniards the tranquillity and confidence which are so indispensable for the

general good which my paternal heart so anxiously desires.

"Art. 3.—Recognises all the debts and obligations contracted by the nation under the constitutional system.

"Art. 4.—Retains in their rank, employments, pay and honours, all military, naval, ecclesiastical, and civil employés of the Constitutional Government.

"Art. 5.—Contains a solemn pledge that the Militia of Madrid, Seville, and other places then at Cadiz, as well as every class of Spaniards, might safely return to their homes under the assurance that they would never be molested at any time for their former political conduct or opinions."

This Decree was signed and published at Cadiz on the 30th September, 1823. On the following day, the too notorious Don Victor Saez (and we beg to remind our readers that this man was a *priest*), arrived at Puerto Santa Maria, having been named Prime Minister of the King, and within a few hours a Royal Decree was issued, of which we subjoin some passages.

"The scandalous excesses which preceded, accompanied, and continued after the establishment of the democratical constitution of Cadiz in the month of March, 1820, are most public and notorious to all my vassals—the most criminal treason—the most shameful cowardice—the most horrible disrespect of my royal person, and the most inevitable violence were the elements employed for the purpose

of essentially changing the paternal Goverment of my realms, by a democratical code, the fertile origin of disasters and calamities."

After stating that the nation had exclaimed with one voice against the tyrannical constitution, and that his vassals had appealed to Europe, his Majesty proceeds: "The whole of Europe, aware of my captivity, and that of my Royal family, of the miserable situation of my loyal and faithful vassals, and of the pernicious maxims which Spanish agents every where propagated, determined to put an end to a state of things which was a universal scandal, and led to the overthrow of all thrones and all ancient institutions, converting them into irreligion and immorality."

"France charged with this holy enterprise has, in a few months, triumphed over the efforts of all the rebels of the world, united for the misfortune of Spain, upon the classic soil of fidelity and loyalty. My august and beloved cousin, the Duke of Angouleme, at the head of a valiant army, and conqueror in all my dominions, has rescued me from the slavery in which I languished, restoring me to my faithful and constant vassals."

"Seated once again upon the Throne of St. Ferdinand by the wise and just hand of the Almighty, by the generous resolutions of my powerful allies, and by the intrepidity of my beloved cousin, the Duke of Angouleme and his valiant army, and desiring to provide a remedy for the most urgent

necessities of my people, and to manifest to the whole world my real will in the first moments of having recovered my liberty, I decree the following:

"1. All the acts (of whatever class or kind they may be) of the Government called Constitutional, which has domineered over my people from the 7th of March, 1820, till to-day the 1st of October, 1823, are null and without value, declaring as I do declare, that in the whole of this period I have not been at liberty, that I have been obliged to sanction the laws and expedite the orders, decrees, and regulations which, against my will, were prepared and expedited by the Government.

"2. I approve all that has been decreed and ordained by the Provisional Junta of Government, and by the Regency of the kingdom, the former established in Oyarzun on the 9th of April, and the latter in Madrid, on the 23rd of May of the present year, &c. &c."

No comment from us is necessary upon these documents; but as the circumstances under which the first decree was promulgated are not generally known, it may be interesting to our readers to be made acquainted with them.

During the latter days of September, 1823, the hopelessness of the constitutional cause had become manifest even to its most strenuous defenders. After the taking of the Trocadero, the French army was looked upon as invincible. The King, indeed, was in the Isle of Leon with his Ministers, and with

the remnant of the Cortes, but not only was there no money, nor any means of carrying on the contest, but the troops gave signs of mutiny, and it was evident that if called upon to act on the defensive, they would lay down their arms. Under these circumstances the King, on the 29th of September, announced to his Ministers that he should go to Puerto Sta. Maria, and join the French army; they did their utmost to dissuade him from taking such a step, but upon his continuing firm to his purpose, they respectfully announced their intention of resigning. Ferdinand argued the subject with them in the most friendly manner, and ended by approving their determination with reference to the then existing state of things; he added that his motive in joining the Duke of Angouleme was to forward the objects that he had of late discussed with his Ministers, in consequence of foreseeing the final triumph of the French army; and these objects form the subject of the decree in question.

On the morning of the 30th the Ministers resigned, when the King expressed his hope that they would not leave him till the last moment, and said his departure was fixed for an early hour on the following morning. The reply was, that as private individuals they would not desert his Majesty so long as he pleased to desire their services, but that as Ministers their functions had altogether ceased. Subsequently to this conversation one of the Ex-Ministers suggested to the King, that it might

serve to quiet the alarm which was naturally felt by a large body of his Majesty's subjects, if some manifestation on his part were made of the policy which he should pursue under the new order of things, and of the principles upon which the government of the country would in future be conducted.

The King expressed his complete approbation of the suggestion, and a decree was drawn up, solely with reference to the intentions recently expressed by his Majesty to his Ministers. Ferdinand with his own hand corrected the draft,* and overruled the objections of the Ministers upon various points of form which would have delayed the publication of the decree; and six thousand copies of it were on the same day printed and distributed.

No act ever emanated more spontaneously from a Sovereign; indeed coercion was out of the question, for that implies power, and the Ministers had none to give effect to their will. The King's determination to proceed to Puerto Sta. Maria was known to, and well received by the troops; the resignation of the Ministers was likewise made public; and the King, if it had occurred to him, or he had thought it necessary, might have arrested every member of his late Government, and every Deputy of the Cortes then in the Isle of Leon. But on the night of the 30th he not only took leave of the Ex-

* The original draft, with the King's corrections, is extant at Madrid.

Ministers with every demonstration of regard, but insisted upon all the members of his family (who had retired to rest early, for the purpose of being ready for the journey on the following morning) getting up from their beds to do the same.

Yet within four-and-twenty hours after that time, Ferdinand issued his decree of general proscription, in which we see recorded the principles of the apostolical party, and the dire results of priestly vengeance; and if we did not fear to tire the patience and to disgust the feelings of our readers, we should upon this occasion give an account of persecutions which followed the restitution of Ferdinand to despotic power; they breathe a spirit of the bloodiest and blindest vengeance, and are quite unparalleled in modern history. We may hereafter think it our duty to lay a succinct history of them before the British public, in order that it may be well understood what kind of system the Tories of England are seeking to establish in Spain, and how his Majesty's Ministers, in endeavouring to avert such a calamity from a brave and generous people, have been engaged in a work of philanthropy, and conforming to that great Christian maxim of doing as they would be done by.

But the Carlists would now have far different accounts to settle with their present opponents, from those which Ferdinand had with his subjects in 1823; and ample in proportion would be the vengeance, for they would have no army of French-

men, and no Duke of Angouleme to exert even the poor control which was then exercised over Ferdinand. Terror would be their watchword—blood and more blood, their unceasing cry—the extermination of their enemies would be their only satisfaction and their only security. And yet unmindful of the past, and careless of what *must* be the future, if fanaticism should ever sit enthroned in Spain, Lord Carnarvon would wish the enlightened people of England to believe, upon the faith of a couple of letters written from the mountains of Biscay, and published, by a Captain that *was*, in the Morning Post, that the Government of Don Carlos would be mild and paternal; that the apostolicals would prove blind to their interests and false to their principles, in order to be "distinguished by moderation;" that they would "exercise clemency" when they were able to glut their vengeance; and that they would voluntarily abstain from the use of means by which alone their unhallowed power could be upheld.

Ignorant must that man be of that party in Spain, or perversely must he use his knowledge, who holds out such a visionary hope. It was the fear of disgusting that party that prevented Don Carlos from publishing his manifesto, (if he or his reverend adviser ever really entertained such an intention); and were he to succeed, and then to attempt a system of moderation, we tell Lord Carnarvon that he would be hurled from the throne by the very hands that

placed him there, as an apostate to his party, and as a traitor to those principles by which alone theocratical government can exist.

Lord Carnarvon however says, (p. 310) that these letters "will satisfy all candid minds on this part of the Spanish question;" but if they do, there must exist in such minds as marvellous a predisposition to credulity, as in those who would believe his Lordship "no friend to despotic Governments." We are disinclined to doubt any thing proceeding from Lord Carnarvon, but we must at the same time regret that in every page of his work he should so woefully misrepresent his own opinions. Indeed if our readers will turn to p. 318, we think they will discover in his Lordship an (apparently) lurking kindliness even for the Inquisition itself.

It is evidently with extreme reluctance that Lord Carnarvon can bring himself to speak of the Durango Decree in terms even of decent reprobation. His Lordship thinks it "cruel (p. 317), and is sure that it has prejudiced the Infant's cause." He "objects to it, not because he thinks it contrary to the law of nations, but because he looks upon it as barbarous, as inconsistent with the spirit of the age, *and involving an unnecessary waste of life*"— (a Peer of England calls the wholesale slaughter of his fellow-countrymen *an unnecessary* waste of life!) Lord Carnarvon believes, however, that the Decree was "forced upon the reluctant Prince, by the extreme exasperation of a people whose native land

was invaded, and whose hereditary rights were outraged by foreigners, with whom they were at peace." But what proof does Lord Carnarvon bring either of the exasperation of the people, or of the reluctance of the Prince? If he has inquired at all about the matter, he must know that he has no such proof to give. He must know that the people were not, and could not be, in any way consulted about it—that their exasperation, whatever it might have been, never could have taken the form of controlling the will of their King, who was not, therefore, in a situation to display reluctance; and who, therefore, with his guilty advisers, must themselves, personally, and for ever, bear the indelible stain of that atrocious edict. In further proof of this, we beg to ask what had become of the extreme exasperation of the Basques, when Don Carlos excepted the British Marines from the operation of the Durango Decree? for they were, more completely than the Legion, foreigners in the Provinces. The British Legion fought under the Queen's colours, were mixed with her troops, and were, to all intents and purposes, Spanish soldiers, as much as the numerous foreigners serving in the ranks of the Pretender,—while the British Marines were, in every sense of the word, foreigners in the Provinces; but Don Carlos hesitated not an instant in making an exception in their favour, for he knew what the consequences to himself, of not doing so, would be.

Lord Carnarvon says, he had "sincerely hoped the decree had become little more than a dead letter:"—but he had no more ground for hope in this case, than for his belief in the one we have just cited. His Lordship might have expressed his hope that no more Englishmen would have fallen into the hands of the Carlist butchers, for that is the only way by which the decree could have become a dead letter, and Lord Carnarvon knows well that not a single Englishman has been spared by the Carlists, not even those who had but an hour before, with a generosity which might have touched any but a Carlist heart, relieved from their own scanty store, the wants of their wounded and expiring enemies. His Lordship adds, that he saw with deep disgust, that "*an injudicious officer* of the Carlist cause had recently inflicted the last penalty of the law on some prisoners of the British Legion," and he subsequently calls it *an unfeeling act.* Can a greater curse befal a country than that party-spirit which can lead a man, like Lord Carnarvon, to look upon the deliberate and cold-blooded murder of Englishmen simply as an error in judgment, and as a mere want of proper good feeling! The same sad influence must have blunted his Lordship's powers of perception, when he compared the Decree of Durango with the "equally severe Proclamation" issued by General Evans. For what says the latter? that his Legion was acting in complete conjunction with the British Marine forces—that is, that the British flag waved by the side of

that of Spain—that the troops of both countries were united together, and General Evans accordingly gave notice, that all Englishmen found in arms, in the ranks of the insurgents, would be making war upon the troops and upon the flag of England, and would be liable to, and if taken would *probably* suffer, the punishment awarded to such offence by the British laws.

General Evans had issued no Proclamation of the kind previously to the co-operation of the British naval and marine forces, thereby clearly shewing that he recognised in himself no authority to punish British subjects. But upon her Majesty's forces taking part in the contest, he then, and not till then, warned her Majesty's subjects of the consequences to which they might expose themselves. But he did not say that he had the power or the right to inflict those consequences upon them. The word "probably" points plainly to the British Government, and shews that it was not by him that the sentence was to be passed or to be carried into execution. Can any one doubt, that if an Englishman had been taken in the act of deliberately firing the Carlist guns against one of her Majesty's vessels of war, such a man would have been liable to the severest penalty of the law? and was it not an act of the strictest propriety on the part of General Evans, as the commanding officer of the Queen, and an act of humanity in him, as an Englishman, to announce to his countrymen the change of circumstances which had taken place in the war, and to

warn them of the consequences of that change? Nay, did not Lord Ranelagh, in his published correspondence with Lord John Hay, plead ignorance of the co-operation of her Majesty's forces as an excuse, a lame one indeed, for his being found fighting in the Carlist ranks? Yet Lord Carnarvon calls the Proclamation "the precise counterpart of the Durango Edict, emulating that document in the severity of its enactments." And says, with an affected ignorance, which sits upon him as ill as on other occasions his pretended knowledge, that *he does not know whether any Englishman has suffered* under our exterminating edict!!!

Public attention, never very willingly bestowed in England upon Foreign Affairs, is now so completely occupied by matters of great domestic interest, that we feel we should but weary our readers if we rejoined to all Lord Carnarvon's replies to our statements, or if we pointed out the numerous instances in which he has, to our great surprise, not thought it beneath him to misrepresent what we have said. We shall pass by, without observation, the strange inconsistency with which, after condemning her Majesty's Ministers, in such bitter terms, for having interfered in Spain, he quarrels with them (p. 322) for not having done so sooner. We shall say nothing more about the murder of Cabrera's mother —a horrid crime, but which has been an invaluable event to the Tories, who have turned it to account upon every occasion, shewing thereby how few are the acts of cruelty committed by the Queen's troops,

which they are able to set off against the diabolical atrocities of the Carlists.

We beg to remark, however, that when Lord Carnarvon says, that the cases of the war of independence and of the present contest are not parallel, and that in the former the British Government did not interfere to prevent cruelties, because "every British interest was involved in the issue of the war:" he soils the purity of his benevolence most grievously, for he admits that our interests are to be the measure of our humanity, and he affirms a position to which we beg to demur, namely, that the true interests of a cause can be really promoted by such detestable means. We trust that Lord Carnarvon wrote this passage inadvertently, for the principle which it implies, is akin to the most odious parts of the political system of Machiavel. We would also, while we are on this part of Lord Carnarvon's chapter, ask him upon what grounds he ventures to assert that "the Spanish Government of to-day, sit quietly in the council-room at Madrid; send forth instructions to their Generals which would disgrace a barbarous country and a heathen age." Where are these instructions? by whom, to whom, and when were any such issued by the Spanish Government? We know of none, and we believe that Lord Carnarvon is, on this point, in the same state of ignorance as ourselves. His Lordship is a poet, and to a poet's license he is entitled when he is writing poetry—but a libel, fit

only for the pamphlets of his protegés, should not have found its way into his works in prose.

After having expressed our reluctance to enter upon trifling matters, our readers will believe that we advert most unwillingly to the case of Mr. Honan, and we are really ashamed of occupying, on such a topic, their time and our own: but as Lord Carnarvon uses such very small arms for his attack, we must, we suppose, have recourse to weapons equally diminutive.

We should have thought that Lord Carnarvon, remembering Mr. Honan's letter to the Morning Post, declaring that every word stated in our pamphlet respecting him, with the exception of the single fact of his arrest at Madrid, is devoid of truth, and comparing that sweeping declaration with the "statement of the transaction," nearly as he "received it from Mr. Honan's own lips," would have hesitated before he himself asserted that either our premises, or our inferences, were "wholly void of foundation." It was, however, necessary for his Lordship not to hesitate, for had he done so, he would have weakened his own strange deductions respecting the oppressive character of the Spanish Government, and the total decline of British influence in Spain.

We shall now state the whole case in a few words, and we do so upon the authority, and on the responsibility, of Mr. Villiers himself. Immediately upon Mr. Honan's arrival at Madrid, he called upon Mr. Villiers for the purpose, as he himself said, of explaining the causes of his return: he then volun-

tarily, and without any solicitation on the part of Mr. Villiers, to whom Mr. Honan's comings and goings were utterly indifferent, told him of the correspondence which had taken place between himself and the proprietor of the Morning Herald respecting his journey to Madrid, by which it appeared that Mr. Honan had set forth in strong terms the impropriety of his returning to the Spanish capital after his residence in the Basque Provinces; and after the letters which he had written, and published with his name, when there. Mr. Honan likewise read to Mr. Villiers the letter which determined him to set out upon his journey, for it threatened him with loss of employment, if he delayed any longer, which, Mr. Honan said, having a wife and family, he could not afford. Mr. Honan then repeated to Mr. Villiers the various reasons why he considered that it was improper and personally dangerous for him to come back to Spain, in which Mr. Villiers agreed, and Mr. Honan added, that all the friends and acquaintances he had met, had expressed their surprise at his having ventured to return. Mr. Honan, at the same interview, himself informed Mr. Villiers, that he had been refused a passport, to proceed to Madrid, by the authorities of Barcelona. Mr. Villiers frankly informed Mr. Honan, that he looked upon him as a Carlist agent, and should not permit him to forward his correspondence in future by the couriers of the British Legation.

Subsequently to this visit of Mr. Honan's, Mr.

Villiers received a private letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, stating that considerable excitement had been caused by Mr. Honan's return to Madrid, from the idea that he was an emissary of the Pretender's, and that the Government, in order to prevent any disagreeable occurrence, were desirous of sending him away, but would not do so without previous communication with Mr. Villiers. Mr. Villiers, upon the receipt of this letter, immediately went to the Foreign Office, where the Secretary of State shewed him the report of the Civil Governor of Madrid, which stated that Mr. Honan's return had produced great indignation among the numerous persons to whom Mr. Honan and his correspondence from the Basque Provinces were known; and that, as notwithstanding the vigilance which the Police would be directed to observe, an insult or an accident might happen to Mr. Honan in any moment of popular excitement, the civil authority was desirous that he should not continue to reside in Madrid.*

Under these circumstances the Minister said it was intended to send Mr. Honan out of the country by the way either of Cadiz or Portugal, because if

* The Minister likewise expressed his great surprise that Mr. Honan should have managed to get there, as the authorities upon the frontier had orders not to permit his entrance into Spain, adding, that as Mr. Honan was expected from Catalonia, they had probably been deceived by his coming from Paris with the British Ambassador's passport.

allowed to go by the northern road, he would probably proceed to the Basque Provinces, with the results of his mission to Madrid.

Mr. Villiers did not deny the right of the Government to send away any foreigner from Madrid, nor could he object to the expediency of it, after the opinion he had himself expressed to Mr. Honan of his vocation. An opinion too of which he had made no secret to various persons who had mentioned the subject to him—but he told the Spanish Minister that he should much dislike to see a British subject conveyed away like a prisoner, and that he believed there would be no occasion for it. He stipulated likewise, that Mr. Honan should be allowed to take his own time for leaving Madrid, and to select the road he thought most convenient to himself. He added, moreover, that if Mr. Honan chose the north road, and gave his word not to diverge from it, he (Mr. V.) would be responsible to the Spanish Government for the promise being faithfully kept.

These conditions were all unhesitatingly agreed to by the Secretary of State, who said, there was not the slightest wish to behave with disrespect to the British Minister, or with unnecessary harshness towards a British subject; and upon Mr. Villiers undertaking to make the matter known to Mr. Honan, it was agreed that Mr. Honan should not receive any other communication from the Spanish Government.

Mr. Villiers accordingly did make the communication of what had passed with the Spanish Minister in all its details to Mr. Honan, who replied that nothing but force should induce him to leave Madrid—that to force he should of course make no resistance, but that to nothing else should he yield.

Mr. Villiers had no alternative but to make known to the Government Mr. Honan's determination not to take the advice which had been tendered to him in a friendly way. The Spanish Minister, however, appeared to hesitate about adopting the measures which Mr. Honan had declared would be necessary for his removal, as upon two separate occasions he asked Mr. Villiers if Mr. Honan would not consent to withdraw himself quietly from Madrid. Mr. Villiers replied, that Mr. Honan had not altered his determination, and the Minister declared it was absolutely necessary that he should not remain, as sooner or later he would be the occasion of an "alboroto" (disturbance).

Some days afterwards Mr. Honan was conveyed by the police to the frontier of Portugal.

This statement, we repeat, is given upon the authority of Mr. Villiers, but it may not be inopportune here to observe that the accuracy of the statement contained in our first pamphlet has been confirmed by various highly respectable British residents at Madrid, who *had heard the details from Mr. Honan's own lips.*

Will any Englishman deny that a Government,

be it constitutional or despotic, has a right to send away an obnoxious foreigner from its dominions? Will any reasonable man deny that Mr. Honan's was a case for the fair exercise of that right, when it is considered that he had arrived at the capital of Spain, fresh from the Basque Provinces, where he had written letters styling Don Carlos king, and foretelling his speedy victories and glories, and boasting of the favours which had been shewn him by that prince and his officers? Is it surprising that after this the public of Madrid, in the midst of a civil war and at a moment of great excitement, should have looked upon his return to the capital as impudently braving the Government, or that the Government should, therefore, on his own account, desire his removal? Did not Mr. Honan himself foretell, in his correspondence with the proprietor of his paper, exactly what must happen to him? and could any Government in the performance of their duty have acted with greater forbearance? Yet Mr. Honan tells Lord Carnarvon, and his Lordship believes it, that he had expressed his readiness to leave the kingdom on receiving any direct intimation to that effect from the Government. Why, what intimation could be more direct than one officially made to him by the British Minister, in the name and on behalf of the Spanish Government? an intimation that made him acquainted with the more rigorous measures which had first been resolved upon, and the milder ones which, through

Mr. Villiers's intervention, were afterwards agreed to. What course could be more respectful to the British Minister, or less harsh towards Mr. Honan? or how could the Spanish Government subsequently avoid resorting to the only measures which Mr. Honan declared would compel him to leave Madrid? How can Lord Carnarvon possibly credit for an instant that "Mr. Villiers had pledged his word to Mr. Mendizabal that Mr. Honan was not a Carlist agent?"—Have pledged his word as to what another man *was not!* and that man Mr. Honan, just returned from the court of Don Carlos, and whose correspondence Mr. Villiers had refused to forward, not on account of his Carlist opinions (because with them Mr. Villiers had no concern, and though of course aware of them, he had always, during Mr. Honan's former residence at Madrid, afforded him all the facilities for conveying his correspondence and all the information he desired), but because he considered him a Carlist agent. Mr. Honan must have laughed in his sleeve when he got Lord Carnarvon to publish such a libel upon the common sense or common honesty of Mr. Villiers. But his Lordship says, that Mr. Honan's crime in the eyes of the Spanish Government was the transmission of accurate (i. e. Carlist) intelligence from Spain to England, but then how comes it that no other Newspaper correspondent has ever been sent away from Madrid? for we do not suppose it will be contended that the ability displayed in Mr. Honan's

letters made him so dangerous to the Queen's cause, that it was essential *per fas aut nefas* to get rid of him. The Tory papers of England, the Carlist papers of France, the Augsbourg Gazette, all have their correspondents in that capital; none of them, however, have been interfered with by the Government, and for the simple reason that to none of them have attached the same suspicions as to Mr. Honan.

We now close this long and tedious story, which much against our inclination we have been forced into by Lord Carnarvon. We do not think, however, that upon perusing it "every Englishman" will consider with Lord Carnarvon that he "has a right to feel deeply aggrieved by the conduct of the Spanish Government," or that "our Minister was not treated with the respect due to the representative of the Majesty of Great Britain." Whether to have taken the advice given by the British Minister would have been less "prejudicial to the character" of Mr. Honan, than the course which that gentleman has since adopted, by foully abusing Mr. Villiers in the Morning Post, is for the public to decide.

Lord Carnarvon (p. 316), with reference to a statement in our pamphlet respecting Mr. Mendizabal and the Juntas of 1835, says, that when that Minister was "forced upon the Queen by the Juntas, in opposition to the Minister (Count Toreno) by whose influence he was first promoted, he came

forward in a new character, counteracting in many important respects the policy of his late patron, and entering on a far more revolutionary course; for he legalized the insurrection of the Juntas, by compelling the Queen to rescind the Decree, which under Toreno's influence, and at his urgent advice she had issued a few days before, and which denounced the Juntas 'as rebellious and self-constituted men.'"

We are no panegyrists of Mr. Mendizabal; our object was merely to state facts as they occurred, and to point out the errors into which Lord Carnarvon had fallen. We stated that Mr. Mendizabal was appointed Minister without the slightest interference, direct or indirect, on the part of the British Government, and that he had nothing to do with the rebellious Juntas which were established while he was on his journey to Madrid. When he arrived he found that Count Toreno had published a decree against them, which would have been wise and proper if there had been the force to carry it into effect, but which was little short of madness when these self-constituted bodies had usurped the authority of the Government in every town of Spain, and when the Government had not a soldier to march against them. Count Toreno a few days afterwards was compelled to resign, and the Queen, as we said, availing herself of the prestige which Mr. Mendizabal brought with him, appointed him her Prime Minister.

But having no means at his disposal to contend with the Juntas, he was compelled, in order to put them down, to temporise with them; and as a first step, of course, to rescind the decree of Count Toreno: the consequence was, that these bodies immediately lost the support of public opinion, upon which they had relied, and the whole were in a short time dissolved. Mr. Mendizabal's was therefore not a "far more revolutionary course" than Count Toreno's; for if Count Toreno had remained in office, and had held to his edict, the Queen's authority would in a few days not have extended beyond the gates of Madrid; but that authority was universally acknowledged when he retired from the Ministry, and when his decree was rescinded.

Yet Lord Carnarvon, with marvellous self-complacency says, our facts "may be *partly* true"—(Partly, indeed! why which of them has he disproved?) and yet his "statement be correct;" and what was that statement? Why, that England had "supported the Juntas of the Provinces in which all the Jacobinism of Spain was concentrated." Now, as we do not suppose that his Lordship will venture to assert that the British Government was in communication with, or was in any way assisting the rebellious subjects of the Queen of Spain, he must mean that the English Government indirectly supported those rebels, by aiding the appointment of Mr. Mendizabal; but his Majesty's Ministers had no more to do with the appointment of Mr.

Mendizabal, than had Lord Carnarvon himself. Mr. Mendizabal had nothing to do with the establishment of the Juntas, which he found in the full exercise of their illegal power when he crossed the Spanish frontier: and as soon as he came into office, his first care, as it was his first duty, was to put them down; and he succeeded in doing so to the great satisfaction of the British Government, who, according to Lord Carnarvon, have supported "*a party that disclaimed her (the Queen's) authority, because the policy pursued by her Ministers, was not sufficiently violent.*"

We said, that we saw cause to regret the abolition of the Convents. But Lord Carnarvon has no right to infer from that, that we virtually admit (p. 329) "the iniquitous measures adopted by the Government to excuse the ruin of the Clergy." We regretted the abolition of the Convents, because, in Spain, as in every other country, we dislike to see reforms, however necessary, adopted in haste, or executed with harshness—because the Convents afforded relief to a large number of poor, for whom under the circumstances of the country, the same provision could not be made as in England, where at the Reformation, all the abbies and monasteries were swept away—because, during a state of civil war, the public revenue could not suffice for paying the stipend allotted to the monks; and lastly, because the property of the Convents was likely to be ill administered, while the attention of the Govern-

ment and the Cortes was directed to matters of more vital and pressing importance. These were ample reasons for expressing our regret, without our being supposed thereby to admit that the measures of the Government were iniquitous. Although we may not make so large an outlay in expressions of horror and disgust as Lord Carnarvon upon this subject, we probably feel as acutely as his Lordship the sufferings of the unfortunate inmates of those Convents; but we deny altogether that the Government, or the authorities of the Queen of Spain, are animated "by a spirit of hatred towards the Church"—that a strong popular feeling existed against the monks, who eat up the fruits of the land, and never were considered as part of the Church, is true; that the Government had political motives for abolishing the Convents, we also admit; for every one of them contained just so many conspirators against the Queen as it had inmates—but against the secular — the working Clergy — the Church properly so called—there is no spirit of hatred on the part of the Government, and no intentions have been manifested, nor any measures adopted, to bring about their ruin.

Far be it from us, however, to stand forth as the advocates of all the acts of the Spanish Government —the instances are abundant in which we totally condemn them; but, at the same time, we look to their position of unparalleled difficulty, and find many grounds for palliation, if not for excuse. It

should be remembered, that there is at this moment in Spain, a Sovereign who will long be a minor—a disputed succession—a civil war, and an exhausted treasury. Each of them evils, as history proves, sufficient to bring upon a nation its corresponding train of disasters; and it is the part of a generous mind, as well as the duty of any writer with pretensions to impartiality, duly to weigh these circumstances, before he attempts to blacken every error into crime, and before he condemns a Government for not mastering all the fiery elements which revolution lets loose, and for failing in the vigour which union alone can give.

Lord Carnarvon says, (p. 330) that we doubt the accuracy of his information, that Santos Ladron was executed in direct breach of a promise given to the inhabitants of Pamplona, that his life should be saved. We not only doubt, but absolutely deny it, and if his Lordship doubts our version of the facts, let him address himself to any respectable inhabitant of Pamplona, and he will find it confirmed; but what does his Lordship say in support of his own statement—that "such, he is assured, was the case, nor does he see any reason to doubt it:"—or, in other words, some one interested in propagating a story, tells Lord Carnarvon that which his Lordship has an interest in believing, and between them they persuade each other that it is a fact, that Santos Ladron "fell avowedly a victim to the basest treachery;" and that in consequence

of the unsuspecting fearlessness of his honourable mind, he was seized and executed as a traitor. But if Lord Carnarvon had inquired about the character of S. Ladron, he would have found that it was of the worst description; he might have learned that when Governor of Carthagena in 1830, his brutal conduct caused some of the most respectable famlies in the town to emigrate from their homes; that in order to find a pretence for the exercise of his tyranny, he "got up" a conspiracy which was reprobated even by the Minister Calomarde, and that during the illness of the King at La Granja, without any knowledge of the momentary change made in the order of succession, he had every thing prepared for proclaiming Don Carlos; and that again just before the death of Ferdinand, he had organized a small force, with which to raise the standard of insurrection immediately upon that event taking place. He was seized in arms against his Sovereign, and met with a rebel's death.

Lord Carnarvon denies our statement of a female and a child having been executed by the order of Zumalacarregui, and he does so upon the authority of Captain Henningsen, who was serving at that period in the Carlist armies. The execution took place in the spring of 1834, some time before Captain Henningsen joined the Carlist forces, and, therefore, his authority is null upon the subject. Lord Carnarvon says that officer denies the degrading punishment inflicted on female spies. We refer

his Lordship to the Captain's letter in the Morning Post, in which he admits it. His Lordship says, that the slaughter of the Christino prisoners in a Catalonian castle, appears to be an absolute fiction, copied from a paragraph in a newspaper of the day. This is a most unwarrantable assertion on his part. Our information was derived from a high official source at Barcelona. We never happened to see the account of it in any newspaper, and if we had, we certainly should not have been content with such more than questionable authority, (though we shall presently have to shew that Lord Carnarvon is not so scrupulous as ourselves). His Lordship is likewise pleased to affirm that what we said respecting the coercion of Don Carlos by Zumalacarregui, is "an intrepid mis-statement," and adds, that it is disbelieved by Lord Eliot.

There is not a man for whom we have greater esteem than we have for Lord Eliot—none whose honour and judgment we hold in higher estimation, and had he really been in circumstances to have formed an opinion from personal observation upon the subject, we should almost have inclined to doubt that, which we know to be true. But Lord Carnarvon's imagination runs riot with facts, and whenever he thinks he has a point in his favour, he will insist upon proving so much that he ends by proving nothing. We are very sure that Lord Eliot never authorized Lord Carnarvon to say that "he was personally and officially acquainted with Don Carlos

during the period of the supposed coercion"—that period was from the first moment that Zumalacarregui took the command of the Carlist forces, until the day he died. Lord Eliot was but a few days in the Basque Provinces, and we have no recollection of having limited our statement to the period that his Lordship's mission lasted.* Again, Lord Carnarvon says, that Lord Eliot "enjoyed peculiar opportunities of ascertaining the truth"—which we apprehend must mean that Lord Eliot was able to judge of the Carlist General's manner to his King, but if our memory does not deceive us, Don Carlos and Zumalacarregui were in different parts of the province during the whole time of Lord Eliot's residence there; and they were in consequence treated with separately by Lord Eliot, who never saw them together.

Lord Eliot will no doubt remember, that when he went to the head-quarters of Don Carlos to propose to him the exchange of prisoners, Col. Wylde went with the same object to the head-quarters of Zumalacarregui.

The Carlist General gave his formal consent to the arrangement, without the smallest reference to what might be his Royal Master's wishes or opinions upon the subject, and when Col. Wylde went after-

* It was in the middle of April when Lord Eliot went to the head-quarters of Don Carlos, and on the 4th of May, his Lordship left Pamplona on his return to Bayonne.

wards to the head-quarters of the Prince, and stated that he was the bearer of Zumalacarregui's consent to the exchange of prisoners, Don Carlos exhibited an evident feeling of jealousy of the authority of his General; and being vexed that strangers should perceive the real state of things, he replied sharply, "Zumalacarregui must obey my orders." We believe also, that subsequently, this feeling was more strongly marked in the discussions between Lord Eliot and the two Ministers, Cruz Mayor and Villamur. While upon this part of the subject, we cannot forbear adding an example of the much boasted humanity of Zumalacarregui. One of his inferior officers, Sarasa, put to death all the officers (36 in number) and non-commissioned officers taken at Guernica. Zumalacarregui's excuse to Lord Eliot and Col. Wylde, for this barbarity was, that he had only received the convention signed by General Valdes on the same day that the execution took place; but he knew that the convention had been agreed to, he had signed it himself two, if not three days previously, and he was therefore morally, if not legally, bound to act upon it without delay, and to have given orders to his officer to do so likewise.

We also, like Lord Carnarvon, will briefly allude to the case of Dona Mariana de Pineda. His His Lordship commences by observing (p. 332.), that "in times of civil disturbance men fall almost unheeded in the field or on the scaffold." Yet half

his Lordship's book is filled with praises of those men who have fallen during civil disturbance, and with denunciations of the Government of Spain, in whom alone he can discover guilt or crime. His Lordship continues, "but the violent death of a woman, and a beautiful woman too, is under any circumstances peculiarly abhorrent to every chivalrous feeling of our nature;" and how is his chivalry exhibited? by calling the case one "which was determined at the time by the calm award of the law, and should not be re-opened to be again discussed under the influence of feeling and of passion." But who, that has ever heard of this case in all its revolting circumstances can forget it, and who that has the heart of a man, even without the spirit of chivalry, can remember it but with burning indignation?

His Lordship says, that Dona Mariana de Pineda "was distinctly proved to have taken a prominent part in the formation of a treasonable plot of the most horrible kind—her guilt was fully established, and no formality of the law omitted in her case." We utterly deny it, for we are acquainted with every circumstance connected with the case. *No* treasonable plot was proved, or even attempted to be proved, and *none* of the usual formalities of the law were observed in her case.

The affair happened precisely as we stated in our pamphlet. Dona Mariana de Pineda ordered a flag to be embroidered with the words, Law, Liberty,

Equality, upon it. She subsequently forbade the work to be continued, but the police wishing to strike terror into the people, selected this unfortunate lady for their victim, and caused the flag to be conveyed to her house, where they immediately followed, and of course found it. The trial instead of being public, took place with closed doors—instead of the usual time being given to her advocate to prepare her defence, he was ordered to make it in writing in four and twenty hours—instead of the case going before the judges by whom alone it could be lawfully tried, Don Ramon Pedrosa, Alcalde del Crimen, was appointed to try it.* The Public accuser brought his charge against the prisoner in writing. We have seen a certified copy of it, and the only mention of conspiracy in it, is, the opinion that such a flag must have been intended to promote a rising of the Liberals; not an attempt was made to shew that by embroidering a flag any existing law was violated, and the judge was merely called upon to pronounce sentence of death.

The invariable practice of making known to prisoners the sentence pronounced, in order that they may be able to appeal against it, was disregarded inthe case of Dona Mariana de Pineda. She

* Don Ramon Pedrosa, from a Lieutenant in the army, was suddenly appointed to a high judicial situation on account of his sanguinary and subservient disposition. He was one of those monsters, who in times such as those, raised themselves to the highest offices of the state, upon piles of their murdered victims.

only learned it from the functionary of the law charged to carry it into execution, and this lovely woman was torn from her children, and dragged to the "garrote vil" amidst the lamentations of the whole town of Grenada, where her memory lives in the hearts of the people, and her assassins are doomed to everlasting execration.

The deed, moreover, was not done "in times of civil disturbance, when men fall unheeded on the scaffold." It took place in the year 1831, at a moment of complete tranquillity, and under a Government which, compared to that which Lord Carnarvon wishes to see established in Spain, was humane and just. Lord Carnarvon of course knew nothing about the case, and it should be a lesson to him how he gives ear to those who have an interest in deceiving him. The individual who furnished his Lordship with the information in question, made him attach the authority of his name to a statement completely devoid of truth, and by inducing him to say that our "statements recoiled upon the cause they are intended to promote," he made his Lordship ridiculous.

With respect to the execution of the Pole and six Frenchmen, Lord Carnarvon states that "they neither raised any cry for Don Carlos nor created the least disturbance." Would that such had been the case, and then these unfortunate men might yet have been living! So far, however, is this from being true, that official intelligence was received by

our Minister at Madrid, that some foreigners who had just landed from a yacht, and had raised the cry of Don Carlos in a village near Santander, had been arrested by the Queen's authorities. Mr. Villiers, knowing that at the time some young English gentlemen were cruizing in a yacht in the neighbourhood of Bilboa, felt the utmost alarm lest they should have landed and committed this great imprudence. He lost not an instant in procuring an order from the Spanish Minister to stay all proceedings against the prisoners, whoever they might be, and when his courier was on the point of starting for Santander, one arrived from the Governor of that place with an account of these unfortunate men having been executed. It appeared they were ignorant of the part of the country in which they had landed, and thought themselves already in that occupied by Don Carlos. Lord Carnarvon, however, says, that "their intention of joining Don Carlos constituted their crime, and they were regarded as already belonging to that army, which was in fact protected by the Convention; that protection was not, however, extended to them, and they were murdered." We beg our readers to mark this passage. When six Frenchmen and a Pole *not* belonging to the army protected by the Convention, and whose intention even of joining it could only rest upon their own statement, are executed, Lord Carnarvon calls their execution murder; but when his own countrymen, who *do*

belong to that army so protected, are put to death by wholesale, it is an "injudicious officer" who commits "an unfeeling act."

How imprudent it would be to judge of an author's character by his works! how dangerous it is to trust to history, without knowing the spirit in which it is written! We are aware of the brilliant qualities which adorn Lord Carnarvon; we gladly do homage to his amiable and honourable character; but to those who do not know him, but who do know recent events in Spain, his Lordship must appear a man of childish credulity, of one-sided views, of despotic tendencies, and, above all, of most un-English feeling; in short, the very reverse of all that for which his numerous friends esteem him.

We now come to that part of Lord Carnarvon's work which attacks our views respecting a confederation of Constitutional Governments, called by his Lordship, with infinite pleasantry, "The Anglo-Ministerial United-Constitutional Company of Nations;" and we must preface our remarks upon this subject by stating, that Lord Carnarvon has most unjustifiably assumed that we are advocating a system of headlong propagandism, instead of indicating a direction and a tendency which was to be followed with judgment, and with reference to circumstances as they arose. His Lordship says that, "instead of endeavouring to adapt new principles, as far as they are sound, to old forms and

interests; instead of drawing the two antagonist parties insensibly together, and enabling their better parts to meet, if possible, on amicable terms; the author of the pamphlet would ostentatiously array them against each other, to fight a battle of extinction, and to embitter the happiness of the existing generation by a struggle that must be protracted, and would probably be the most severe that modern Europe has witnessed."

Now we beg to ask from what part of our pamphlet, either in its letter or its spirit, does Lord Carnarvon draw this fanciful picture of the scheme which he attributes to us?—a scheme the most opposed to our principles and opinions; one that would be the most injurious to England—and we beg to say that, in treating of any question of foreign policy, English interests are our first and guiding consideration;—a state of things that none but a madman would desire to see realized, and which, we are convinced, the policy pursued by England towards Spain, is the best calculated to prevent.

We said that we were far from advocating the cause of revolution anywhere; that it was in general a disastrous means towards a most doubtful end: nor did we consider that England, whatever might be her wishes or her interests, had a right, or that it was her policy to meddle, unasked, in the internal affairs of other countries, and we hope it is unnecessary to say more upon the "battle

of extinction," the "tremendous collision," and the "exterminating contest," which we are supposed to be desirous of seeing realized.

Subsequently, when replying to Lord Carnarvon upon the policy of Her Majesty's Government in recognizing the Queen of Spain, we said that she would have to reckon for support upon the liberal party; that some form of popular representation would be adopted, and that by degrees a confederation of Constitutional Governments in the West would be formed to make head against the despotic confederation of the North and East of Europe, and that a common interest would bind together England, Belgium, France, Spain, and Portugal. But does this imply collision and extermination? Does it mean that our Government is to excite the passions and array the opinions of one half the world against the other half? or would it not rather, by any impartial mind, be interpreted to mean, that accession and exhibition of force, which is the best calculated to prevent the "battle of extinction," which Lord Carnarvon cannot wish more than ourselves to see indefinitely postponed?

As well might his Lordship have argued that the House of Commons, when last year it voted an addition of 5000 men to our naval forces, refused to "adapt new principles, as far as they are sound, to old forms and interests." There was hardly a man who voted in favour of that measure, who had not at the moment Russia present to his mind: all felt

that her increasing power required to be kept in check, and all knew that the exhibition of force, and the being prepared for war, was the best mode of preserving peace. We believe, moreover, that our relations with Russia have not suffered in consequence, and that those relations have formed no exception to the rule, that respect attends the strong.

Is there, however, any novelty in the project, and can we be accused of advocating those dangers, which, with certain people, are inseparable from novelty? Is not the Holy Alliance a confederation of Governments, bound together by a common interest? Does not the mere fact, that such an alliance exists in one part of Europe, prove that the parties engaged in it have, or suppose they have, interests distinct from those of the other European nations? Lord Carnarvon finds no fault with such a confederation because its connecting link is despotism, and because the people are looked upon by it as the humble instruments of the one supreme will of their Rulers; but let a similar alliance be meditated between Governments under which popular rights have a real existence, and between nations among whom popular representation gives a guarantee that life and property will be protected, and industry set free,—then, and not till then, does his Lordship consider such a project "visionary and dangerous," "injurious to the best interests of England and of the world," and that "a principle,

entirely novel in its character, would regulate the future alliances of Great Britain." "The bond of union now proposed," says his Lordship, "is not to be formed as heretofore, on national interests of a practical and intelligible character, but on a similarity of opinion on abstract points, on vague sympathies arising from the common adoption of some speculative principles of Government."

In the first place, the common adoption by five nations of such "speculative principles" of Government as obtain in England, is not ill calculated to advance the prosperity and promote the union of those nations; and we see no reason why a "similarity of opinions upon abstract points" should not exist between them as well as between the members of the Holy Alliance. But his Lordship says, that "all those varied considerations that led the statesmen of this country, in other times, to look with an eye of peculiar favour on particular states as the natural allies of England, would then be totally disregarded." Does he suppose, however, that those varied considerations are not also constantly varying, and does he not perceive that British statesmen of the present day, must, like those of former times, shape their course according to the state of Europe at the time in which they are acting; and if those Powers, which in former periods, were our friends and allies, now pursue a system of policy inconsistent with the views and interests of England, England must look for new

alliances more suited to her own system, and may find those alliances in quarters in which, in past times, she encountered only jealousy or hostility. But surely that is a happy change: and while on the one hand it would be childish imbecility to sacrifice the interests of the country to please certain foreign Powers, merely because, some twenty or thirty years ago, and under different circumstances, England and those Powers were acting together; so, on the other hand, it would be as ungenerous as it would be foolish, to allow the recollections of former differences, to cast even the most transient shade over alliances which have arisen out of a community of interests, which are founded in mutual good faith, and of which the object is the preservation of peace, and the maintenance of the independence of nations.

In order to convince himself of this necessity, let any one consider the numerous phases through which our relations with every great Power of Europe have passed during the last thirty years. Take Russia, for instance, at the peace of Tilsit, in 1812, at the Congresses of Vienna and Verona, and such as she now is, with all her real or supposed views of aggrandisement. Compare her Naval force in 1814 and in 1837. Take France in 1814;—in 1823, when she restored absolutism in Spain; when yearning after the Holy Alliance under Charles the Tenth; and lastly, when making her revolution of July, of which the inevitable con-

sequence was, an intimate alliance with England. No man doubts the secret, but not, on that account, less heartfelt enmity, which the Northern Powers bear us for our greatness, for our power, and, above all, for our institutions. No man can be ignorant that they deny the right of Louis Philippe to his crown, and never will forgive or be reconciled to what they hold to be the work of the people. They expected that parliamentary reform, and the revolution of July, would be the ruin of England and France; they have been disappointed: but they are not disheartened, and are taking their measures accordingly. Neither do we blame them. Be their reasons personal or political, be they influenced by love of despotism, or by notions of philanthropy, they have in their hands power, of which no man willingly deprives himself, and it is natural they should hate systems and principles that would be subversive of that power. But does not a corresponding policy become necessary for British statesmen? Are they not to seek out new allies when our old ones have seceded from us? Shall we not endeavour to establish new relations when former ones have been changed by the action of time, and the ever-varying course of human affairs? Lord Carnarvon, "looking at the map, and judging from the history of Europe," and thinking that, because he did the same things, he was therefore acting upon the same principles as statesmen of other times, would soon find himself left

behind by events, and he alone standing still; while the political world was moving rapidly around him.

It by no means follows, however, that because England unites herself more closely with countries whose institutions are similar to her own, she should quarrel with or offend others, that are differently situated; or place Austria, as Lord Carnarvon is pleased to imagine, "as a despotic power, under the ban of the constitutional coalition." We should recommend her to do this, just as much as, but no more than, she herself has been placed, as a constitutional power, under the ban of the despotic coalition. Nations, like individuals, may pursue different objects, and may have opposite interests in view; but actual collisions and war are not the necessary consequences of such a state of things.

We are sneered at by Lord Carnarvon (p. 339) for dwelling upon the advantages which Great Britain would derive from a close connexion with Spain, and we are asked whether "unambitious France would resign in favour of this country the influence she has wielded over Spanish councils for so many generations." We answer, that neither commercially nor politically have England and France conflicting interests in Spain, and France would therefore have no ground to look with "suspicion on such an accession of British influence." England asks for no exclusive advantages

in Spain, and Spain could give none to her which she is not at the same time bound to confer upon France. Supposing, therefore, that a treaty of commerce were concluded with us, and that the cottons and iron of England were taken by Spain in return for the wines and fruits and corn of that country; would Spain not benefit by such an exchange? would she not become more civilized and richer, and a better customer for the silks and other productions of France? Where then would be the clashing of commercial interests in the Spanish, more than in any other markets of the world, which would compel France to withdraw from a combination of states of which England formed a part? On the contrary, it would tend to the mutual advantage of all the parties concerned, and to cement, rather than weaken, the alliance.

With respect to political advantages, we said, that "in the event of a war we should have in Spain an ally, whose friendly ports and geographical position, might be to us of inestimable value." Does Lord Carnarvon deny this? Will he say, that in the event of a war with Russia, for instance, it would not be more advantageous to us to find in Spain a Government that sympathises with our own, rather than one which would be closely connected with, if not entirely subservient to the enemy we were engaged with? And would this be a state of things to excite the fears or the jealousy of "unambitious France?" Would Louis Philippe be

an indifferent spectator of our contest with a power, which if its means were equal to its will, would humble his throne to the dust? Must not he necessarily wish to see us successful, and would he grudge us any means that could contribute to our success? We believe not, and which is of more importance, we are quite sure the French nation would not, whatever may have been the bygone "rivalry of six hundred years," to which Lord Carnarvon makes such an illiberal appeal. We admit, that "the mere signing of a treaty," would not be sufficient for the purpose, but we know that new interests will obliterate ancient rivalship. We see the proof of it in the daily increasing feelings of good will which are growing up between the people of England and France; and we are confident that the false principles and hateful policy of those who argue that nature made those two great nations to be enemies, will be utterly and for ever confounded.

But then it is argued, that France would not resign her supreme influence over the Spanish councils. Now influence is a vague term, and its application to present times not very intelligible. Nothing can deprive France of the legitimate influence which common interests, her own great power, and her geographical position must give her in Spain, and circumstances must always render that influence greater than the influence of England; nor would England have any motive for attempting to dispute this influence with France. As to the

undue influence which France, under Louis XIV. attempted to exercise over Spain, it has long ceased to exist, and never can be revived.

The spirit of the age has discarded the fraudulent diplomacy of the olden time—the days of political trick and exclusive advantage are gone by. Nations have now discovered that honesty is the best policy; and if there still be any governments who yet cling to ancient maxims, and who yet love to burrow in the secret mazes of under-ground diplomacy, their workings cannot long remain hidden from the vigilant eyes by which they are watched; and their toils and stratagems generally end in covering them with ridicule and discredit.

Lord Carnarvon, however, looks with complacency upon the "sagacious Sovereign" of France refusing to concur in the views of the British Government with respect to Spain, and we cannot help here observing upon the Tory approbation which is reserved for the King of the French, then only, when he is supposed to be in opposition to the views of the Government of England. Mr. Walton, who has not the gift of speaking civilly in his "able Pamphlet," states, that Louis Philippe "dethroned his kinsman," while others of that party more discreet, though not differing in opinion, but entirely forgetful of the prompt and manly decision with which the Duke of Wellington recognised the choice of the French nation, jeer at the alliance, and seek by every means to weaken or destroy our

connexion with, what they denounce as illegitimacy. Louis Philippe may, it is true, not have agreed to a proposal of the English Government to take a more active share in the Spanish contest; but does it thence follow, that his views on the Spanish question differ from those of the English Government? His instant recognition of the Queen of Spain, and his promise of armed assistance, if necessary—his participation in the Quadruple Treaty—his sending to Spain an auxiliary legion composed of men actually in the service of France—his appointment of a new Ambassador immediately after the death of M. de Rayneval, and the revolution at La Granja in 1836—his blockading the frontier, and his sincere wishes for the success of the Queen's cause, expressed in his speech from the throne, were we conclude all voluntary acts of the French King—all tending to the same object, which the British Government was aiming at; and if subsequently, the economical spirit of the Chambers—the impossibility of sparing a sufficient number of troops, or the fear of incurring the resentment of the Northern Powers (a resentment which to France may not be a matter of as such entire indifference as it is to England), prevented his adopting a particular course with respect to Spain, however much we may disagree with the policy, we entirely deny that it is a proof of Louis Philippe's differing from the views of England, and of his being no longer desirous to see the cause of the Queen and the Constitutional Go-

vernment triumph in Spain. Were this otherwise, it would afford but a small proof of that monarch's sagacity, for if Don Carlos were seated upon the throne, then, indeed, would French influence be extinguished in Spain: then, indeed, would it be succeeded by the paramount influence of those very Powers who bear the deadliest hate to the present dynasty of France. Those Powers know this well, and leave no means untried to bring that change about; they know that the alliance of England and France is all-powerful in Europe, and that this alliance would receive an immense accession of strength by the exclusion of despotism from the Peninsula—their policy upon this subject plainly indicates the source of their fears, and the nature of the interests they seek to promote—those interests are fundamentally hostile to England and France, whose institutions and independence those Powers consider incompatible with the maintenance of their own system, and which, therefore, they long to crush. The policy we should adopt is pointed out by that which those Powers pursue.

With respect to the alliance of Western Europe being at the mercy of Russia, who could dissolve it by consenting to the annexation of Belgium to France, "on the understanding that Russian ambition should indemnify itself on the side of Turkey (p. 341)," it can hardly be worth while to meet such a notion by a serious refutation, nor can we think that Lord Carnarvon is in earnest when he

gives out that such an arrangement depends only upon the mutual consent of France and Russia. When all Germany and England shall be blotted out of the map of Europe, then, and then only, will an alliance between France and Russia possess the power with which Lord Carnarvon in his sagacity has invested it.

Lord Carnarvon misrepresents us when he says that we asserted, that by the proposed confederacy "great and almost exclusive advantages" would be secured to this country. We stated that we should acquire political and commercial advantages, which we have now shewn could in no way excite the jealousy of France, or be hurtful to her interests; and which, therefore, could be no reason for her secession from the alliance which his Lordship insists upon as inevitable. He draws an unwarrantable deduction from our "scheme," when he says, it would create "distinctions fatal to the social happiness of Europe," for no distinctions ever occurred to us which do not already exist, and which have not yet placed, and probably never will, place "out of the pale of political amity all states and princes whose opinions on matters of civil government are not in unison with our own." These are no grounds therefore for calling the scheme "illiberal"—neither is it "impolitic," because it is merely the imitation in self-defence of a system, which for adverse interests has already been established by others.—"Exclusive" it may be to a

certain degree, but it is only after we ourselves have been excluded; as well might the Reform Club be taunted with being exclusive, and its members be reproached with not having become members of the Carlton Club. We have shewn that British Statesmen of the present day are compelled, by altered circumstances, no longer to look with the same eyes as their predecessors "on particular states as the natural allies of England"—but that the fact of a closer alliance with other countries, would be far from leading to "battles of extinction" with those whose interests were formerly identified with our own. We utterly disclaimed any thing like "the banding together of liberal against despotic Europe," or of any other thought in the confederacy, than to find in it a bond of union among Constitutional Governments similar to that already existing among absolute Monarchs, who are not as a necessary consequence guilty of propagandism—a system which in our eyes is most erroneous and impolitic, and deserving the failure by which it is usually attended. As for exciting "popular passions to the highest pitch," "arming one half of Europe against the other," and British Ministers "leading the crusade;" France and Spain "rushing into Republicanism," and our Foreign Secretary marching "hand in hand with foreign Jacobinism against every long established interest in the world," these are all phantoms of Lord Carnarvon's own creating, which we shall therefore leave to his Lordship to

attack; but before he enters upon the combat we would respectfully suggest to him to peruse a certain chapter of Cervantes, which is not inappropriate to the subject.

Lord Carnarvon, who is "no partizan," and "fights no party battles," views with undisguised aversion every opponent of despotism in Spain. It little matters to his Lordship that the whole of the aristocracy—the learned professions—the commercial and monied interests should be ranged on the side of the Queen—they are all comprehended under the ban of his apostolical anathema; and Ferdinand, Don Carlos, the Bishop of Leon, the Inquisition, the Monks, Cabrera, Messrs. Walton, Henningsen, and Honan, all in their turn, and much, no doubt, to their respective satisfaction, receive the tribute of his Lordship's approbation. He cannot, when speaking of Spanish Liberals, even confine his invectives to the past or the present, but prophecies that if the Carlist insurrection were suppressed, those Liberals would not long "refrain from re-establishing those principles, which even now in their speeches they rather postpone than renounce." The generosity and justice of this taunt are about equal to the logic upon which it is founded. He asks by whom was the revolution of La Granja effected, and in answer to himself, says, by the faction of Mr. Mendizabal. But is his Lordship ignorant of the origin and the acts, of the Ministry in power at the time of that revolution?

Is he not aware that M. Isturitz, its chief, was a man noted through his whole life for ultra-revolutionary principles—who a few months before was compelled to conceal himself from the police, after the failure of a revolution which he had endeavoured to bring about in the capital? He and his colleagues, taken from a small minority of the Cortes, were called to power by means which we shall not here detail or characterize; and during the three short months they held office, they dissolved the Chambers—put down the liberty of the Press—disarmed the National Guards, and placed the capital under martial law. Surely such acts were sufficient to drive the partizans of the Queen to desperation—but all would have been borne with patience, if military triumphs had accompanied these unconstitutional proceedings. When, however, reverses followed each other in rapid succession, and the Liberals felt that further endurance would be certain destruction, they rose as one man; and for a rallying standard proclaimed the Constitution of 1812. But so conscious were they of the defects of that code, and so averse again to run the risks of failure, that even in the excitement of successful revolution, they unanimously declared that this Constitution must be modified, and adapted to the present wants and wishes of the nation.

The Queen Regent, too, in those terrible moments at La Granja, when the executive power was in the hands of a mutinous soldiery—but when her own

extraordinary courage and presence of mind rose with the difficulties of her position, called to her assistance, without the suggestion of any one, Mr. Calatrava, and Mr. Cuadra, than whom two more honourable men do not exist in Spain, and none were more unconnected with the faction that had brought about the political change. Her Majesty knew their attachment to the Constitution of 1812; but she confided in their loyalty to protect the rights of the Crown; and knew their honesty when they publicly declared that "the Constitution must be completely reformed, and renewed in harmony with the representative systems which obtain in Europe."

They have well redeemed their pledge; and although we are far from defending certain acts which are the offspring of revolution, and which assuredly would never have been attempted in peaceful times, yet when we consider that in the first moment of triumph, no outrage was committed, and no blood spilt, save that of the unfortunate Quesada, who rushed headlong upon his own destruction—that amidst all the horrors of a civil war, and all the wretchedness that an exhausted treasury entails, the public tranquillity has, with hardly any interruption, been maintained by the National Guards—that the Cortes have calmly discussed, and satisfactorily concluded, the new Constitution, from which all the defects that disfigured the former one are effaced,—that the privileges of the Crown are secured, and popular powers are kept within due

bounds, and that this Code has now been joyfully accepted by the nation; when we consider all this, we repeat, regardless of the sneers of Lord Carnarvon, that "there is not another people in Europe who, under such trying circumstances, would have exhibited such moderation;" and we add, that none is fitter than the Spanish nation at this moment is, to receive the blessings of peace; and that the popular party in Spain, schooled by experience, is less likely than any other set of men to abuse their hard-earned liberties.

Lord Carnarvon, with reference to a British force being sent to Spain, and to the results that were to be expected from such a measure, denies (p. 352) the weariness and exhaustion which prevail in the Basque Provinces, and founds his denial upon the rout of the British Legion, and the fact, that a British force, commissioned by the Crown, was placed in such a predicament, that in spite of all which skill and courage could effect, it was compelled to cede the field; and "that the flag of England was driven back by a mountain force, which dimmed in one brief day of bitter humiliation the glory of years."

Can any thing be further removed from the fact than this assertion? Can any thing be more ungenerous, and more thoroughly un-English, than the feeling which pervades the sentence we have just quoted? Well may Lord John Russell say in his address to his constituents, that the efforts of the

so-called Conservatives, have been vainly directed to affix a mark of dishonour on their countrymen, gallantly contending in arms in a foreign land, and well does he say "vainly;" for we are convinced that the people of England are too intelligent not to detect the base artifice. Their national feelings make them rejoice at the success, and they are too generous not to sympathize with the reverses of their countrymen, without reference to the cause or the country in which they may be engaged. The people of England cannot be made to believe that, because in a particular case, one of those misfortunes so common in war has happened, therefore the glory of years has been dimmed—they will bear in mind the reverses which attended our arms upon more than one occasion in Spain, and remember that they led only to fresh triumphs. They well know that which the whole Spanish nation admits, that the heroic courage, the firmness and the discipline of four hundred marines before the lines of Hernani, adds even a fresh lustre to the renown that gilds our military fame in the Peninsula; and that the combatants on both sides were forced to declare that a few more such men would put an end to the war. Sir Robert Peel, in his speech on the Address in January last, said, "I can say, with perfect truth, that I heard with satisfaction that the King had given that aid to the Queen of Spain which he had stipulated to give her, if it should become necessary. I must also say, that if this country, in the

execution of a treaty, the original policy of which I may condemn, does afford aid, when that aid, whether of British seamen or British soldiers, is given, I never can refuse my sympathy to those gallant men, nor fail to rejoice in their success." Those are the sentiments of an Englishman—of one, who, however he may disagree with the policy of the Government, can never be indifferent to the interests of his fellow countrymen. To such sentiments the people of England will respond, and when Lord Carnarvon says that the Queen's party "dislikes the presence" of Englishmen, and would "regret their triumphs more than their disasters," they will ask him, supposing the fact of "nominal cooperation of the Spanish Government" to be true, how the Tories can complain of that, when they have both in Parliament and in the Press, represented the British Legion to be the refuse of society, a mutinous, inactive, drunken banditti—yet these men, calumniated in a manner which will reflect eternal disgrace upon their traducers, have in the midst of severe hardships nobly sustained the name of England in the field, and have met with but one reverse, and that, after three days continued and successful fighting. In order to judge of their conduct in victory, we will compare it with that of British troops upon other occasions, when those troops were commanded by experienced officers, and even under the rigid discipline which the Duke of Wellington well knew how to enforce.

God knows that in quoting these instances we are moved by no intention to dim the lustre of our arms, or to detract from the imperishable glory which the Duke of Wellington has earned for himself and for his country—but we feel that in instituting a point of comparison between Englishmen at different times, but under similar circumstances, we do an act of justice to that grossly maligned portion of our countrymen who compose the British Legion.

We quote from the able and eloquent work of Colonel Napier, who assuredly is no disparager of his countrymen, but who is too well aware of the duties of a historian to disguise the truth, and who knows that British troops have no need of having that truth concealed.

After the glorious assault of Ciudad Rodrigo in in 1813, says Colonel Napier, "The allies now plunged into the streets from all quarters, for O'Toole's attack was also successful, and at the other side of the town Pack's Portuguese meeting no resistance, had entered the place, and the reserves also came in. Then throwing off the restraints of discipline, the troops committed frightful excesses. The town was fired in three or four places—the soldiers menaced their officers, and shot each other—many were killed in the market-place—intoxication soon increased the tumult—disorder every where prevailed, and at last the fury rising to an absolute madness, a fire was wilfully lighted in

the middle of the great magazine, when the town and all in it would have been blown to atoms, but for the energetic courage of some officers and a few soldiers who still preserved their senses."

After the fall of Badajoz, Colonel Napier thus narrates the dreadful scene which ensued:—"Now commenced that wild and desperate wickedness which tarnished the lustre of the soldier's heroism. All, indeed, were not alike, for hundreds risked, and many lost, their lives in striving to stop the violence, but the madness generally prevailed, and as the worst men were leaders here, all the dreadful passions of human nature were displayed. Shameless rapacity, brutal intemperance, savage lust, cruelty and murder, shrieks and piteous lamentations, groans, shouts, imprecations, the hissing of fires bursting from the houses, the crashing of doors and windows, and the reports of muskets used in violence, resounded for two days and nights in the streets of Badajoz! On the third, when the city was sacked, when the soldiers were exhausted by their own excesses, the tumult rather subsided than was quelled. The wounded men were then looked to, the dead disposed of!"

Such, unfortunately, was the conduct of troops, veterans in comparison to those of the Legion, commanded by experienced officers, and under a system of discipline severer than that of any other army in Europe, but which was inapplicable to the Legion—they, moreover, had no Durango decrees rankling

in their minds, and no mangled corpses of their comrades had been exposed in insult to their view, just before the storming of Badajoz—but at Irun the very same "injudicious officer," alluded to by Lord Carnarvon, commanded the garrison, and how does he for himself and for his companions in arms speak to Don Carlos upon the conduct of the British Legion? He surely cannot be a suspected historian of what took place on that occasion.

The memorial addressed by the Governor of Irun to Don Carlos, after stating the dispositions taken for the defence of the place, continues—"but, notwithstanding the prodigious valour all displayed, the exterior fortifications being demolished, it was impossible to resist the impetus and valour of the English division, which, with fixed bayonets and a tremendous fire, attacked us on the 17th—the few soldiers (for the greater part were already hors de combat) having fallen back with the armed peasants upon the Consistorial house, our last point of resistance, we considered our death inevitable, as the assault was to be made by the British Legion. Resolved to perish among the ruins of the edifice, we beheld the battalions advance, the ladders prepared, and ourselves surrounded on every side. The fort, whose artillery might still have protected us, was no longer able to resist the attack, and surrendered at the moment when the English in the market-place, reinforced on every side, passed the fosse, and were about to force the outward gate. In this most cri-

tical situation some officers of the Legion advanced, and with the greatest generosity offered us quarter. Sire, an offer so unexpected surprised us for a moment, but they pledged their honour; and resistance being madness, we laid down our arms.

"It would be prolix, Sire, were we to extol, as it would be our duty, the delicacy and the regard we received from men, who, on our part, have been treated with the utmost rigour of war, and at a moment when in the fulness of our hearts we see every attention heaped upon our officers and soldiers, we should be wanting to the noblest dictates of gratitude, if we failed to make known this heroic conduct to your Majesty.

"Sire, your Majesty's troops although beaten, are not dishonoured, for it is certain, that in the whole course of the war, no fortified place has defended itself with equal valour against such superior forces, our conduct being even qualified as foolhardy by those to whom we owe our lives.

"The officers and soldiers, Sire, who are prisoners, are worthy of every consideration, and we, as their chiefs, in their name, and at their request, earnestly solicit that your Majesty will command the Generals of your Royal army to treat with all humanity the individuals of the abovementioned Legion who may fall into their hands—for justice requires it as well as the gratitude of your vassals, your Royal and never failing clemency, and the interests of your Majesty's service; near seven hundred fami-

lies of those who composed the garrison of this town and Fuenterrabia would have mourned the deaths of their fathers, brothers, relatives, and friends—they all live, and live for your Majesty, by the noble generosity of their enemies. May your Majesty listen to the voice of these unfortunate individuals, who have been snatched from the brink of the grave, and benignantly receiving our petitions, may your Majesty grant them.

Irun, 19th May, 1837.

FRANCISCO LARRODE,
Colonel, 1st Commandant.

JOSE ANTº. SOROA,
Commandant of Arms, and Commanding the Line of the Bidasoa."

This Memorial was voluntarily placed in the hands of General Evans, in order that it might be transmitted to Don Carlos, upon the garrison being marched out of Irun, and gratitude overpowering every other sentiment in the breasts of these most bitter foes (for Soroa had been the principal executioner of his master's bloody will), snatched from them a tribute to the valour and generosity of the Legion, at a time when Lord Carnarvon, and his party, strain every nerve to degrade that corps in the eyes of their fellow-countrymen, and modelling themselves upon the example of Don Carlos, surpass in cruelty his edict of Durango, for that imposes *death* alone upon foreigners, while the

Tories seek to brand their own countrymen with *dishonour*.

Lord Carnarvon is not more successful in his proof of the ingratitude of the Spanish nation towards England, than in demonstrating that the war had brutalized his own countrymen. His Lordship bids his reader to cast his eye over an Address to the Queen Regent, drawn up by the Commissioners of the National Guards in several places in the north of Spain, on a recent occasion, when British troops appear to have interfered; in which the Commissioners stated, that "they cannot behold without indignation, that English soldiers, calling themselves our Allies, should steep their bayonets in the blood of Spaniards. These cruel auxiliaries have deserved the implacable hatred vowed against them by the National Guards."

Now what will *our* readers say when we tell them that no such address was ever written at all, by any of the National Guards whatever, in any part of Spain. The persons who did draw it up were those connected, not with the National Guard in Spain, but with "Le National" newspaper in Paris; a newspaper which, in consequence of its ignorant and most foul abuse of England, and of all that is connected with English interests or policy, seems to have become classical authority for the Tories, for we have already had to notice a quotation from that journal by the "powerful" writer in the Quarterly Review. But we repeat, that the

Address was never heard of in Spain until it was received from Paris, at the same time with a Proclamation, stated by the "National" to have come from Reus, establishing a Republic and a Central Government, &c.—nothing of the kind having taken place in that town, and the Proclamation bearing the signatures of three persons wholly unknown there. Lord Carnarvon states that the Address came "from several places in the north of Spain." But he well knows, or if he again consults the National, he will find, that the forgery came from Catalonia; and as soon as it was known, not only the authorities of Barcelona, but those of Figueras, Rosas, and many other towns, addressed the British Consul in that place, in terms expressive of their gratitude to England, and of the indignation and disgust which they, and all their fellow-citizens, felt at this unworthy imposture practised by the enemies to the Queen's cause; and, on the 4th of June, the Corporation of Gerona addressed a Memorial (officially published in the Madrid Gazette of the 22d of June) upon the subject, to the Civil Governor of the Province, in which they declare that they had seen with the utmost indignation, in a Paris Journal, a supposed representation from the National Guard of Gerona, united with that of other cities.

They add, that so far from the National Guard having made use of terms disrespectful to the Government, and injurious to the English, or to the

authorities of Barcelona, *they* never addressed the Queen at all upon the subject, to which the supposed memorial alludes, and the Corporation, in the name of the National Guards, "solemnly denies the assertion of the French Journal," and "makes known to the whole world the falseness and forgery of the document." Yet, upon testimony such as this, are the people of Spain maligned, and the people of England called upon to believe stories which not only never had any real existence, but which are the very reverse of what actually took place.

Lord Carnarvon, however, says, and with truth, that the National Guard "is justly supposed to represent the opinions of the liberal mind of Spain." We take him at his word, and his Lordship will, we hope, confess that the indignation felt by that body at being supposed hostile to England, is no unfair measure of their "grateful sense of the benefits conferred upon their country by British intervention."

Equally unhappy is his Lordship in his renewed attempt to prove, with reference to commercial matters, the decline of British influence in Spain. He quotes a memorial from the principal merchants of Alicant to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, stating, that "it is notorious that British interests and British security have been for many years past totally neglected by our representative at the Court of Madrid, notwithstanding the repre-

sentations repeatedly made by the British residents in Spain,"—" all our applications to the Ambassador at Madrid have been of no avail."

We could, if we chose, state something about the manner in which the merchants of Alicant were induced to get up this Memorial, but does not the Noble Lord see that the complaints are of *many years* standing, and that the Memorial does not apply to that period (since the King's death), in which the policy of the British Government is supposed to have been so injurious to British interests. For, in the same year, Mr. Villiers received from the very same British merchants at Alicant, as well as from those of Cadiz, Malaga, Valencia, and Tarragona, letters of thanks for his exertions in their favour, and assuring him that they have, on "numerous occasions," experienced the good effects of his advocacy of the rights of British subjects. Such letters were, of course, not written until services had been rendered—none such, however, were addressed to any of Mr. Villiers' predecessors, who were probably men as able and as active in their endeavours to obtain redress for their countrymen as himself—and will not our readers, therefore, conclude that former British Ministers were not placed in circumstances as favourable for exercising influence; and will they not admit, that, when Lord Carnarvon declares that " a supercilious disregard of British claims and British interests are the inevitable results of the violent and *ex-parte* policy we

have pursued," we are justified in throwing back upon his Lordship the charge of "intrepid mis-statement" which he brought against us?

The Memorial, however, quoted by Lord Carnarvon, goes on to state, "we have the intolerable mortification to see that, especially, the Ministers of France and America, when under the necessity of having to make complaints, obtain immediate redress." Now any body who has an opportunity of reading the Madrid Gazette, may have seen, repeatedly, orders issued by the Government to their various authorities, founded upon representations of the British Minister, in favour of British subjects; and, *subsequently*, similar orders founded upon the representations of other Foreign Ministers, and we will defy both Lord Mahon, who brought the Alicant Memorial before Parliament, and Lord Carnarvon, who reproduces it, and the merchants of Alicant themselves, to state any one case, since the death of the late King (that ominous period from which British influence is said to have declined), in which the complaints of any Foreign Minister have been satisfied in preference to those of our own, and if they cannot do this, then "the redress of positive wrong," which now "is scornfully refused to Great Britain," must have been denied in some of those "many years past," to which Lord Carnarvon is not intending to allude.

His Lordship, between two paragraphs upon the commercial question, weaves in a new proof of our

loss of influence in Spain. He says, "how low it has fallen with the *Royalists*, may be inferred from the striking fact, that although the French have been fellow-labourers with us in the war against the Basques, the Durango decree, *if current accounts be correct*, has never, or *scarcely ever*, been carried into effect to the prejudice of any French prisoners." The *real* fact being, that every French soldier caught by the Carlists has been shot.

Lord Carnarvon proceeds to quote (as a set-off to the letters from the British merchants at various ports of Spain alluded to in our pamphlet) "a letter written by a respectable merchant and sagacious observer of events." The letter states that "the Constitutional party have always been jealous of English commerce, and it is a fact, that wherever the Queen's troops gain a footing, there custom-houses are established. Take, for instance, St. Sebastian and Pasages, protected, as we are told, by Englishmen, Evans and Lord John Hay, there custom-houses have been established to the great injury of British commerce; whilst, and this is an important fact, French merchandize can enter the provinces, and do so largely, by crossing the Bidassoa, free of all duty."

That there exist both ignorance and prejudice in Spain with respect to foreign commerce cannot be denied—but have we any right to wonder at it, when we remember the obloquy cast upon Mr. Huskisson for his attempts to liberalise our com-

mercial system, or have we a right to quarrel with the self-protecting opinions of Spaniards, when we reflect upon the language held in Parliament whenever a change in our corn laws is brought forward?—that the Constitutional party is more jealous than the Apostolical of English commerce is a statement at variance with the fact, as a comparison between the last three years with the ten preceding ones will demonstrate; so likewise is the statement respecting custom-houses. In the first place, none has been established at Pasages; and secondly, one has been placed at St. Sebastian, not because the Queen's troops have *gained a footing* there (it never has been in the power of the Insurgents) but because the merchants and inhabitants of St. Sebastian had for years past petitioned the Government to have one. But what can General Evans or Lord John Hay have to do with the question of custom-houses? the former, an officer in the Queen's service, and under the orders of her Government—the latter commanding her Majesty's co-operating force. We repeat, in what possible manner can these two officers be mixed up with the establishment of a custom-house? French merchandize enters the provinces, free of duty, just the same as English does at Bilboa or any other port in the provinces except St. Sebastian: but we must remind our readers that it does so only since the taking of Irun, for there Don Carlos, in violation of the privileges, had his custom-house, and levied heavy duties which, as Lord

Carnarvon states, "legally ought only to be collected at Santander and Vitoria."

But, says Lord Carnarvon, "under the present existing treaties, one article particularly stipulates that English merchants may have houses and warehouses in the Biscayan Provinces," and have they not? Can his Lordship give an instance of any Englishman having been deprived of his house or warehouse, or not having been allowed to establish them? and if he cannot shew this, what object has he in quoting this portion of the treaty? The passage continues: "and that they shall enjoy in their commerce the same privileges as natives," which, we apprehend, means that they are not to enjoy *different* privileges, and that when the natives of St. Sebastian obtain that, which is to them, the privilege of a custom-house, the English residents in that place are not to be exempt from it.

But then, says his Lordship, "the custom-houses at St. Sebastian and Pasages (where there is not one) have been erected without the usual notice, given from one friendly Power to another." And this is the summing up of our commercial grievances in Spain!—that England has had no notice of the custom-house at St. Sebastian. We really don't know whether such a notice is "usual" or not between friendly Powers, or whether Spain has been guilty of this terrible omission, though we do know that St. Sebastian is a place of so little commercial importance to us, that it has only been within the

present year that the English Government has, for the first time, established a Vice-consul there. We remember, a few years ago, that Gloucester was made a port of entry and export, but we much doubt whether Great Britain gave notice of that important fact to Spain; and we don't remember that any minister or writer in that country complained of such a "confused and destructive state of affairs."

We have entered, and, we fear, at a tedious length, upon these trifling questions; but when a man of Lord Carnarvon's character and station declares that they "indeed are damning proofs that our unjust interference in the Biscayan struggle has been not only revolting to every principle of justice and manly honour, but deeply prejudicial to the mercantile interests of Great Britain," and when, in order to give an undue weight to his statements, he assures his readers that he is no partizan, these trifles become of importance, and it is necessary to put the British public upon their guard against his Lordship's partiality or misinformation.

While we are upon this subject, we think it may not be inopportune to give an example of the spirit in which the Tories have dealt with the Spanish question, from the moment they thought it could be used for party purposes. The recognition of the Queen, the Quadruple Alliance, our naval co-operation, the war against the Basques—all had their turn. At last it was considered that our commer-

cial relations with Spain might be advantageously used, and Sir R. Peel, in his speech on the 10th of March, announced that a friend of his was about to bring forward the question, unconnected with politics. Accordingly, due notice was given by the Hon. Member for Winchester, and a day was fixed for the debate. In the mean while, however, pressing letters for information were written to Spain, and the merchants were urged to state any complaints they might have against the British Government, or the British Minister at Madrid.

We will give an extract from the reply of the merchants of Alicant, dated 15th April:—"We beg to refer to our memorial of the 16th of March, 1836, which we confirm. We are, however, most happy to be enabled to add, that in consequence of the persevering exertions of Mr. Villiers, our present representative at the Court of Madrid, we have been relieved from some of those personal grievances of which we have therein complained, viz. exemption from the present loan of 200 millions, as per Royal order of 13th January; from billets, of the 17th ditto; and from serving in the National Guard: and we are confident, from the zeal so evidently displayed in these instances by Mr. Villiers, that he will continue to afford us that same protection for which we feel ourselves so grateful; unaccustomed as we have been, for a series of years, to receive satisfaction from any of his predecessors to our numerous remonstrances.

"We shall be very happy to express publicly our thanks to the Honourable Bingham Baring, or any other Honourable Member, should their interference in favour of a commercial treaty, or other ameliorations in our present condition, be attended with equal success."

The merchants at Alicant viewed the proceeding in its proper light; and, acting with the spirit of gentlemen, sent Mr. Villiers a copy of their reply to their correspondent. At the same time, a *Carlist* Banking House of London (the object of course being to discredit the Government with reference to Spain in the eyes of the public, and thereby to forward the interests of Don Carlos) wrote to their correspondents at Malaga, Cadiz, and other places, shewing the expediency of an address being got up by the merchants, previously to a motion in the House of Commons on the affairs of Spain, representing that their contributions had been materially increased, and they had been exposed to great losses by the neglect of the mission at Madrid; throwing doubts upon the authenticity of the letter from the Cadiz merchants published in the Morning Chronicle, and urging them to find out any motive of complaint against the British Minister.

These letters were answered in a manner that ill suited the purposes of the writer, and the House of Commons heard no more of the motion upon our commercial relations with Spain. We must,

however, add, that we entirely acquit Mr. B. Baring of all participation in this most unfair, unparliamentary, and ungentlemanlike proceeding. If these pages should meet his eye, he will probably learn, for the first time, that such a course had been adopted; but in his intended motion he was to be made, like Lord Carnarvon in his book, the instrument of others, and the victim of misinformation.

We will now briefly state what English interests have gained, and what English influence has effected, during the three ominous years of its alleged decline and fall. And first and foremost we will place the fact, that by the new Constitution, the blessed principle of religious toleration has been admitted, and henceforth no obstacle exists to English subjects building chapels in Spain, or to the performance of Divine worship according to the rites of the Protestant Church.

The New Testament has been printed in Spanish at Madrid, and is now being circulated throughout Spain, by an agent of that Society, by whose untiring zeal the blessings of Christian knowledge have been spread to the remotest corners of the earth. Let Lord Carnarvon lay his hand upon his heart, and honestly declare if he thinks these triumphs would have been gained under the administration of his friend, the Bishop of Leon.

The slave-trade, under the Spanish flag, has received its death-blow. Within a few months

after the treaty of 1835 was concluded, twenty-nine slave-ships were actually condemned under its provisions, which, previously to the treaty, would have escaped; and though Lord Carnarvon talks (p. 136) of her Majesty's Ministers as "men who sympathise so liberally with their poor brethren of another clime," we are sure that, when not under the influence of party spirit, he will sincerely rejoice over the number of his fellow-creatures who have thus, by British influence, been snatched from misery and bondage. The Spanish Government has, moreover, lent itself cordially to various measures proposed by the British Government in order to render the operation of the treaty yet more complete.

British subjects in Spain have been exempted, for the first time, from several onerous contributions; from serving in the National Guard; and from that most serious grievance, the billeting of soldiers in their houses. The piratical acts of the Spanish Revenue Cruisers, so destructive to British property, and in endeavouring to obtain redress for which the British Legation, up to the year 1834, was constantly occupied, and invariably failing, have now altogether ceased. British commerce will likewise experience an immense relief by the abolition of the great exceptional duties, imposed in 1830, upon all merchandise proceeding in vessels from Gibraltar.

Little, in fact, is now wanting to place our com-

mercial interests with Spain upon the most satisfactory footing, save a treaty; and to this the Spanish Government is known to be perfectly well disposed, but in the present state of things they have not been sufficiently strong to carry the question in the Cortes, unaccompanied by some advantages greater than those which the treaty itself would have afforded; but if the treaty had been connected with the guarantee of a loan for which security would have been given upon the *surplus* revenue of Cuba (amounting to nearly a million sterling per annum), British productions to the value of two millions sterling, would annually be exported to Spain; and setting aside the political advantages, of having afforded to the Spanish Government the means of putting an end to the war, we leave it to any impartial person to decide whether this would not have been a relief of vast importance during the late commercial crisis.

Against these benefits, which, according to Lord Carnarvon, are proofs of the decline of British influence, what is there to be shewn, while that influence was, in Lord Carnarvon's opinion, in the ascendant? —Nothing.

In 1817 we concluded a Slave Treaty, it is true, but we did so because we gave £400,000 for it, and the slave trade afterwards flourished more vigorously than ever. No other advantage, however, was obtained for English interests or commerce. Exclusive privileges were bestowed upon France,

and exceptionable duties were inflicted upon England. Treaties were violated, and no redress ever obtained; yet, from the time of Ferdinand's restoration, to his death, some of the most able of British diplomatists have represented Great Britain at the Court of Madrid; and, during part of that time, our foreign affairs were conducted by the vigorous hand of Mr. Canning. If, then, all these persons failed, it must have been because circumstances prevented their possessing that influence which England is now able to exercise.

Before concluding, we think it necessary to say a few words respecting Lord Carnarvon's "remarks on the present state of Catalonia," which, quite as much as any other part of his Lordship's book, shew how dangerous it is for an author, with pretensions to trustworthiness, to sit down in his study in London, and draw on his fancy for a picture of the condition, the opinions, and the interior proceedings of a country with which he is unacquainted; and upon the eve too of events by which the character of his statements, as regards the past, and of his prophecies with respect to the future, are to be tested.

His Lordship says (p. 416.) that "it must appear somewhat singular that the Catalans, who drained their dearest veins in support of Don Carlos a few years ago, have not shewn as great a zeal on the present occasion, and indeed in some places remained almost passionless spectators of the struggle,

although that prince had actually taken the field in person," &c. "This apparent inconsistency of conduct must have forced itself on the observation of every man previously acquainted with the internal state of Spain." But the fact is, that there is no inconsistency of conduct, for the Catalans have acted exactly as every body acquainted with their character predicted they would.

Without detaining our readers by answering at length Lord Carnarvon's "solution of the difficulty," which is, that the Carlist resources were mismanaged in 1827—that the insurrection of 1827 was ill-judged—that "the Royalist party spent their oil when the sun was high—and unsheathed the sword when their state required the balsam of peace;"—we shall upon this topic, as we have upon every other, state nothing but facts; and facts, such as are accessible to all who think it worth while to enquire respecting that which they bring before the public as authentic.

Old feuds and an inextinguishable hatred exist between the inhabitants of the mountain districts in Catalonia and those who dwell upon the sea-shore—the former have always professed absolute, and the latter liberal opinions—the mountainous part of Catalonia is the most barren of all Spain; the people are poor, ignorant to the last degree, and though they are completely under the dominion of the priests, their ill-will towards their enemies on the coast contributes quite as much as the influence of

the priests to sustain their political opinions; but the same strongly marked character distinguishes both parties. The Catalan is active, vigorous, ingenious, and turbulent, but incapable of a sacrifice —he has none of that natural aptitude for organization in disciplined bodies, which distinguishes the Navarrese mountaineer; he is obstinate, and often brave, but his motives are invariably self-interested. The lowest Catalan has his own political notions, but he asserts them only, when he imagines that the assertion of them is to be attended with immediate advantage to himself.

The conduct of the Catalans since the death of Ferdinand, has been perfectly consistent with their character. Thousands have risen in the mountain districts at the summons of their chiefs, but the rallying cry of Don Carlos was not the motive that roused them to action—it was the love of pillage, and the desire to make war upon the lowlanders, who, on their side, were animated by a similar impulse. Hence the civil war in Catalonia always had its distinctive provincial character—the banners which the combatants assumed had little to do with the quarrel—both parties were contented to be left to themselves, or at least were unwilling to receive any assistance that should entail upon them a sacrifice. Two years ago, Don Carlos, relying upon the reality of the insurrection in his favour, sent a chosen body of men under Guerguè into Catalonia. The Catalans, besides detesting the

Navarrese, knew that they should have to support these auxiliaries, and they thought it more convenient to make war upon them. The Navarrese were exposed to all the hardships that troops can meet with, in a hostile country: and Guerguè, with the miserable remains of his force, was compelled to fly for safety to Navarre.

All those acquainted with Catalonia predicted that the presence of Don Carlos in that province would have not the the slightest influence upon the nominal supporters of his cause. It was foretold that it was only by leading the Catalans in their undisciplined mobs from plunder to plunder that Don Carlos could hope to keep them in good humour; but that if his occupation of the territory was to lead him to levy contributions, and to exact hard service from the people, the keen inhabitants of that greedy province would not be slow in discovering that it would better answer their purpose to destroy their visitor than to maintain him.

The prophecy has strictly come to pass, for although Lord Carnarvon may like to fancy that "the Carlist principle in Catalonia is infinitely stronger now in numbers, respectability, and in opinion than in 1827," we believe that Don Carlos is of a very different way of thinking. That *Prince errant* first marched towards that part of the country where he believed the "Carlist principle" to be the strongest. Tristany, the leading insurgent chief of the province, expressed his indignation that

his territory, where he was with difficulty able to maintain himself, should be thus invaded, and absolutely refused to give any assistance to the King he was pretending to serve; the people finding that the expedition was to live at their cost, refused on their part to furnish any articles of provision. Many villages were deserted even by the women and "Curas," upon the approach of the Carlists—and young men from the Carlist districts came to the head-quarters of the Queen's General, to ask for arms in order to repel the intruders. One chief alone, Ros de Eroles, who was hostile to Tristany, joined the Pretender; and the only service he rendered, was to form a cordon between the two armies, in order to prevent the Navarrese from deserting. Of his motive for this *service* he made no secret, openly avowing, that by impeding the dispersion of Don Carlos's forces, he was rendering their destruction more certain; and certain it would have been, if any man of common energy and activity, or even of common sense had commanded the Queen's army.

The Carlists were reduced to feed upon the unripe grapes in the vineyards, and were dying by hundreds, and deserting in every direction, when the Baron de Meer deceived by false reports, marched in the direction of Barcelona, and left the passage of the Ebro open to the Carlist expedition; Don Carlos was thus enabled to escape from starvation, and from that "old and unabated attachment to him" on the part of the Catalans, which is to

"strew with many thorns the couch of the Queen of Spain." Lord Carnarvon's imagination is too lively to permit him to be a historian—romance is the region in which alone his talents fit him to shine.

Lord Carnarvon, in his "general reflections," states that her Majesty's Ministers, in the management of Spanish affairs, "have been led into a course of almost unmitigated error;" but his Lordship, when he makes this sweeping censure, would have done well to inform his readers what course he would have adopted, if he had directed the British Government at the time of Ferdinand's death; and as his declaration of policy would now be *ex post facto*, he was advantageously placed for making an exposition of it.

The British Government had to choose between three courses—to recognise Don Carlos, to remain strictly neutral, or to recognize the Queen; we cannot imagine a fourth.

The first it is hardly worth while to waste time in discussing. To have recognized a Prince as King of a country from which he was absent, into which he did not dare set his foot, from which he was formally excluded, and in which another Sovereign had been unanimously proclaimed; to have sent our Minister from Madrid to gallop after him into Portugal, and to find him if he could, in order to deliver his credentials in the village inn, where the wandering Infant might happen to be housed, is so ludicrously absurd (setting aside the somewhat false

position in which we should have been placed with respect to Don Miguel, who, in all probability, would have assisted at the ceremony), that we cannot bestow on such a course a serious argument. The proceeding would have been so opposed to English practice and English interests, that we should have been thought insane, even by those Powers who wished well to Don Carlos, but who nevertheless did not withdraw their Ministers from the Court of Madrid till many months after the death of Ferdinand, or their Chargés d'affaires, till some time after the revolution of La Granja; and who, notwithstanding the anxious care with which they have watched an opportunity for recognizing the Pretender, have never yet been able to find one.

Her Majesty's Government accordingly, aware that in Spain there was a Sovereign *de jure* and *de facto*, did not see fit to send the British Minister to another country in order to recognize a Prince who was neither; and failing in that, they should (according to Lord Carnarvon, *passim*) have remained neutral: a "dignified neutrality" is evidently what his Lordship, after observing for four years the course of events in Spain, would have recommended. Now we beg our readers to consider what this policy would have led us to; and we have ample data for forming an opinion upon it, because various Powers have been in that wait-a-while position which Lord Carnarvon thinks would have been so desirable for England. Those Powers, upon the

King's death, declared that they should wait to see what was the decision of the Spanish nation upon the question of succession to the throne, (which declaration by the way, was somewhat derogatory to the divine right of Kings, and not altogether consistent with the harsh and unforgiving conduct of those Powers towards Louis Philippe), and that in the meanwhile they should remain neutral. We might then have done like them if we had chosen to expose "the representative of the Majesty of Great Britain" to what the Ministers of the Northern Powers were necessarily compelled to endure, owing to the "dignified neutrality" of their Sovereigns. Nondescript diplomatists, something between visitors and envoys, they remained at Madrid, exercising no functions, struggling for the official character they had laid aside, without any official right to support the claim, and viewed both by the Government and by the public as spies upon a state of things to which they were bound to wish evil; at last they, all of them, suddenly received orders to be taken violently ill, and to require a course of German waters. They accordingly took leave, departed for Ems and Carlsbad, and left behind them some individuals charged with the correspondence of their missions.

The Spanish Government was well aware of the nature of that correspondence, and these Dii Minores were held in slender estimation; but as they reported the Queen's cause to be in the utmost jeo-

pardy, and that of Don Carlos upon the eve of triumphing, they also were instructed by their Governments to decamp, and to quarter themselves at Pau and Bayonne; and in furtherance of the "dignified neutrality," still professed by their Sovereigns, steadily to keep up a secret correspondence with the Court and Agents of Don Carlos, and to be ready to join him the moment he entered Bilboa. The French Government, however, considering that this was "*too bad*," desired that they should *move on*.

Such is the ignominious plight to which Lord Carnarvon's policy would have reduced England, and her diplomatic representative in Spain; this is Lord Carnarvon's solicitous care for British interests and British commerce—his sensitive anxiety for British influence, and for the respect in which the name of Englishman should be held in the Peninsula. We defy him to get out of the dilemma. If we had followed the course he recommends, we must either have left our mission at Madrid, or have withdrawn it; and in either case the results would have been the same. The British Minister could only communicate with the Government *de facto*, which was that of the Queen: and what influence could he hope to exercise in behalf of his countrymen and their interests, with a Government not recognised by England, and with which he could only treat unofficially and by toleration; and if he had been withdrawn, what respect would the British Consuls have commanded from the local

authorities of places all acknowledging and obeying the Queen?

The persons and properties of Englishmen would have been unprotected—their commerce grievously injured, and the complaints which it is now so hard to "get up," would have provided the Tories with abundant means for attacking the policy of his Majesty's Ministers for their "management of Spanish affairs," but the hands of the Government would have been tied. Having declared at first for a "dignified neutrality,"—neutral they must have continued to be, till the end of the war. Deprived of all political influence, and unable to support our commercial interests in Spain, the British Government would have made itself the laughing stock of Europe, and this for the mere purpose of linking itself on to the tail of the Holy Alliance upon the Spanish question only, continuing all the while a distinct policy upon every other question. Could any imaginable absurdity be greater than this? It could not have been the only one, however, into which Lord Carnarvon's policy would have led us. It must be remembered, that we did not recognise the Queen of Spain until after France had done so; and, be it remembered, without any consultation or previous communication with us; and if, in spite of this, we had adopted a "dignified neutrality," what would have been our position then? France would have been omnipotent in Spain, and England self-ejected from it! In addition to the inconveniences

we have just described, we should have had to suffer from all the exclusive advantages that would have been bestowed upon France, whose recognition would then have been of tenfold importance; then, indeed, we should, in the language of the merchants of Alicant, have had "the intolerable mortification to see that the Ministers of France and America (who, by the by, instantly recognised the Queen), when under the necessity of making complaints, obtain immediate satisfaction;" then, indeed, there would have been "no Pyrenees," and "unambitious France" would have well known how to support the Sovereign of her election, and to choose her own time for doing it, in order that her dominion over that Sovereign might be the more secure, while "England, humbled and repentant England," (p. 346) would have been left with her Northern associates in "dignified neutrality."

We presume, therefore, that the British Government, bearing in mind these considerations, having a great respect for Sovereigns whom they consider to be so *de jure*, and following the practice always observed by England, of acknowledging those who are so *de facto*, recognized the Queen of Spain. Concerning other motives and views that probably influenced them in this act, we have said so much, that it is unnecessary again to revert to them, or indeed to recapitulate our observations upon the course that has since been pursued by England. We do not deny that "the consolidation of our

alliance with France was one of the most important objects contemplated by the Quadruple Treaty:" but that consolidation was as much sought by France as by England. Nothing could have been more voluntary than the participation of France in that Treaty. The English Government have steadily adhered to the objects of that compact, and if France has pursued a course not equally direct, is the English Government to be blamed for that? Are they responsible for the influence which the Holy Alliance is able to exercise over the French Cabinet, or for the blindness of that Cabinet to the vengeance which the Northern Powers have sworn against the revolution of July, and for its weakness in allowing itself to be dictated to where it might be able to command? Lord Carnarvon, however, admits one thing that neutralises all the rest he says upon this subject. He admits that the Quadruple Treaty has not led to coldness between the French and English *people*, and so long as that is the case, a little more or a little less cordiality between the two Cabinets is of comparative unimportance. Public opinion both in England and France is far too powerful to admit of the Government of either country straying widely away from the national interest, and both nations know too well how much their power and prosperity depend upon their union, to fall into the snares which are set for them by those who would again rouse "the rivality of six hundred years."

Lord Carnarvon says, that the great political and commercial benefits secured to this country exist only in our imagination; and he talks of Spain rushing into a revolution notoriously hostile to our interests; but does his Lordship suppose that great benefits can at once be secured in the midst of confusion and civil war, or that we ever contemplated such benefit except as the effects of tranquillity in Spain, when her Government shall be strong enough to work out her regeneration, and to carry into practice the policy which it is the obvious interest of Spain to pursue? And does he think that four short years is sufficient to test the value of a system; or does he forget how insignificant such period is in the history of a nation? Let tranquillity once be restored in that distracted country, and we shall have no fears about the result of the policy we have advocated. Already Spain is so far from rushing into a revolution hostile to England, that we have shewn how infinitely more favourable the present state of things is to our interests than any former system has ever been. We have shewn, and not by vague declamation, but by incontrovertible facts, that at no time was the British nation held in higher respect by Spaniards than it is at present; and when Lord Carnarvon says that that "respect has waned under the mingled inconsistency and oppression of our conduct," he utters that, which he may possibly wish to be true, but which he is utterly incapable of proving.

When he says that the policy of England "stimulates revolution at Madrid by all the means in its power," (p. 363) we throw back upon him the foul and abominable accusation, with an indignation which nothing but self-respect controls. When he says that "with reference to her foreign policy, Great Britain is at present placed in the most humiliating position it has ever been her fate to occupy," we rejoice that she has at least escaped the degradation to which *his* policy would have reduced us; and when he says that "the friend of general humanity must rejoice" "when the arms of England meet with a reverse," it is more in sorrow than in anger that we contemplate such results from the workings of party spirit.

Lord Carnarvon, in speaking of the prospects of Europe, says (p. 365), that "in spite of inevitable changes, the tendency of events is to increase the sum of human happiness by the advance of education and progressive amelioration of the human race; and Spain, if left to work out and consolidate her own system, will form no exception to the general rule." Yet the system his Lordship has devoted himself to advocating, and which he would wish to see "worked out," is one that *must* be incomparably more horrible than that which was "consolidated" in unhappy Spain during the last ten years of Ferdinand's life; when a heavy fine and imprisonment for two years were imposed upon any one who was guilty of the heinous offence of

merely writing to those who had emigrated—and the punishment of eight years at the gallies upon him who refused to turn informer,* when informers were never to be held responsible before any tribunal, whatever might be the result of their accusations; nor were their names or their information to be made public†—when all the Universities, and all the schools of primary instruction were shut up, and a College of Bull-fighting was instituted in their stead. Such was the manner in which human happiness and education were promoted in Spain from 1823 to 1833, and it is not just to try, by our own high tribunal of civilization and morality, the errors of a nation that has been exposed to such a brutalizing system. An impartial mind would rather dwell with pleasure upon the comparative absence of persecution for opinions, and upon the little desire of revenge that have distinguished the liberal party in Spain, during the last four years, when every passion was excited, and when differences of political opinion were questions of life and death.

Lord Carnarvon is, no doubt, sincere in his desire to see the sum of human happiness increased, the blessings of education more widely diffused, and the human race progressively improved. We are sure that from his benevolent wishes he does not exclude Spain; that country where so much misery

* Royal Decree of 1st Oct. 1830. † Ibid. 10th May, 1831.

exists, where so much improvement is needed, which is in itself a history of all the evils that mis-government can bring upon a nation, and a monument of the power of man to neutralize and render valueless the choicest gifts of his Creator. There exists not in the world a country where improvement of every kind would be so rapid as in Spain. Her varied climate and her fertile soil, her geographical position, her rivers and her harbours, the extreme intelligence of her people, are all elements of greatness, and means of civilization, if turned to the account for which they were destined by nature. Let Spain enjoy but ten years of good government, and we shall see her rise like a Phœnix from her ashes, and mount up in greatness and in power until she takes the place to which she is entitled, among the first-rate nations of the earth.

Surely such a spectacle would be as delightful, as it would be imposing. What more interesting study could be desired by the philosopher and the philanthropist than to watch such a triumph of reason, to see order issue out of chaos, and to behold misery become replaced by happiness. What higher reward, than the gratification of witnessing such a change, could befall the English politician who had been instrumental in creating such an ally for his country, while at the same time he had been promoting the welfare of millions of his fellow-men?

If such a state of things could be realised, and

we firmly believe in its possibility, for we are convinced it cannot be the will of Heaven that Spain should for ever lie bound in suffering and degradation, no man, doubtless, would rejoice in so blessed a consummation more than Lord Carnarvon himself. But, if that be so, let him not devote his talents to the support of a cause, which, if successful, must indefinitely retard, if not entirely extinguish, all hope of improvement in Spain—let him not lend the authority of his good name and exalted station to men who are already, and in anticipation, gloating over the numberless victims they have marked out for destruction; whose only system of Government is terror; whose accession to power would be announced in letters of blood; and whose ascendancy would involve their ruined country in misery and in mourning, and in hopeless desolation. Surely the recent expedition of the Pretender must have undeceived Lord Carnarvon, as to the sympathies which exist among the people of Spain towards that Prince and his party. In Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia, he has presented himself in person; and every where he has been repulsed or ill received. No province, no town, no village, has declared in his favour. No fortified place has given him admission—he has unsuccessfully summoned and menaced San Pedor, Castellon de la Plana, Vinaroz, and Valencia, but neither by treason nor by force, did he get their gates opened to him. In his wandering course he met neither hospitality nor

respect; he and his troops have lived by plunder; and his name is now coupled with curses in every place through which he has marched. In Valencia, where once his party was comparatively strong, he is abhorred—he has deprived himself of every remnant of respect, by appearing in public, arm in arm, with the notorious and infamous Cabrera.

From that moment his kingly influence ceased for among the Carlists, of every degree, Cabrera is looked upon as a disgrace to human nature; and few are there in Valencia who have not fallen within his grasp, and been made to rue the power which that monster has been allowed to wield. The people thought that kindred sentiments alone could have produced such union between Don Carlos and Cabrera; and they could hope for no future protection from one who thus placed himself under the guidance of their oppressor.

Setting aside, however, the irreparable injury which the expedition of Don Carlos has done to his cause, there is but one pervading feeling in every province where the civil war still exists. Be it in Navarre (where Don Carlos' flight will never be forgiven), Aragon, Catalonia, Valencia, or La Mancha, the only wish is for repose; and for relief from the intolerable misery which this long-continued struggle entails. When Lord Carnarvon talks of leaving Spaniards "unfettered by foreign interference," and says, that "the glorious temple of freedom must be raised by their own exertions," how little does he know of what is passing in Spain,

or of the feelings and wishes of that numerous portion of the Spanish people which is more immediately exposed to the horrors of civil war—how little does he know of the proceedings of those hordes of armed banditti (who, by Lord Londonderry in a speech, and by Mr. Honan in a book, are called the regular forces of Don Carlos) who intercept the communications, ravage the country, sack and burn the villages; and who, having hoisted the standard of Don Carlos only as a cloak for robbery, fall indiscriminately upon friends and foes to his cause. Freedom from these marauders is the "glorious temple" which the masses in Spain desire to raise, but which they cannot accomplish by their own exertions—the sympathies of some of them are, doubtless, in favour of Don Carlos, but their lives and their properties are to them of incomparably greater and more immediate importance, than the political institutions which the country may eventually adopt; to the Government, therefore, which will protect them, they will gladly give their allegiance, and will bless the hand, be it Spanish or Foreign, which bestows that peace to which they have so long been strangers.

The Government of Spain, with its exhausted treasury, its incompetent generals, and unpaid and discontented army, has not strength sufficient for the purpose. Yet it is but little aid they want, and that aid is such as England could easily give, and which she would be well repaid for bestowing. The

Spanish question has been made a party question in England—the facts connected with it have been grossly disfigured—its real bearings upon England and Europe have been misrepresented; and with all the sincerity of conviction we say, that it behoves the Government and Parliament to come to an understanding upon this subject, for it is of daily increasing importance, and the longer its settlement is delayed the more it will be encompassed by difficulties and dangers. The restoration of peace in Spain would be a work over which humanity would rejoice—it would tend, more than any other event, to cement our union with France, and to secure the peace of Europe; and the people of England would hereafter reflect with pride, that in this, as in all other instances, we had been first to lead the way where human happiness could be advanced. It would be a glorious page in the history of England, which should record, that one of the earliest acts of a reign, full of future hope and of high promise, had been in conformity with the doctrines of our Redeemer, and consistent with the best interests of Great Britain.

THE END.

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
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